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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.  Background and motivation 
 
Over the last few decades a growing body of literature has set and 
developed the foundations of the positive analysis of Public Finance. The 
economic methodology has been applied to the study of political agents and 
institutions giving rise to the so-called political economy literature. This 
line of research rejects the naïve idea of a benevolent planner that designs 
socially optimal public policies (and, hence, solves market failures) as 
“there is no suggestion that improvement lies in the selection of morally 
superior agents who will use their powers in some ‘public interest’” 
Buchanan (1989: 18). The present dissertation studies the targeted 
distribution of public spending based on the assumption that public officials 
act as vote- or office-seeking individuals. Specifically, the dissertation 
examines the political determinants of government spending and the 
electoral returns to the tactical allocation of funds.  
 
The three empirical studies presented in the following chapters focus on 
Spain, considering different periods of its history and diverse political 
regimes. This setting provides me with the opportunity to explore different 
types of political tactics. In Chapter 2 the role of pork-barrel politics in the 
allocation of road spending is examined in the context of a semi-democratic 
regime. Chapter 3 revolves around the introduction of a public employment 
program and tests for the existence of clientelism (and, in particular, 
patronage). Chapter 4 estimates the returns that partisan alignment provides 
in terms of intergovernmental grants and votes for the local incumbent, in a 
context of high decentralization of public spending.  
 
These three studies have several components in common: voters are 
individuals with policy preferences; office-seeking politicians and parties 
run for election with their electoral platforms (plagued with promises that 
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are meant to be fulfilled in case of victory); when elections take place, 
voters cast their vote taking into consideration their preferences and the 
credibility of the candidates’ promises1.   
 
The remaining part of this introduction is divided into three sections. The 
first one includes a short overview of the political economy of public 
spending. I then describe the institutional setting of three different periods 
of Spain’s history (from the semi-democratic regime of the 19th century 
Restoration to the present democratic system) with the aim to show how the 
linkages between state and citizens have evolved. Lastly, I present a 
summary of the three central chapters of the dissertation, including the 
contribution of each study.  
 
 
2.  Elections and tactical politics 
 
Electoral competition models are probably the most widely used models in 
the research on political economy. These models consider that competition 
takes place between two office-motivated candidates only interested in 
winning the next election. In this context, the two main versions referred to 
are the median-voter model (Downs, 1957, Black, 1948), and the 
probabilistic voting model (Enelow and Hinich, 1982). The first of these 
models shows that, in equilibrium, the candidate that wins an election is the 
one announcing the policy preferred by the voter with median preferences. 
Such equilibrium, however, only exists under very restrictive assumptions, 
such as single-peaked preferences or voting on a single dimension. In 
contrast, the probabilistic voting model establishes a more general setting 
than the median-voter model: voting occurs on a multiple dimension; the 
intensity of policy preferences is also taken into account; and candidates are 
not identical.  
 
                                                           
1
 The credibility of politicians and parties depends to a large extent on their performance 
in the past legislature. Thus, elections act as a mechanism to control and discipline 
political agents. This setting with imperfect information can be considered an agency 
problem – following Besley’s (2006) discussion – where the party (the “agent”) is subject 
to moral hazard and/or adverse selection issues.  
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The probabilistic voting model has been commonly used to examine 
distributive policies. In the widely-cited papers of Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1987), Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Cox and McCubbins (1986), the 
theoretical setting is that of two parties competing to attract voters; the 
latter care not only about their ideology but also about the redistributive 
benefits they might receive from the elected government. According to the 
swing-voter model of Lindbeck and Weibull or Dixit and Londregan, 
parties allocate public spending disproportionally towards swing voters (i.e. 
mobile voters more prone to change their vote) because they can pose a 
credible threat in case of not being favored. On the contrary, Cox and 
McCubbins consider that the candidates’ risk aversion leads them to target 
core voters (who have a more certain return). The swing and core voter 
models belong to a subfield of political economy named pork-barrel or 
distributive politics. This sort of distribution is characterized by its tactical 
– rather than programmatic – nature and by the fact that the uneven 
allocation of funds – gathered from a common pool – is used to target a 
narrow group of beneficiaries that are usually geographically concentrated. 
To test such hypotheses, one of the main challenges consists in finding an 
appropriate measure of the share of swing and core voters in a constituency.  
 
The empirical evidence provided by the studies on pork barrel is mixed. 
Levitt and Snyder (1995) show that US federal spending was unevenly 
allocated to favor districts with large shares of Democratic voters, 
especially where the target population of the program was geographically 
concentrated and in periods of strong Democratic control. In postwar Italy, 
Golden and Picci (2008) find support for the core-voter hypothesis: 
influential deputies2 from the governing party direct greater public works 
construction to their home districts. Dahlberg and Johanson (2002) examine 
a Swedish grant program and find that intergovernmental transfers allocated 
by the incumbent central government to local governments were skewed in 
favor of municipalities with large shares of swing voters. Further, the 
                                                           
2
 To measure the political influence of deputies, several factors are considered: the 
deputy’s national rank within his party according to the number of preference votes, the 
deputy’s seniority, the deputy’s education, the gender of the deputy, whether the deputy is 
a minister or undersecretary and whether the deputy has ever been influential in the 
party’s hierarchy. 
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growth of the US federal government during the New Deal has also been 
subject to numerous studies, several of which show to which extent public 
spending in that time was to a large extent not based on programmatic 
grounds (Wallis, 1991, 1998, Wright, 1974).  
 
So far it has been emphasized that candidates are individuals with pure 
electoral objectives; however, another remarkable feature of candidates is 
their attachment to an ideology (a vast majority of them is affiliated to a 
political party), which makes them care also about the type of policies 
implemented. In contrast to the median-voter model, in a partisan model – 
in which policies are mainly driven by partisanship (e.g. Alesina and 
Rosenthal, 1995)3 policy outcomes do not need to converge. Indeed, in 
many countries across the world (such as in the US) electoral campaigns are 
strongly polarized. Candidates are willing to run for elections with very 
different platforms in order not to lose their credibility. If candidates only 
seek to attract the median voter and present a policy which is distant from 
their ideology, the likelihood of reneging afterwards is very high and this 
harms political credibility.  
 
The above-mentioned electoral competition and partisan models do not 
need to be mutually exclusive. For example, Arulampalam et al. (2009) find 
that Indian states that in the last state election are aligned with the central 
government, and swing, receive on average 16% higher transfers than 
unaligned and non-swing states. The inter-relation between different layers 
of government has recently received considerable attention by political 
economy scholars. Favoring co-partisans brings numerous benefits both to 
donor and recipient governments. On the one hand, providing resources for 
co-partisans facilitates that the policy preferences of the donor are better 
matched. On the other hand, it is more fruitful to transfer resources to 
aligned districts if the donor wants to ensure that he can claim full credit of 
the investment made. This last point, in turn, helps enhancing the donor’s 
                                                           
3
 Another model where candidates are not office-seeking but rather policy-motivated is 
the citizen-candidate model (Osborne and Slivinsky, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). This 
model sets a general-equilibrium approach where any voter can become a candidate and 
where the policy finally implemented is the one preferred by the winning candidate; 
hence, ensuring commitment and avoiding reputation issues. 
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probabilities of re-election as well as the political support for the recipient 
government, although, as Müller (2007: 268) notes, “ while government 
office is the best precondition for being able to claim credit for public 
policies, the case is more complicated in coalition than in single-party 
governments”. Some, like Baron and Ferejohn (1989), suggest that it is the 
leader of the coalition who can claim the greatest credit. The important role 
of coalitions is also considered by Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) 
when assessing the effects of partisan alignment on intergovernmental 
transfers in Spain. 
 
When politicians find strong barriers to claim credit from the policies 
adopted, they may resort to an alternative tactic known in the political 
economy literature as clientelism (a term used to refer to the direct 
exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for public goods, services and jobs4). 
This practice tends to be more prominent in young democracies and for this 
reason clientelism tends to be the subject of studies on developing 
countries5. Empirical evidence has been provided, for instance, for 
Argentina (Stokes, 2005, and Calvo and Murillo, 2004), Uruguay 
(Manacorda et al., 2009), Mexico (De la O, 2013) and Benin (Wantchekon, 
2003). The list of quantitative studies on this topic is reduced, in 
comparison to the large number of descriptive studies. This phenomenon, as 
argued by Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2002), is due to three main problems: 
the “conceptual identification” of the patron-client relationship (does the 
quid pro quo exchange of votes for goods, jobs, services, etc. really 
occur?); the “subjective interpretation” of the exchange (which motivations 
lie behind?); and the “strategic misrepresentation” of clientelism made by 
politicians (that is, their denial of such practices). In other words, the line 
                                                           
4
 Piattoni (2001: 6) considers that “all public decision-making may become a token of 
exchange” but it is worth noting that some of them are more efficient than others in 
generating and maintaining patron-client linkages. For instance, jobs are particularly 
effective because they are clearly targeted and easy to withdraw from citizens (a fact that 
makes the politician’s threat credible).  
5
 Keefer (2007) finds empirical evidence that younger democracies systematically have 
an under-provision of non-targeted goods (such as education), overprovision of targeted 
goods (like infrastructure investment), and higher levels of corruption. 
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that separates clientelism from usual politics is sometimes thin and this 
explains why identifying the former turns out to be a difficult task.  
 
 
3. Spanish institutional background: from a semi-democratic 
regime to a decentralized State 
 
The evolution of Spanish politics from the Spanish Restoration (1874-1923) 
to the present days sets an excellent framework to study the evolution of 
citizen-politician linkages: from the role of caciques (i.e. local elites at the 
service of their clientele) in the 19th century to the partisan strategies of the 
political parties operating in a 21st century decentralized State.  
 
The Spanish Restoration (1874-1923) offers to political economists and 
historians a particulary interesting case to study the peculiar functioning of 
pork-barrel politics in a semi-democratic system. Such system allowed the 
two hegemonic parties (Liberals and Conservatives) to remain in power for 
fifty years thanks to the so-called turno pacífico (peaceful turn), which 
relied on an agreement between the Liberals and Conservatives to ensure 
the peaceful alternation in power. The institutional setting was largely based 
on the capacity of influence of the rural powers, including caciques – who 
linked citizens to the central government in absence of well-structured 
political parties6. This period of time is considered as “the most stable and 
long lived of the constitutional regimes of the 19th century” (Shubert, 1992). 
Regime stability was, indeed, one of the main concerns of the governing 
parties during the first stage of the Restoration because prior to the turno 
pacífico Spain lived difficult times of social and political unrest. Over the 
years, however, Spain evolved towards a society with a larger weight of 
urban elites (unhappy with the hegemonic parties), a growing labor 
movement and an eroded monarchy – due to the 1898 loss of colonies, 
amongst other factors. Also, the universal male suffrage was introduced in 
1890, with important political consequences. In this new context, the initial 
                                                           
6
  See Varela Ortega (1977) for an accurate and in-depth analysis of political parties and 
clientelism (or caciquismo in Spanish terms) during the Spanish Restoration.   
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tactics of Liberals and Conservatives had to be shifted drastically, as it is 
shown in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
 
The crisis of the Restoration Regime by the early 20s lead to a military 
coup in 1923. This was the starting point of the Primo de Rivera 
dictatorship, which lasted until 1930. During this time interval, clientelism 
was still persistent and so was it during the Second Republic (1931-1936). 
The Second Republic took a step forward to strengthen Spain’s civil society 
and the political authority of the state. The power of the Church, the land-
owners and the military was limited through anticlerical legislation, and 
agrarian and military reforms. However, the government’s ambition to build 
a liberal democratic state fell short of expectations and caciques remained 
powerful in rural areas. The opposition to the Second Republic’s reforms 
came essentially from the oligarchic landowners and the rise of the 
anarchist movement.  
 
The time that follows the Second Republic is the Franco dictatorship. The 
initial period was characterized by a rigid autarkical system that 
impoverished a vast majority of citizens. Provided that the State apparatus 
became the supplier of food and employment, Spaniards became extremely 
dependent on public goods, which reinforced, in turn, existing clientelist 
linkages. The 1959 Plan de Estabilización (Stabilization Plan) lead to a 
period of economic growth that fostered urbanization as well as the 
progressive modernization of the country’s economy and society. After the 
death of Franco in 1975, Spain started its road to democracy. In democratic 
times, “individual” patrons (the caciques) were replaced by “collective” 
patrons (i.e. political parties) that mediate between the state and its citizens. 
Three well-known cases are the targeting of Galicia, Andalusia and 
Catalonia by the People’s Party, the Socialist Party and Convergència i 
Unió (the regionalist party), respectively. The case of Andalusia is 
especially controversial, since the socialist party has been accused of 
establishing a plan for rural employment (the so-called PER, Plan de 
Empleo Rural) which has only served to create a political stronghold 
instead of solving unemployment problems. This issue is empirically 
analyzed in Chapter 3 of the dissertation. 
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The PER was introduced by the Spanish central government in 1984 and it 
was just one of the many reforms approved during the 80s with the aim to 
modernize the country. One of the most noticeable transformations that 
Spanish institutions have experienced over the last three decades is the 
establishment of a decentralized state with the subsequent (and progressive) 
devolution of powers from the central government to lower layers of 
government – in particular, to the regional level. The decentralization 
process, however, has not had the same pace on the expenditure and 
revenue side. Nowadays regional governments are in charge of providing 
key services (education, health and social services) but they have low 
capacity to raise revenues, which make them reliant on central government 
grants (especially until the 2009 reform).  
 
Decentralization is meant to increase social welfare to the extent that lower-
level governments have better access to information on their citizens’ 
preferences, and thus, these can be better matched (Oates, 1999). Another 
positive aspect of decentralization is the potential improvement in 
accountability. On the normative side, fiscal federalism theory suggests that 
the allocation of grants has to guarantee economic efficiency and equity 
amongst the members of the federation (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). 
However, from a positive perspective, grants can also serve to donors for 
strategically targeting specific districts with the aim to extract further votes 
(Grossman, 1994). In the case of formula-based transfers, this situation is 
less likely to occur. But in the case of discretionary transfers (such as 
capital grants) there is room left for using targeted spending. This is the 
topic of research in the last study (Chapter 4) of the dissertation. 
 
 
4. Three empirical studies on the political economy of government 
spending 
 
Chapter 2: “Pork-Barrel Politics in Semi-Democracies: The Spanish 
“Parliamentary Roads,” 1880-1914” 
This chapter analyzes the effects of parliamentary representation on road 
infrastructure expenditure during the Spanish Restoration.  
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In economic terms, during the Restoration period roads were a crucial part 
of the transport network given the low expansion of the railway system at 
that time. In political terms, roads were the most important collective 
benefit that a candidate could use to gain his district’s electoral support. The 
new road projects approved between 1877 and 1911 represented more 
kilometers than the overall built by the State in the whole nineteenth 
century. This excess was due to the lack of a rational plan for a national 
road system, which facilitated, in turn, the government’s discretion over 
road construction spending. 
 
The main hypothesis is that the mix of government vote buying and local 
autonomy shaped the allocation of road resources among provinces. On the 
one hand, governments subordinated the distribution of resources to the 
regime’s global objectives (in the short run, the implementation of the 
‘turn’ system; in the long run, the search for political stability). On the other 
hand, members of Parliament competed individually to obtain resources 
from the government, to increase their reputation and strengthen their links 
to elites in their districts. To assess empirically these hypotheses a linear 
panel data model with time and province fixed-effects is applied on a data 
set of Spanish provinces over the period 1880-1914.  
 
I believe the contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it is the 
first time that 19th century electoral data referring to a semi-democratic 
system have been used to analyze the tactical allocation of public funds 
among territories. This allows to identify the importance of electoral 
dynamics within semi-democratic political systems, and to offer an example 
of the influence of government tactics on infrastructure allocation. On the 
other hand, the analysis is based in a newly built geographical database 
containing both electoral outcomes and road expenditures for the Spanish 
Restoration. 
 
Chapter 3: “Electoral Rewards to Patronage Politics: Evidence from Rural 
Unemployment Subsidies in Spain” 
This study examines the effects of a public employment program – the 
Spanish Plan for Rural Employment, PER – on the electoral support for the 
incumbent governments executing the policy. Such governments were the 
central government (who introduced the program and provided most of the 
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funding) and the local government (who executed the distribution of public 
jobs). The program has been a matter of controversy since its establishment 
in the early 80s and it has been widely cited as an example of patronage 
politics, the reason being that the allocation of PER jobs at the discretion of 
local politicians goes hand in hand with the provision of a special 
unemployment benefit (the agrarian subsidy) prone to foster a dependence 
relationship between voters and government. 
 
The policy has served to redistribute income from high to low income 
groups and it has contributed to a reduction in the flows of migration 
leaving rural municipalities in those regions (Jofre-Monseny, 2012), but it 
has not fostered economic development in the affected regions (the 
southern regions of Andalusia and Extremadura). Many suggest that a 
plausible hypothesis to explain the permanence of such unproductive 
spending is the electoral rewards that the program provides to incumbents. 
To test this hypothesis, a difference-in-differences design is applied to a 
sample of over 3,900 Spanish municipalities covering the period 1979-
1993. Also, a triple difference approach is used to account for the fact that 
rural municipalities of Andalusia and Extremadura were the most affected 
by the policy (whereas no impact is expected to be found in big cities).  
 
This paper is a contribution to the limited amount of quantitative research 
on clientelism. I believe the specific features of the PER serve to provide a 
clear identification of the exchange relation between patrons (politicians) 
and clients (citizens) and to distinguish it from politics as usual. Also, 
despite many press articles devoted to the PER, and some descriptive 
studies, up to now there was no formal attempt to provide empirical 
evidence for this matter. 
 
Chapter 4: “Partisan Targeting of Inter-Governmental Transfers & State 
Interference in Local Elections: Evidence from Spain” 
In this last study, the questions examined are whether state-level 
incumbents discriminate in the allocation of transfers in favour of local 
governments controlled by co-partisans, and whether the electoral prospects 
of local incumbents improve when they are aligned with the state 
incumbent.  
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To estimate the effects of partisan alignment between local and regional 
governments on capital transfers from the regional to the local level and on 
the votes cast for the local incumbent, this study uses data covering 3,000 
Spanish municipalities during the period 2000-07. The main 
methodological challenge of this type of analysis consists in finding robust 
causal estimates.  To deal with this issue a Regression Discontinuity Design 
(RDD) is employed with some important modifications to account for the 
fact that local councils are elected in Spain using a proportional electoral 
rule that generates many thresholds at which an additional vote brings one 
more seat to a party (therefore a party with more than 50% of the votes does 
not necessarily have more than 50% of the seats). Also, the existence of a 
proportional rule implies that, in many occasions, governments need to be 
formed by coalitions.  
 
The findings of this chapter make several important contributions to the 
existing literature. First, it explores the interactions between local and 
regional governments, while the vast majority of previous research focused 
on the relations between federal and regional governments. Second, 
although the use of a RDD methodology is not a novel approach, it is 
applied in a new way to adapt it to the peculiarities of the Spanish electoral 
system. Specifically, a “fuzzy RDD” is used where the variable that predicts 
the alignment status of a local government is modified to reflect the fact 
that seats are distributed using the d’Hondt rule. 
 
 
 
References 
Alesina, A. and H. Rosenthal. 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government 
and the Economy. Cambridge University Press. 
Arulampalam W., Dasgupta, S., Dhillon, A. and Dutta, B. 2009. “Electoral 
Goals and Center-State Transfers: a Theoretical Model and Empirical 
Evidence from India,” Journal of Development Economics 88: 103–
119. 
Baron, D. and Ferejohn, J. 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures,” American 
Political Science Review 83: 1181–1206. 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
12 
 
Besley, T. and Coate, S. 1997. “An Economic Model of Representative 
Democracy,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 85-114. 
Besley, T. 2006, Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good 
Government, Oxford University Press, USA. 
Black, D. 1948. “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making,” Journal of 
Political Economy 56: 23-34. 
Buchanan, J.M. 1989. “The Public-Choice Perspective,” in Essays on the 
Political Economy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Calvo, E. and Murillo, M.V. 2004. “Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the 
Argentine Electoral Market,” American Journal of Political Science 
48 (4): 742–757. 
Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. 1986. “Electoral Politics as a 
Redistributive Game,” Journal of Politics 48: 370–89. 
Dahlberg, M. and Johansson, E. (2002): “On the Vote Purchasing Behavior 
of Incumbent Governments,” American Political Science Review 96: 
27-47. 
De la O, A.L. 2013. “Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral 
Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico,” 
American Journal of Political Science 57 (1): 1–14. 
Dixit, A.  and Londregan, J. 1996. “The Determinants of Success of Special 
Interests in Redistributive Politics,” Journal of Politics 58 (4), 1132–
55. 
Downs, A. 1957. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a 
Democracy,” Journal of Political Economy  65 (2): 135-150. 
Enelow, J. and Hinich, M. 1982. “Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and 
Electoral Competition,” Journal of Politics 44:115-130. 
Golden, M. and Picci, L. 2008 “Pork-Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–
94,” American Journal of Political Science, 52 (2): 268–289. 
Grossman, P. 1994. “A Political Theory of Intergovernmental Grants,” 
Public Choice, 78: 295–303. 
Jofre-Monseny, J. 2012. “The Effects of Unemployment Benefits on 
Migration in Lagging Regions,” Retrieved from 
http://www.idep.eco.usi.ch/paper-jofre-195372.pdf . 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
13 
 
Keefer, P. 2007. “Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young 
Democracies,” American Journal of Political Science, 51 (4): 804–
821. 
Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S.I. 2007. “A Research Agenda”, in Herbert 
Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.), Patrons, Clients and 
Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political 
Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Levitt, S.D. and Snyder, J.M. 1995. “Political Parties and the Distribution 
of Federal Outlays,” American Journal of Political Science 39 (4): 
958-80. 
Lindbeck, A., Weibull, J. 1987. “Balanced Budget Redistribution and The 
Outcome of Political Competition,” Public Choice 52: 273–97. 
Manacorda, M., Miguel, E. and Vigorito, A. 2010. “Government Transfers 
and Political Support,” National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Working Paper No. 14702. 
Müller, W.C. 2007. “Political Institutions and Linkage Strategies,” in 
Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.), Patrons, Clients and 
Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political 
Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Musgrave, R. 1959. The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public 
Economics. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Oates, W. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt-Brace-
Jovanovich. 
Oates, W. 1999. “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,” Journal of Economic 
Literature 37 (3): 1120-49. 
Osborne, M. J. and Slivinsky, A. 1996. “A Model of Political Competition 
with Citizen-Candidates,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 65-
96. 
Piattoni, S. 2001. “Clientelism in Historical and Political Perspective”, in 
Simona Piattoni (ed.), Clientelism, Interests and Democratic 
Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Shubert. A. 1992. A social History of Modern Spain. Routledge. 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
14 
 
Solé-Ollé, A. and Sorribas-Navarro, P. 2008. “The Effects of Partisan 
Alignment on the Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers. 
Differences-in-Differences Estimates for Spain,” Journal of Public 
Economics 92: 2302–2319. 
Stokes, S. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine 
Politics with evidence from Argentina,” American Political Science 
Review, 99 (3): 315-325. 
Varela Ortega, J. 1977. Los amigos políticos: partidos, elecciones y 
caciquismo en la Restauración: 1875-1900. Alianza. 
Wallis, J.J. 1991. ‘‘The Political Economy of New Deal Fiscal 
Federalism,’’ Economic Inquiry 29: 510–524. 
Wallis, J.J.  1998. “The Political Economy of New Deal Spending 
Revisited, Again: with and without Nevada,” Explorations in 
Economic History, 35 (2): 140–170. 
Wantcheckon, L. 2003. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a 
Field Experiment in Benin”, World Politics 55: 399-422. 
Wright, G. 1974. ‘‘The Political Economy of New Deal Spending,’’ Review 
of Economics and Statistics 59: 30–38. 
          Chapter 2. Pork-Barrel Politics in Semi-Democracies 
15 
 
 
Chapter 2  
Pork-Barrel Politics in Semi-Democracies: The Spanish 
“Parliamentary Roads” (1880-1914) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 1874, after six years of political instability and civil strife, Spain returned 
to a parliamentary monarchy headed by the Bourbon dynasty. During the 
Restoration two political parties (conservatives and liberals) shared power 
peacefully. They formed a duopoly and alternated in power. At each turn 
the incumbent party ceded power to an interim government by the other 
party, who organized the election. The incoming government first planed a 
preliminary distribution of the chamber seats, which always involved its 
victory. Then, the appointed candidates had to negotiate the electoral results 
with local elites in their districts. At the local level, the national agreement 
was implemented through extensive vote buying, coercion and mass fraud, 
and by promising individual favors and indivisible benefits to the electorate. 
Over time, however, the Restoration regime unraveled in the face of 
increasing competition from third parties. It progressively weakened until it 
broke down and was replaced by Primo de Rivera’s military dictatorship in 
1923. 
 
During the Restoration period, roads were one of the most important 
collective benefits that a candidate could use to gain his district’s support. 
Given the low density of the Spanish railway network and the lack of 
waterways, roads were an essential component of the country’s transport 
system, and the only way to connect a large share of the national territory 
with the domestic and international markets. The national government was 
indeed the main source of funds for building and improving roads, and local 
elites used their parliamentary representatives to lobby the government for 
more roads in their territories. In fact, and partially due to the importance of 
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pork-barrel in road expenditure distribution, the Spanish road network 
structure seems to have been badly laid out.1 This might help to explain 
why, despite their indispensability, investment in the Spanish large 
transport networks during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
does not appear to have had a positive effect on the country’s economic 
growth (Herranz-Loncán, 2007a). 
 
The absence of constraints on investment decisions encouraged pork barrel 
in road construction. Before 1914 the Parliament decided on each individual 
road project instead of any national road system. And it approved such 
projects at a frenetic pace, authorizing more than 1,000 new road projects 
between 1877 and 1911. These represented more than 40,000 km: more 
than all the roads built by the State in the whole nineteenth century.2 Not 
surprisingly, in 1912, construction had not even begun on 43 per cent of 
approved roads.3 Thus, the very abundance of approved projects gave the 
executive considerable leeway, because the ministry had to decide what 
roads would be built. The executive could and often did allocate 
expenditure for political purposes, like satisfying individual deputies’ 
demands and private interests. As a result, while it was easy for a member 
of the Parliament (MP) to have a given road project approved by 
Parliament, it was considerably harder to get the Public Works 
                                                           
1
 Actually, this was often recognized by the Spanish governments. For instance, the Royal 
Decree of 17 September 1886 clearly stated that some of the recently built roads were 
completely redundant: “There might be cases of two, three and sometimes four roads all 
abundantly servicing the same public interests, and others that run through desert areas, 
and at such a high cost that it should have been enough to defer its construction through 
more fertile and populated terrains”. 
2
 The 1877 Road Plan favored, with its ambiguity, the further inclusion in it of a large 
number of additional roads, and it was only repealed in 1911. The process of 
Parliamentary approval of new roads reached its zenith in the parliamentary year of 1895-
1896, when 313 new projects were passed. Many of those roads, known at the time as 
“parliamentary roads”, would not be built during the period. For a more detailed 
discussion on “parliamentary roads” see, for instance, Cuéllar Villar (2003) or Alzola y 
Minondo (1879). 
3
 This surplus of approved but not yet built road projects could be found through the 
whole period under study and in all provinces, although it varied substantially among 
them, ranging from 19 to 65 percent of the total approved roads in each province in 1912. 
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Administration to pay for the work. Thus, influence both within the 
legislature and with the administration mattered. 
 
This chapter analyzes what roads the executive agreed to fund. In other 
words, the topic of interest is the influence of pork-barrel politics on the 
actual distribution of road construction expenses among the Spanish 
territories. This is the first and most important step in studying the extent of 
road expenditure misallocation for political reasons in Restoration Spain. In 
this way, this study contributes to explaining why, contrary to expectations, 
the growth impact of transport infrastructure investment was very low in 
Spain during the period.  
 
Our analysis, however, has to surmount the fact that the Spanish 
Restoration does not fit well with most of the pork-barrel literature, which 
was developed for democracies with competitive elections. In such cases, 
the usual partisan models indicate that an incumbent government may target 
two groups of districts: either governments channel public funds to the 
more closely disputed political jurisdictions (that is, they target “swing” 
voters);4 or they do so to their “safe” seats (i.e. to their “core” voters).5 
These models, however, fail to describe a regime like Restoration Spain, 
where the two main parties of the regime (usually called the “dynastic” 
parties) had agreed to alternate in power. Therefore, the party in power 
could not use the distribution of public funds to attract swing voters in the 
next election, since it had acceded to hand over power to the other dynastic 
party. In other words, the role of pork barrel is difficult to understand under 
a system in which the party in power, who decides on the allocation of 
spending, has agreed to be defeated in the next election. 
 
Nevertheless, this peculiarity of the Spanish political system did not 
eliminate the incentives for governments to use pork-barrel policies. On the 
one hand, despite electoral results being centrally planned, Madrid’s limited 
capacity to intervene in society implied that elections outcomes had to be 
negotiated with the local elites, who demanded compensations (such as 
                                                           
4
 See Lindbeck and Weibull (1987); or Dixit and Londregan (1996). 
5
 See, for instance, Cox and McCubbins (1986). 
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public funds) for their districts’ electoral support. On the other hand, the 
two-party system may be seen as a duopoly regime, in which opposition 
districts were actually those which did not respect the alternation system, 
and voted for either the dynastic party that was going to lose the election or 
for a third political force. Restoration Spain provides therefore an 
interesting case of a political system in which a dominating duopoly used 
pork-barrel strategies to persuade the electorate to change the sign of their 
votes in every electoral call. 
 
In this setting, two kinds of political economy models may be relevant to 
analyze pork-barrel in Restoration Spain. One can see the Spanish 
Restoration as a semi-democratic regime ruled by a duopoly that furthered 
its political goals by using the geographical allocation of public resources. 
More specifically, governments showered resources on those districts that 
were loyal to the alternation system, and starved the rebellious ones. This 
would be similar to a typical semi-democratic system,6 although one in 
which the hegemonic political force was not a single party but a duopoly. 
On the other hand, given the importance of local elites, non-partisan 
motivations may also offer a partial description of the political process. In 
non-partisan models, the distribution of public funds reflects the influence 
and ability of individual MPs, who compete for administrative resources to 
reinforce their links with their electorates. Indeed, bringing home the pork 
increases MPs’ reputation with local elites (Levitt and Snyder, 1995; Levitt 
and Poterba, 1999; Milligan and Smart, 2005). 
 
In this regard, our results confirm that the allocation of public funds for 
roads among provinces in Restoration Spain was affected both by the 
regime’s global strategy and aims, and by individual MPs’ relative 
influence. Regarding the former, the outcomes show that, in the early years 
of the Restoration, those provinces whose districts did not accept the two-
party alternation system and, specially, those where more districts elected 
third-party candidates, received relatively less road expenditures. This 
pattern reflects the regime’s search for stability: it tried to provide 
incentives for local elites to comply with the system. Yet individual MPS 
                                                           
6
 See, for instance, Diaz-Cayeros et al.(2006) or Hsieh et al. (2009) 
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also mattered because a province received more resources when more of its 
MPs had leadership positions and when more of its MPs held secure seats. 
 
Over time, however, the ability or willingness of the party in power to 
punish deviation seems to have declined. Starting in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, provinces that elected candidates from third parties 
began to receive an increasing share of resources. The timing coincides 
with the weakening of the Restoration and the gradual modernization of the 
country. Development, in particular, undermined the political consensus 
that had underpinned the peaceful alternation system. The change in 
political strategy is consistent with the predictions of models in which weak 
semi-democratic or non-democratic regimes tend to give concessions to the 
opposition (Ellman and Wantchekon, 2000, Robinson and Torvik, 2009; 
Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006). In the case of the Spanish Restoration, this 
meant choosing a policy of appeasement of those districts that did not 
support the rotation of parties in power. 
 
Our analysis is the first to use 19th century electoral data coming from a 
semi-democratic country to investigate the effect of political factors on the 
allocation of public funds among territories.7 To do so a new geographical 
database on both electoral outcomes and road expenditures for the Spanish 
Restoration is built. In the next sections those data is used to analyze the 
influence of both MPs’ individual characteristics and the regime’s global 
strategy on the actual geographical distribution of road expenditure.  
 
 
  
                                                           
7
 Other historical analyses on this topic, although focusing on 20th century US data, are, 
for instance, Wright (1974), Wallis (1998) or Wallis and Weingast (2005). 
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2. The political system of the Spanish Restoration 
 
In 1874, the Bourbon dynasty returned to the Spanish throne, after a six-
year period in which the country was convulsed by violent political conflict. 
From the start, political leaders who supported the return of the monarchy 
sought to create institutional stability by building consensus among a large 
proportion of the liberal elite. This represented a crucial change in relation 
to Isabel II’s reign (1833-1868), when power was monopolized by certain 
factions, and a growing share of liberals decided that violence and military 
uprisings were the only available means to gain power. Indeed political 
violence led to the collapse of Isabel II’s regime in 1868 and to six years of 
instability. The 1874 Restoration attempted to reform the pre-1868 
parliamentary monarchy in order to make it more stable and peaceful 
without engaging in deeper political and social reforms. From this point of 
view, the regime was a success, as it was more durable than previous 
parliamentary experiences.8 
 
In order to avoid conflict and enhance political stability, the Restoration’s 
conservative founders did not seek to reestablish their former political 
monopoly. They decided instead to collude with the moderate liberal 
opposition. This was the origin of the so-called “turno pacífico” (peaceful 
turn) system, based on a cartel agreement between the two hegemonic 
parties (conservatives and liberals) which lasted for almost half a century. 
During that period, those two dynastic parties formed a duopoly that 
alternated in government with the collaboration of the crown, who put its 
constitutional role at the service of the stability of the system. The 
arrangement was willingly accepted by a large portion of the Spanish social 
elite, who shared the objective of political stability without social or 
political reform (Cabrera and Del Rey, 2002: 20; Dardé, 2003: 292). 
Moreover the pact kept both the anti-liberal sectors of the Catholic right and 
groups of leftist republicans and revolutionaries out of the government 
(Moreno Luzón,  2007: 426; Dardé, 2003: 234).  
 
                                                           
8
 The historiography on the origins and character of the Spanish Restoration political 
system is very large; see a useful synthesis in Varela Ortega (2001). 
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In practice, the turno pacífico system operated as follows:  each 
parliamentary election was preceded by the King’s appointment of a new 
Prime Minister (Presidente del Consejo), usually from the dynastic party 
that was not in the current government. Then, with a new government in 
office, the Parliament was dissolved. Elections were organized under a 
system of mostly simple majority uninominal districts (except for a few, 
mainly urban, plurinominal constituencies).9 Before the election took place, 
the new government planned its results in the so-called “encasillado”, 
which identified who was the officially sanctioned candidate for each 
district. As might be expected, the “encasillado” always involved the 
overall electoral victory of the new ministry.10 
 
However, in spite of the electoral results being planned in Madrid, the 
center did not control the voting process, due to its limited capacity to 
intervene at the local level.  Indeed, at the time, the province constituted 
“the most important level of political and social life in Spain” (Moreno 
Luzón, 2000: 435).11  Elections were actually overseen at the district level 
by the local public authorities, under the influence of the local elites 
(caciques). These local actors controlled the electoral outcomes through a 
variety of means, such as vote buying, coercion and mass fraud, but also by 
promising individual favors or indivisible benefits to the electorate. Favors 
and benefits were to be obtained from the Administration thanks to the 
influence of the elected candidate. Individual favors included exemption 
from military service, personal interventions in the judicial system, job 
offers, etc., whereas the most usual indivisible favors were roads, railways, 
dams, or public buildings (schools, markets, etc.), as well as a preferential 
                                                           
9
 Plurinominal districts were, however, gerrymandered to neutralize, as far as possible, 
the relatively more independent urban electorate (Dardé et al., 2001: 561; Dardé, 2003: 
199, 228). 
10
 Although the Spanish Parliament (Cortes) had a bicameral structure throughout the 
Restoration period, this analysis is restricted to the lower chamber (Congreso de los 
Diputados) since the members of the upper chamber (Senado) either held their position in 
their own right, or were appointed by the king or a restricted electoral college that 
included the provincial administrations (Diputaciones) and a limited number of electors 
designated by the local councils and the wealthiest taxpayers. 
11
 See also Cabrera and Del Rey (2002: 76). 
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treatment in the distribution of the tax burden among districts (Comín, 
1988: 505-07, 674; Martorell Linares, 2000: 276-81). As a result, after each 
election public funds were channeled by MPs to their districts and used by 
the caciques to maintain the loyalty of their clients (Moreno Luzón, 2000: 
426). Restoration Spain was therefore a typical semi-democratic country in 
which candidates built their credibility by exploiting pre-existing patron-
client networks (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2007).  
 
Therefore, throughout the Restoration, winning elections required 
candidates to negotiate support at the local level. They could do so as 
representatives of the two-party duopoly. Since most local elites did not 
have a clear party identification, they might be willing to adapt to the 
duopoly alternation system and give their support to a different party and 
candidate in each election, if this would grant them more resources. 
However, some individual candidates, independently from their party of 
affiliation, proved especially capable in obtaining administrative benefits in 
Madrid. In this case local elites preferred having stable links with these 
effective MPs and to ignore the turn. Those candidates would then be 
repeatedly elected by their districts, regardless of the party in power, and 
would become “candidatos propios”, who were said to “own” an electoral 
district. Actually, some of them belonged to the same regional social elites 
they represented. These candidates’ relative independence from their 
parties’ global strategy was reinforced by the lack of a centralized structure 
in the parties of the duopoly, which were, especially at the beginning of the 
period, little more than weak aggregations of cliques and personal factions 
(Dardé et al., 2001: 564-67.). As a consequence, some historians have 
described the Spanish central administration as “a political market where 
local sectors negotiated competitively” through their MPs (Moreno Luzón, 
207: 434).12 
 
To sum up, during the Restoration the government could not impose 
electoral results. Instead it had to “buy” the support of the local elites to the 
official candidates and, in districts where alternative candidates had strong 
                                                           
12
 See also Dardé et al. (2001: 602-03) and Comín (1988: 504). 
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local links, the pressure of the governments of the duopoly to impose the 
turn might be ineffective.13 This, together with the regime’s general 
objective of securing consensus, helps to explain that there was always a 
significant representation of non-governmental parties in the Parliament. To 
begin with, the dynastic party that was not in office always had a large 
number of MPs, which amounted, on average, to one quarter of the 
Congress throughout the Restoration. Moreover, the Parliament included an 
initially small but growing number of MPs belonging to some right and left-
wing minority parties. These were mainly composed by several republican 
groups, followed by various regionalists and traditionalists parties and also 
(by the end of the period) a few members of the socialist party. By the 
1890s these outsiders accounted for about 20 percent of the chamber. 
 
Despite this parliamentary diversity, the “turno pacífico” was quite 
successful in achieving institutional stability. Relative to the chronic 
political turmoil (frequent military uprisings, revolutionary attempts, and 
regime changes) of the previous decades, the Restoration system operated 
without interruptions for half a century. However, the regime faced 
increasing challenges as time went by, which hindered the long-term 
continuity of the turn system and finally provoked its complete breakdown 
and the establishment of a military dictatorship, under the auspices of the 
crown, in 1923. 
 
The crisis of the Restoration became apparent starting in the 1890s, 
although its triggers had been in place since the establishment of the 
regime. Those triggers were both external and internal to the political 
system (Comín, 1988: 494-95). From the point of view of the internal 
operation of the “turno pacífico”, local powers progressively gained 
influence to the detriment of central power, and local elites established 
therefore more stable links with those candidates (“propios”) who had 
proved efficient in obtaining benefits for their districts.  
 
Several reasons explain a strengthening of ties between candidates and local 
elites. To begin, the passage of time itself proved to the local powers that 
                                                           
13
 See, for instance, Moreno Luzón (2000: 72) or Dardé (2003: 166). 
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the cartel between the conservative and the liberal party would endure, and 
that their cooperation was not necessary to avoid a breakdown of the two 
parties’ agreement. As the cartel consolidated, the local elites’ need to 
follow the two-party alternation system was probably perceived as less 
stringent. The passage of time also reinforced the local clientelistic 
networks, in which the candidates exerted the role of intermediaries with 
the central administration. In that context, the establishment of permanent 
links between the districts and certain candidates favored the regular 
operation of these clientelistic networks (Moreno Luzón, 2007: 435; Dardé 
2001).  Finally, given the two main parties’ lack of a centralized structure 
and the gradual crisis of the regime, the candidates increasingly tended to 
“look for security in a guaranteed local power base” (Moreno Luzón, 2007: 
435).14 As a consequence, the “propios” MPs, which did not adapt to the 
“encasillado”, became an intrinsic part of the Restoration institutional 
system. 
 
Nevertheless, the main challenges to the political system of the Restoration 
came from outside the “turno pacífico”. As has been indicated, the regime 
required the liberal elites to agree to share power in return for political 
stability. However, in the last years of the nineteenth century, the liberal 
consensus could no longer guarantee stability, for several reasons. On the 
one hand, the Restoration institutional setting, which was largely based on 
the capacity of influence of the rural powers, did not adapt to the slow 
modernization of the country and the urban sectors’ increasing presence in 
the Spanish economy and society. This led a growing share of the urban 
elites to feel unsatisfied with the governments of the cartel and seek out 
other representatives (Cabrera and Del Rey, Poder, 2002: 90-99.). At the 
same time, the labor movement had grown enough for the system to face 
both a new set of demands of economic and social reform and renewed 
revolutionary threats. Finally, the monarchy’s legitimacy eroded slowly 
because of an omnipresent corruption and, more sharply, after its defeat in 
the Spanish American war of 1898. As a consequence, after 1900 the 
minority parties, which promoted reforms based on ideological arguments, 
                                                           
14
 See also Martorell Linares (2000: 277) or Dardé et al. (2003: 601-02). 
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gained influence in a number of Spanish towns, where elections became 
increasingly competitive. 
 
Electoral competition was also bolstered by the establishment of universal 
male suffrage in 1890 (Moreno Luzón, 2007; Comín, 1988). This 
constitutional change was one of the most visible concessions made by the 
Restoration regime to the progressive liberal elites. The universal male 
suffrage was a key component of the political program of the Liberal Party, 
and a necessary condition for both its integration in the regime as a 
government force and the acceptance of the Constitution by the moderate 
ranks of the pre-1874 revolutionaries (Dardé, 2003: 205-07).15 However, 
this measure actually undermined the dynastic parties. Indeed extensive 
fraud and vote-buying could only limit the representation of minority 
parties in the first few elections under universal male suffrage. In fact, after 
1900 the extension of the franchise made increasingly difficult to control 
electoral results in urban constituencies. There, elections gradually became 
more competitive and based on modern political practices (Dardé, 2003; 
Cabrera and Del Rey, 2002: 72). At the same time, in rural districts, 
universal male suffrage forced candidates to reinforce their links with local 
clientelistic networks (Moreno Luzón, 2000: 72). 
 
The erosion of the Restoration’s stability accelerated after World War One. 
Between 1917 and Primo de Rivera’s military coup d’état in 1923, the 
government found it increasingly difficult to obtain a parliamentary 
majority and social turmoil was constant, with a growing share of society 
demanding political reform. However, as has been indicated, the origins of 
the crisis can be traced back to the first decades of the Restoration period. 
As may be seen in Figure 1 below, the out-of-office dynastic party’s share 
of elected deputies kept growing over time. The same was true of the 
minority parties’ representation. As a consequence, the margin between the 
two dynastic parties contracted over time and, more importantly, the margin 
between these parties and the minority ones became smaller. 
                                                           
15
 This process would be consistent with the idea that the extension of the franchise may 
be seen as a strategic decision by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest 
and revolution, in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). 
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Figure 1. Dynastic opposition and minority parties’ MPs as share of total. 
 
Sources: Varela Ortega (2001), Sánchez de los Santos (1908 and 1910), El año político 
(1895-1910), El Imparcial (1876), El Liberal (1881-1910), La Correspondencia de 
España (1879-1905), La Época (1879-1905), ABC (1905), and data provided by Javier 
Moreno Luzón. 
 
In sum, over time the strength and stability of Restoration regime eroded to 
the point that Spain could only go one of two ways: democratic reforms or 
the elimination of the parliamentary regime. Actually, both solutions were 
tried during the interwar period. Before 1923, however, the political 
duopoly survived in an increasingly weak position, and this was probably 
reflected in a gradual change in its priorities. In the early Restoration years, 
the government focused on consolidating the two-party cartel and 
marginalizing other political forces. After 1890, the regime tried instead to 
keep discontent under control and to appease those social sectors 
demanding profound reforms (González Hernández, 1997: 181-87; Suárez 
Cortina, 1998: 243; Cabrera and Del Rey, 2002: 105).  
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3. The allocation of public resources during the Restoration: the 
role of governments and individual MPs 
 
Our main hypothesis is that the mix of government vote buying and local 
autonomy shaped the allocation of road resources among provinces. On the 
one hand, governments subordinated the distribution of resources to the 
duopoly’s global objectives. In the short run these objectives reduced to 
implementing the ‘turn’ system; in the long run they included maintaining 
political stability without reform. On the other hand, MPs competed to 
obtain resources from the government, in order to increase their reputation 
and strengthen their links to elites in their districts. In the next paragraphs 
some hypotheses are suggested as to how those two sets of factors might 
have affected the distribution of public expenditure during the regime and 
how their relative influence might have evolved with social and political 
change. 
 
 3.1.  The influence of MPs’ individual characteristics and incentives 
Individual MPs’ strategies seem to have been essential in the operation of 
the Restoration system. In political economy terms, there was therefore a 
large margin for the so-called “non-partisan” political factors to influence 
the geographical allocation of public resources (Levitt and Snyder, 1995; 
Levitt and Poterba, 1999; Milligan and Smart, 2005). Our hypothesis in this 
regard is that a province would receive more funds if, on average, their MPs 
had greater incentives to seek administrative resources for their districts 
and/or higher capacity of influence on the central administration. 
 
Incentives would depend positively on the degree of uncertainty of future 
electoral results. For instance, an established MP who “owned” a district 
(i.e. a “propio” MP) would have less need to build his reputation and would 
seek fewer resources for his constituency, whereas another candidate 
without a strong electoral basis would put more effort in building his 
reputation (see, e.g., Dardé et al., 2001: 608). As for each MP’s influence in 
Madrid, it would be enhanced by seniority or a leadership position within 
his party, and also by being a member of the party in office, since this 
would grant him better access to government officials through the formal 
and informal networks established among party members. 
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3.2. The influence of the regime’s priorities: the early decades 
The Restoration regime found stability through the two parties’ peaceful 
alternation in power. The system required limiting the opposition parties’ 
parliamentary presence. Our hypothesis is that, during the early decades of 
the Restoration regime, if a province had a high number of districts that did 
not follow the turn system (i.e. that elected a higher share of MPs belonging 
either to the minority parties or to the dynastic party that was out of office), 
it would be punished, and such penalty would include fewer road funds. In 
other words, the dynastic parties’ duopoly would use public spending to 
provide incentives for local elites to implement the turn system (Diaz-
Cayeros et al., 2006; Hsieh et al., 2009). Actually, since the most serious 
challenges to the regime came from outside the duopoly, the government 
would be much tougher on the provinces that elected a higher share of third 
party MPs, than on those electing candidates from the dynastic opposition 
(Moreno Luzón, 2000: 61; Dardé, 2003: 253).  
 
3.3. The influence of the regime’s priorities: the crisis of the 
Restoration 
After 1890 the regime faced increasing challenges and these hindered the 
long-term continuity of the turn system. Our hypothesis is that those 
challenges also affected the global strategy of the regime and the use of the 
spatial allocation of resources as a political tool. More specifically, in this 
latter period, the regime tried to keep discontent under control by making 
certain compromises with at least some sectors of the opposition or, in other 
words, by exchanging resources for political stability and constitutional 
loyalty (Ellman and Wantchekon, 2000; Robinson and Torvik, 2009). One 
available instrument was to give a preferential treatment to “politically 
sensitive” territories, i.e. those electing candidates who refused the turn 
system and, especially, those choosing MPs from the minority parties. 
Therefore, in stark opposition to what is expected in the beginning of the 
regime, during the latter stage of the Restoration, if a province had a high 
number of districts that elected their MPs without respecting the peaceful 
turn and, especially, a large share of districts electing candidates from the 
minority parties, it would be privileged in the distribution of resources.  
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4. Empirical framework 
 
Investigating these hypotheses is perforce limited by the availability of data. 
On the one hand, because road expenditure data are only reported by 
provinces, but not by electoral districts, electoral outcomes data had to be 
aggregated by province, and carry out the analysis at the provincial level. 
This unavoidable spatial aggregation has forced us to smooth local variation 
and introduces a measurement error problem in the analysis, for which no 
straightforward solution is available. There are, however, some reasons that 
may have reduced the incidence of this problem. Indeed, as Carlos Dardé et 
al. (2001: 563) note, a significant number of provinces showed certain 
political unity during the period under study.16 More importantly, local 
elites would not only be interested in an increase in their district’s road 
mileage, but also in having a good connection with the main markets (such 
as the provincial capital), which would involve the completion of some 
provincial roads which ran partially out of their own district territory. 
Therefore, broadly speaking, the local elites of all districts in each province 
would actually be interested in the development of the whole provincial 
road network. 
 
On the other hand, since road investment in the Basque Country and 
Navarre was mostly financed and executed by the provincial 
administrations (Diputaciones), these four provinces (Álava, Biscay, 
Guipúzcoa and Navarre) have been excluded from the analysis. Hence, our 
final sample consists of a set of 45 provinces with an average of 309 
districts and 372 elected deputies per election.  
 
The analysis has been restricted to road expenditures undertaken by the 
central government between 1880 and 1914. The study starts in 1880, the 
year that followed the 1879 election, which is considered the beginning of 
the “turno pacífico” system. The 1914 adoption of the Ugarte Plan, which 
reduced the government’s discretion over road construction spending, 
makes that year a good ending point. It is assumed that a given year’s 
                                                           
16
 The authors highlight the provincial scope of some local powers at the time, and 
indicates that many provinces were controlled by a single cacique or clientelist network. 
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investment was influenced by the results of the nearest previous election. In 
the case of election years, it is considered that the expenditure made by the 
government during the year was not influenced by that year’s election 
outcomes. This is reasonable given that once approved, infrastructure 
spending was delayed by a somewhat involved implementation process. In 
other words, politicians needed some time before their influence on 
investment showed up at the local level. As a result, the following elections 
are included: 1879, 1881, 1884, 1886, 1891, 1893, 1896, 1898, 1899, 1901, 
1903, 1905, 1907 and 1910.   
 
Our dependent variable is annual expenditures on new road construction in 
constant pesetas per capita.17 Information on public road investment has 
been extracted from the Memorias, Anuarios and Estadísticas de Obras 
Públicas, which were published regularly by the Spanish Ministry of Public 
Works (Ministerio de Fomento) between 1856 and 1924.18  
 
The independent variables are all measured annually and at the provincial 
level.  To capture the economic demand for roads, the impact of population 
density and the level of GDP per capita is estimated.19 The time gaps in 
these variables have been filled through interpolation. Provinces with lower 
population density are expected to get larger construction investment per 
capita (since a higher level of spending would be necessary in those 
provinces to connect a given amount of population to the network). The 
                                                           
17
 Investment figures have been expressed in real terms by using the price index for 
“other construction” investment by Prados de la Escosura (2003). 
18
 Although, ideally, the study should have focused on public expenditure dedicated to 
second and third category roads, which were those more directly linked to territorial 
interests, the data on road investment are not disaggregated by category for some years of 
the period under study. However, since second and third category roads accounted for 
93% of the new road mileage constructed during the period, it is considered that the 
aggregate investment on all categories of State roads can be used as a good 
approximation to this variable of interest. 
19
 These time varying variables are considered in Herranz-Loncán (2007), as determinants 
of provincial road endowments in Spain between 1860 and 1930. Other economic factors 
that appear to be relevant in that research are construction costs or the maritime or border 
character of a province. However, since those variables are time-invariant cannot be used 
to estimate the model through fixed-effects. 
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opposite (positive) effect should hold in the case of richer (in terms of per 
capita GDP) provinces. 
 
Then, electoral data is added. In this regard, the main source of information 
is the appendix to the book El poder de la influencia, edited by José Varela 
Ortega, which contains the name of a large share of the deputies that were 
elected in each district from 1876 until 1923, as well as their party of 
affiliation. This database, however, has numerous gaps, which have been 
filled by drawing on Modesto Sánchez de los Santos’ volumes on the 
chambers elected in 1907 and 1910,20 the yearly publication El año político 
(1895-1910), some of the newspapers published in the days after each 
election (El Imparcial, El Liberal, La Correspondencia de España, La 
Época and ABC) and the Historical Archive of Deputies (1810-1977) of the 
Spanish Congress.21 
 
This new data set allows us to calculate the Relative seniority of each MP, 
which measures the difference between the maximum seniority in the 
chamber after each election and the seniority of each deputy.22 Then, that 
variable is averaged over the deputies in each province. The lower this 
indicator (the lower this difference), the more senior these deputies were, 
and the more able they would be to attract resources to their constituencies. 
Second, the share of deputies in province i and term t who had been 
ministers in previous terms is measured, as a proxy for their long-term 
political influence. Those MPs with a greater leadership position should 
garner more public funds for their provinces. Third, to capture the presence 
of “propios” MPs in province i and term t, two measures are computed to 
account for the share of deputies who: i) had been elected in the past in the 
                                                           
20
 Sánchez de los Santos, 1908 and 1910. 
21
 See the website of the Spanish Congress: 
http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/SDocum/ArchCon/SDHist
oDipu 
22
 Seniority refers to the number of elections, from 1876 until election t, in which the 
deputy X had been elected. Given that legislatures in Restoration times differed 
considerably in length, the seniority has also been computed by using the number of years 
in office instead of the number of elections. The results hold similar, but are not presented 
for the sake of brevity. 
Chapter 2. Pork-Barrel Politics in Semi-Democracies 
32 
 
same district; and ii) had sat with the opposition for at least one term of 
office (i.e. had not adapted to the turn system). 
 
Finally, the elected MPs are divided into three types: government MPs, 
dynastic opposition MPs (Liberal MPs under a Conservative government 
and Conservative MPs under a Liberal government), and minority MPs 
(those not running as either Liberals or Conservatives). Then the share of 
deputies belonging to the dynastic opposition and the share that belonged to 
the minority parties in each province are computed. 23 Table 1 presents a 
summary description of the variables and their descriptive statistics and 
data sources. 
                                                           
23
 Therefore, the share of government MPs is taken as the reference category. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variable Description Mean (S.D) Source 
Road investment 
p.c. 
Pesetas of road investmentit / 
Populationit 
1.16 
(1.07) 
Ministerio de 
Fomento, Memorias, 
Anuarios and 
Estadísticas de 
Obras Públicas 
(1880-1914) 
% Minority 
seats 
Minority parties’ seatsit / Total 
seatsit 
0.07 
(0.14) 
 
Varela Ortega 
(2001), Sánchez de 
los Santos (1908 and 
1910), El año 
político (1895-
1910), El Imparcial 
(1876), El Liberal 
(1881-1910), La 
Correspondencia de 
España (1879-1905), 
La Época (1879-
1905), ABC (1905) 
and Historical 
Archive of Deputies 
(Spanish Congress). 
% Opposition 
seats 
Dynastic opposition party’s seatsit / 
Total seatsit 
0.24 
(0.18) 
% Propios 
% established deputiesit/ Total n. of 
deputiesit 
0.28 
(0.20) 
% Deputies who 
were Ministers 
in the past 
Deputiesit who were ministers in 
previous electoral terms/ Total n. of 
deputiesit 
0.07 
(0.25) 
Relative 
seniority 
 
: max. number of times that a 
deputy has been elected up to 
election year t             
 : nº of times that deputy n in 
province i at election year t has been 
previously elected.                                         
N: total number of deputies in 
province i in electoral year t 
5.78 
(3.61) 
Population 
density 
Population
 it / Km2 
42.16 
(26.27) Population censuses 
GDP pc (GDP
 it /1000) / Population it 0.46 (0.17) 
Data provided by 
Julio Martínez-
Galarraga 
Note: Subindex it refers to province i and year t. 
 
Taken together, these data form a panel comprising 35 years (distributed 
among 14 elections) and 45 provinces. Since the behavior of units 
(provinces) at different points in time can be observed, the variation 
between units as well as over time can be captured by using a linear panel  
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data model with both time and province fixed effects as follows: 
 
iit = β Politicalit + λ Xit + αi + αt + uit (1) 
 
where iit is investment per capita on roads; Politicalit includes the political 
variables linked to our hypotheses; Xit accounts for economic variables that 
change over time;  αt represents year-specific effects capturing the impact 
of certain factors (such as economic crises, national policies, etc.) that 
occurred in a given year and affected all provinces; αi represents province 
effects, accounting for factors that are specific to a given area but constant 
in time (e.g., construction costs, maritime and border provinces, etc.); and 
uit is an error term.  
 
Regarding the estimation method, since the results presented treat the 
province effects as fixed, this means that the effects of political variables 
are identified from within-province variation over time. Finally, according 
to several tests performed, the disturbances in our panel are both 
heteroscedastic and autocorrelated, which makes clustering at the province 
level necessary. Also, the fact that the value of the political variables is the 
same for the years between two consecutive elections indicate that 
clustering at the election level is also necessary. So, standard errors are 
clustered both by province and by election. 
 
 
5. The politics of road spending 
 
Table 2 below presents the outcomes of a set of regressions based on 
equation (1). Column (1) presents the fixed-effects estimates obtained from 
the baseline model (economic variables only) and columns (2) to (5) present 
the results when political variables are included. In all the regressions the 
coefficients of the economic variables are statistically significant and have 
the expected sign: public investment per capita on road construction was 
lower in densely-populated provinces and higher in provinces with larger 
GDP per capita.  
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Table 2: Determinants of the regional allocation of road investment during the Spanish 
Restoration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Political variables 
% Minority seats  0.50* 
(1.690) 
  0.40 
(1.355) 
% Dyn. opposition 
seats 
 -0.01 
(-0.058) 
  -0.14 
(-0.778) 
% Propios   0.52** 
(2.367) 
 0.60** 
(2.530) 
% Deputies who were 
Ministers in the past 
   1.27** 
(2.132) 
1.32** 
(2.165) 
Relative seniority    0.04 
(0.969) 
0.06 
(1.383) 
 Economic variables 
Population density -0.02** 
(-1.996) 
-0.02** 
(-2.224) 
-0.01* 
(-1.772) 
-0.02* 
(-1.876) 
-0.02* 
(-1.907) 
GDP pc 3.42*** 
(5.021) 
3.01*** 
(4.659) 
3.57*** 
(5.049) 
3.40*** 
(5.108) 
3.20*** 
(4.838) 
Constant 0.22 
(0.458) 
0.55 
(1.033) 
0.06 
(0.124) 
0.15 
(0.307) 
0.28 
(0.510) 
Nº Observations 1,575 1,575 1,575 1,575 1,575 
Time-effects ( fT) YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test time effects 5.29 
[0.0000] 
5.13 
[0.0000] 
5.18 
[0.0000] 
5.14 
[0.0000] 
5.09 
[0.0000] 
R-squared 0.143 0.146 0.149 0.151 0.162 
Notes: (1) Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (2) dependent 
variable: road investment per capita; (3) all columns report fixed-effects estimates; (4) DoF 
adjustment is imposed in fixed-effect regressions. 
 
To evaluate the impact of political factors, let us focus on column (5), 
which is based on the full model —the other specifications have much the 
same results. No evidence is found that either the share of minority MPs or 
the share of the dynastic opposition MPs had a statistically significant effect 
on the amount of road investment received by a province. By contrast, the 
proportion of “propios” had a significant and positive impact on road 
investment. It thus seems that “propios” did not have lower incentives to 
lobby for their provinces, and instead it appears that they were particularly 
good at attracting resources for their provinces. More precisely, a standard 
deviation rise in the share of “propios” among a province’s deputies would 
produce a 0.17 pesetas increase in per capita investment on roads (i.e. 16 
percent of the standard deviation of the dependent variable). Similarly, the 
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higher the provincial share of deputies that had been ministers in the past, 
the greater the road funds that province received.24 More concretely, one 
standard deviation rise in this variable would translate into a 0.33 pesetas 
increase in road investment per capita (i.e. 31 percent of the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable). 
 
By contrast, the coefficient of the relative seniority of each province’s MPs 
is not statistically different than zero, a result that, at first sight, seems 
surprising. There are, however, two possible complementary explanations 
for that. First, in line with suggestions made by Kevin and Smart (2005), 
once the seniority of a politician exceeds a certain threshold, his 
expectations of running for re-election might fall and, as such, he might 
relax his efforts in attempting to obtain spending for his district.25 Second, 
the provincial share of “propios” MPs increased a province’s allocation of 
road investment. By definition, these deputies were senior, so it seems that 
seniority was only relevant when the MP was politically independent and 
did not respect the ‘turn’. 
 
As was suggested in Section 3 of this chapter, the governments’ attitude 
towards the provinces that did not respect the turn may have changed with 
the gradual erosion of support for the Restoration. This may explain the 
lack of significance of the variables that measure the share of minority or 
dynastic opposition MPs when their impact over the whole period is tested. 
In order to account for the presence of structural change in the relationship 
between the political variables and road spending, two additional sets of 
regressions are run. In the first one, whose results are reported in Table 3, 
the changes in the governments’ attitude towards the “rebellious” provinces 
                                                           
24
 The same regressions have been run with two alternative variables to measure the effect 
of potentially influential politicians: a dummy variable set to 1 if the minister of Public 
Works was a deputy elected for that province and the share of deputies in each province 
which were ministers at time t. None of these variables turned out to be statistically 
significant. 
25
 In an attempt to contrast this hypothesis an alternative variable is computed: the share 
of deputies, in each province, who had been deputies in this legislature and in all the 
previous terms. This means that they were the most senior representatives in the 
Parliament after each election. In this case, the effect of seniority is negative although not 
statistically significant (the results are not reported for the sake of simplicity). 
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are considered to be mainly associated to the exogenous shocks that took 
place in the 1890s (such as universal male suffrage or the colonial defeat). 
Therefore, a time dummy variable for the second part of the period under 
analysis (1891-1914) is defined, which is interacted with both the share of 
minority and dynastic opposition deputies.26 This approach allows us to test 
for level differences between before and after 1890. 
                                                           
26
 Comín (1988: 495), suggests 1898 as the main turning point in the Restoration period. 
Actually, the main results of the analysis are not altered significantly 1896 or 1898 are 
taken instead of 1890 (again, these results are not reported for the sake of simplicity). 
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Table 3: Determinants of the regional allocation of road investment during the Spanish 
Restoration. Interaction of a dummy for the 2nd sub-period (1892-1914) with the political 
factors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Political Variables 
% Minority seats  -1.20* 
(-1.874) 
  -1.22* 
(-1.896) 
% Minority seats× 2nd 
period 
 2.09*** 
(3.019) 
  2.00*** 
(2.880) 
% Dyn. opposition seats  -0.77* 
(-1.917) 
  -1.00** 
(-2.383) 
% Dyn. opposition 
seats× 2nd period 
 1.01** 
(2.318) 
  1.13*** 
(2.621) 
Propios   0.52** 
(2.367) 
 0.59** 
(2.573) 
% Deputies who were 
Ministers in the past 
   1.27** 
(2.132) 
1.41** 
(2.371) 
Relative Seniority    0.04 
(0.969) 
0.06 
(1.536) 
      Economic Variables 
Population density -0.02** 
(-1.996) 
-0.02** 
(-2.447) 
-0.01* 
(-1.772) 
-0.02* 
(-1.876) 
-0.02** 
(-2.102) 
GDP pc 3.42*** 
(5.021) 
2.65*** 
(4.302) 
3.57*** 
(5.049) 
3.40*** 
(5.108) 
2.86*** 
(4.527) 
Constant 0.22 
(0.458) 
0.97* 
(1.893) 
0.06 
(0.124) 
0.15 
(0.307) 
0.69 
(1.303) 
Nº Observations 1,575 1,575 1,575 1,575 1,575 
Time-effects ( fT) YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test time effects 5.29 
[0.0000] 
4.99 
[0.0000] 
5.18 
[0.0000] 
5.14 
[0.0000] 
5.08 
[0.0000] 
R-squared 0.143 0.162 0.149 0.151 0.178 
Notes: (1) Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (2) dependent 
variable: road investment per capita; (3) all columns report fixed-effects estimates; (4) DoF 
adjustment is imposed in fixed-effect regressions. 
 
 
As an alternative a second set of regressions is run, whose results are 
presented in Table 4, and where it is assumed instead that the governments’ 
change of attitude was gradual, being mainly the result of the country’s 
socioeconomic evolution and the slow weakening of the political system.  
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This alternative hypothesis is evaluated by interacting the political variables 
with a linear time trend as follows: 
 
iit = αi + βt(% Minority,%Dynastic opposition)it + η(Propios, Leadearship, 
Seniority)it + λ Xit + αi + αt + uit 
βt = β0+ β1 × trend (2) 
 
 
Table 4: Determinants of the regional allocation of road investment during the  Spanish 
Restoration. Interaction of linear trend with the political factors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Political Variables 
% Minority seats  -1.74** 
(-2.557) 
  -1.74** 
(-2.525) 
% Minority seats ×  
trend 
 0.09*** 
(3.661) 
  0.09*** 
(3.513) 
% Dyn. opposition 
seats 
 -0.71 
(-1.562) 
  -0.92** 
(-1.976) 
% Dyn. opposition 
seats× trend 
 0.04* 
(1.681) 
  0.04* 
(1.878) 
Propios   0.52** 
(2.367) 
 0.56** 
(2.432) 
% Deputies who were 
Ministers in the past 
   1.27** 
(2.132) 
1.35** 
(2.266) 
Relative seniority    0.04 
(0.969) 
0.05 
(1.256) 
      Economic Variables 
Population density -0.02** 
(-1.996) 
-0.03*** 
(-2.599) 
-0.01* 
(-1.772) 
-0.02* 
(-1.876) 
-0.02** 
(-2.270) 
GDP pc 3.42*** 
(5.021) 
2.37*** 
(3.966) 
3.57*** 
(5.049) 
3.40*** 
(5.108) 
2.58*** 
(4.191) 
Constant 0.22 
(0.458) 
1.17** 
(2.271) 
0.06 
(0.124) 
0.15 
(0.307) 
0.90* 
(1.698) 
Nº Observations 1,575 1,575 1,575 1,575 1,575 
Time-effects ( fT) YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test time effects 5.29 
[0.0000] 
4.98 
[0.0000] 
5.18 
[0.0000] 
5.14 
[0.0000] 
4.72 
[0.0000] 
R-squared 0.143 0.162 0.149 0.151 0.178 
Notes: (1) Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (2) dependent 
variable: road investment per capita; (3) all columns report fixed-effects estimates; (4) DoF 
adjustment is imposed in fixed-effect regressions. 
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In both tables, column (5), which shows the coefficients of the full model, 
confirms the hypothesis that the governments’ attitude towards the 
provinces that did not respect the turn changed over time. In Table 3, higher 
shares of minority and dynastic opposition MPs reduced government 
expenditure on road construction during the early years of the period under 
study, but that effect was reversed after 1890. In addition, during the second 
sub-period, the positive impact of having a higher share of non-
governmental MPs was much smaller in the case of dynastic opposition 
deputies, something that is consistent with the fact that they represented less 
of a threat to the regime. More precisely, the coefficients in column (5) 
indicate that, during the first period, raising a province’s share of minority 
MPs by one standard deviation would provoke a decrease of 0.17 pesetas in 
road construction per capita in that province (i.e. 16 percent of the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable). In contrast, during the second period, 
the same standard deviation increase would have translated into an uptick of 
0.11 pesetas per capita (i.e. 10 percent of the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable). As for the dynastic opposition MPs, they produce 
similar effects to minority deputies in the first period and just a 2 percent 
increase during the second one.  
 
The results reported in Table 4 are also consistent with the hypothesis that 
the regime changed its attitude towards the “rebellious” districts. In this 
case, using again the coefficients presented in column (5) one can see that 
in an initial year (t=1) a single standard deviation rise in the variable % 
Minority seats led to a 0.23 pesetas decrease in per capita road investment. 
However, this effect changed over time and, by 1914 (i.e. at t=35) the effect 
of an increase of one standard deviation in this variable was a rise of 0.20 
pesetas per capita in road investment. Finally, in both tables, the effects of 
the other political variables (“Propios”, Deputies that were ministers in the 
past and Relative seniority) remain unchanged from those reported in Table 
2.27 
 
                                                           
27
 The significance of the interaction of all other (political and economic) variables has 
also been tested with a dummy for the second period. However, those interactions were 
not significant, which indicates that the impact of those factors was not affected by 
structural change. 
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To sum up, although these two specifications involve different assumptions 
on the evolution of the relationship between road spending and the political 
variables, both are consistent with our main hypothesis about the evolution 
of the regime.28 In both cases, the results of the estimation indicate that, in 
the early stages of the Restoration, political stability required the 
government to distribute relatively less road investment to those provinces 
where deputies were elected without regard to the turn. By contrast, as time 
went by and the crisis of the regime became apparent, such punishments did 
not work and the government tended to change its criteria for the allocation 
of road funds. As a result, over time, those provinces where the turn system 
was less respected and, even more so, those electing candidates from the 
minority parties, tended to receive more resources, probably in an attempt 
to limit discontent and to appease those social sectors demanding profound 
reforms.  
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This study has examined the distribution of state funding for road 
infrastructure during the Spanish Restoration. The case of Spain is 
particularly interesting because it was a semi-democratic system quite 
different from those of contemporary developed economies, which are the 
most frequent object of this kind of political economy analysis.  It is also 
interesting because the hegemonic force was not a party but a duopoly, 
which established a system of alternation in power. 
 
Our panel data set for Spanish provinces between 1880 and 1914 confirms 
that political factors played an important role in the regional distribution of 
road construction expenditures. The analysis shows that the allocation of 
                                                           
28
 Despite the fact that the two sets of regressions are based on different assumptions on 
the relationship between spending and electoral variables, both sets of results are 
presented, due to the uncertainty on the real shape of the relationship. The true dynamics 
was probably a combination of both processes, with some sudden shocks during the 
1890s, which cannot be dated with precision, as well as a gradual evolution throughout 
the whole period under study, with some potential changes in slope which cannot either 
be dated with precision. Therefore, both models provide two partial and imperfect 
approaches to that process of change.  
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public funds was affected by two different sets of political determinants: the 
delegation characteristics (such as the share of MPs with party leadership 
positions, and electoral independence), and the regime’s global strategy and 
aims. In particular, during the early stages of the Restoration regime, those 
provinces with a higher share of districts that did not follow the two-party 
alternation system and, specially, those electing candidates from third 
parties, received fewer road funds. A suggestion is that this reflects the 
regime effort to control elections. Road subsidies were part of a set of 
incentives that encouraged the provinces to comply with the system. Over 
time, however, such punishment strategy disappeared and, since the last few 
years of the nineteenth century, the provinces that elected more candidates 
from the minority parties actually became privileged in the distribution of 
resources. Because the change in policy coincided with the weakening of 
the Restoration regime, this is interpreted as an exchange of resources for 
political stability in “politically sensitive” provinces. 
 
These results confirm the importance of pork-barrel politics in the 
allocation of road resources in Restoration Spain, despite the hardly 
democratic character of the regime. The influence of territorial interests on 
the geographical distribution of road expenditures was significant and 
sizeable. Indeed it helps to explain the inefficiency that characterized the 
construction of the Spanish road network, something of which 
contemporary opinion was perfectly aware. The waste of resources 
associated to this process necessarily had to constitute a burden on Spanish 
economic growth, and to contribute to the relative failure of investment in 
large transport infrastructure throughout the period under study. 
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Chapter 3  
Electoral Rewards to Patronage Politics: Evidence from 
Rural Unemployment Subsidies in Spain 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The redistribution of rents from high-income to low-income groups might 
be pursued by governments with the use of public employment targeted to 
the disadvantaged group (Alesina et al., 2000, Gimpelson et al., 2000). 
Under certain circumstances, however, this type of policy might create 
undesired side effects such as the direct exchange of votes for access to 
public employment, namely, patronage. This and other sorts of clientelism, 
has been argued to have a clear negative impact on economic development 
(Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 1981). The Plan for Rural Employment (Plan 
de Empleo Rural – PER), introduced in the Spanish regions of Extremadura 
and Andalusia by the central government in the early eighties, is an oft-
cited example of patronage politics provided that the allocation of PER jobs 
at the discretion of local politicians goes hand in hand with the provision of 
a special unemployment benefit (the agrarian subsidy) prone to foster a 
dependence relationship between voters and government1.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present empirical evidence for the electoral 
returns to patronage by examining the specific case of the Spanish PER, a 
public program with particular features that make it susceptible of 
patronage. The program aims at using public works (essentially, 
                                                           
1
 The detrimental effects of the PER and the agrarian subsidy on the economic 
development of Andalusia and Extremadura are to some extent similar to those in 
southern Italy (see Chubb, 1981, 1982, for an in-depth study of Italian patronage). 
Further, with regards to the effects of welfare benefits on voting behaviour, two 
prominent examples are those of  Progresa, a Mexican program of poverty alleviation  
(see  De la O, 2012, Diaz Cayeros et al., 2013 ) and PANES, an Uruguayan anti-poverty 
program of cash transfers (Manacorda et al., 2009). 
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infrastructure projects) to generate temporary employment in the rural areas 
of Andalusia and Extremadura, thus softening the negative consequences of 
high unemployment in these regions. The policy has certainly granted 
additional rents to low income households and, as documented by Jofre-
Monseny (2012), it has contributed to a reduction in the flows of migration 
leaving rural municipalities in those regions (an effect mainly driven by 
lower out-migration). Nevertheless, the PER has not fostered economic 
development in the affected regions: Extremadura and Andalusia are still 
lagging well behind Spain’s average region in terms of GDP per capita and 
unemployment rates2. In fact, with regards to unemployment, another 
relevant finding of Jofre-Monseny’s study is that the introduction of the 
broad program that comprises the PER and the agrarian subsidy increased 
unemployment rates by 15% in the affected municipalities3.The Spanish 
Congress was already made aware of the harmful consequences of the 
program in 1994 by the Commission of Agriculture, Farming and Fisheries, 
who argued that “the system has fostered in Andalusia and Extremadura a 
culture of inactivity, which blocks any initiative of development and 
deactivates the willingness to work” 4.  
 
Further, despite improving the provision of some local public services, the 
program has not solved important infrastructure shortages in these regions 
and the projects have been costly and slowly implemented. The explanation 
behind the permanence of such unproductive spending might be that 
politicians see in patronage a fruitful source of electoral rewards that 
                                                           
2
 According to the INE (National Statistics Institute), in 2011 Andalusia and 
Extremadura’s GDP per capita were, respectively, 25% and 30% below the national 
average (and the two lowest in Spain), and unemployment rates for the same year were, 
40% and 15% above the  national average, respectively.  
3
 Jofre-Monseny employs a ‘border’ identification strategy, that compares municipalities 
in Andalusia and Extremadura close to the border with the adjacent regions (Murcia, 
Castilla la Mancha and Castilla y León), which are also close to the border but not 
affected by the program. 
4
 Statement extracted from the report: “Dictamen aprobado por la Comisión de 
Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca en relación con el informe elaborado por la ponencia 
especial para estudiar la reforma del actual sistema del Plan de Empleo Rural (PER) y el 
subsidio agrario. (154/000005)”, pp. 21. Despite suggesting the need for reforms, the 
program has not suffered substantive changes since its establishment.  
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compensates for the inefficient redistribution of income through jobs and, in 
turn, for its negative effect on economic growth (Wantchekon, 2003; Keefer 
2005). In fact, there is the widespread perception that the PER has served as 
a mere instrument of patronage at the disposal of the socialist party (PSOE), 
who established the program and has turned Extremadura and Andalusia 
into its strongholds5.  
 
In other words, “the Plan for Rural Employment is a public policy directly 
identified with the captive vote, clientelism, caciquismo6, and corruption” 
(Corzo, 2002: 189). But despite many press articles devoted to the topic, 
and some descriptive studies (such as Hopkin, 2007, Corzo, 2002, Hopkin 
and Mastropaolo, 2001, and Cazorla, 1995), nobody has attempted to 
provide empirical evidence for this matter. This study is, thus, a 
contribution to the literature on clientelism, whose scholars claim that the 
lack of quantitative studies is due to difficulties in providing a clear 
identification of the patronage relation and the subjectivity in assessing the 
real motivations behind the exchange of votes (see Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 
2002).  However, I believe that the specificities of the PER (presented in 
section 2 of this chapter) help overcoming such problems.  
 
The empirical analysis consists on apply a difference-in-differences (DD)  
approach to a data set of electoral outcomes from Spanish general and local 
elections – as both the local and central governments are involved in the 
allocation of jobs – before and after the introduction of the PER in 1984. In 
short, the results show that in the municipalities affected by the program, 
the PSOE increased its share of the general election vote.  This positive 
                                                           
5
 The list of newspaper articles reporting this fact is very large. These are just two of the 
many examples:  
“The PSOE sweeps to victory in the PER villages.” ABC, 29/11/1993 
“In the villages where there is more agrarian subsidy the vote for the PSOE is higher than 
in the rest of Andalusia.” El Mundo, 26/12/1990 
6
 In the Spanish context the term caciquismo is commonly used to refer to clientelism. 
The concept has its roots in the term cacique, a word used to refer to local party bosses 
who gained power by manipulating the administrative machinery for their own personal 
benefit and that of their clientele in XIX century Spain. Carr (1982) provides a concise 
description of cacique’s role:  “the cacique always protected his village clientele from the 
laws, taxes and conscription levies of the outside world of the state”. 
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effect of the PER on election outcomes has its peak during the second term 
after the introduction of the program but, still, remains significant along all 
the period under study. In addition, I also analyze whether such increase in 
the support for the PSOE is partly due to a raise the voter turnout, but I find 
inconclusive evidence. Lastly, at the local layer of government I do not find 
evidence of any electoral reward to mayors. Overall, the PER offers an 
interesting case study of patronage for several reasons: first, the 
involvement of several layers of government in the process of supplying 
jobs, allows me to assess whether voters make any distinction when casting 
their votes in local and general elections; second, it offers a unique 
combination of patronage jobs and welfare benefits (through the agrarian 
subsidy), which reinforces the dependence relationship between patrons 
(politicians) and clients (citizens).   
 
Although there is scarce quantitative evidence for the influence of 
patronage (or clientelism, broadly speaking) and welfare benefits on 
election outcomes, my results are consistent with the significant electoral 
returns found in most of other studies. For instance, Folke et al. (2011) 
show that patronage helped political parties in US states to increase their 
probability of remaining in office. Golden and Picci (2011) obtain a 
positive effect of patronage on preference votes received by elite legislators 
affiliated with Italy’s two main parties. Calvo and Murillo (2004) present 
evidence for the electoral benefits obtained by the Peronist Party in 
Argentina from the allocation of patronage jobs7. Manacorda et al. (2009) 
find that the PANES beneficiaries in Uruguay were 28% more likely to 
support the incumbent government. Finally, De la O (2005) finds that 
Progresa, in Mexico, increased by 5 and 4 percentage points, the voter 
turnout and the incumbent’s vote share, respectively.   
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents in detail the 
institutional framework of the Plan for Rural Employment and discusses the 
                                                           
7
 The relevance of this study relies on the analysis made of both the supply and demand 
side of patronage, which helps identifying why some patrons benefit more than others. 
The authors conclude that the benefits for the Peronist Party were due to the fact that its 
constituencies were less skilled and more dependent of public jobs, and its supporters 
were geographically concentrated. 
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political economy implications of the program. In section 3 I describe the 
data used and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  The Plan for Rural Employment: a tool for political exchange  
 
2.1. Institutional framework 
The PER has its origins in the so-called Community Employment (Empleo 
Comunitario), established in 1971 by the Franco regime. The Community 
Employment was designed to tackle the problem of unemployment but also 
– and most importantly – to keep social unrest under control. By the end of 
the 70s, it was not only the government (ruled at that time by the party 
Unión de Centro Democrático, UCD8) distributing the funds of the 
Community Employment but specially the main unions (Comisiones 
Obreras, CC.OO, and Unión General de Tranajadores, U.G.T), who were 
accused of engaging in clientelist relations to recruit new members for the 
organization (González, 1990). At that time, the PSOE was neither a 
consolidated nor a well-structured political party as Hopkin and 
Mastropaolo (2001: 166) notice:  “the [socialist] party essentially consisted 
of small groups of ambitious young politicians in a handful of cities”. 
 
A few years later, in 1982, the socialist party (Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español, PSOE) came in power in the Spanish Parliament for the first time 
in its history. One of the first public programs it implemented was the PER, 
which was effective from January 19849 and was aimed at alleviating the 
effects of high seasonal unemployment in the rural sector, solving the 
shortcomings of the Community Employment. The Royal Decree 3237/83 
determined that the only Autonomous Regions that could have access to the 
                                                           
8
 UCD was a center-right party that played a major role during the Spanish transition to 
democracy. It was the first party in government after the Francoist dictatorship and it held 
power from 1977 until 1982, when it was replaced by the socialist party.    
9
 It was initially regulated by the Royal Decree 3237/1983 of 28 December and the Royal 
Decree 513/84 of 11 January. The few amendments made afterwards are not relevant for 
this study. 
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program would be those where the unemployment rate amongst the so-
called “seasonal agricultural workers” (trabajadores eventuales agrarios) 
was above the national average or where the amount of such workers was 
proportionally above to that in other rural areas. The scope of the program 
was limited to Andalusia and Extremadura given that they fulfilled the 
necessary requirements: in 1983 the unemployment rate amongst the 
agrarian workers in Andalusia and Extremadura was 26%10 (27% in 
Andalusia and 17% in Extremadura), compared to a share of 11% in the rest 
of Spain.  In 1996, when the People’s Party (PP) came to power, it extended 
the program to the adjacent regions of Murcia, Castilla la Mancha, and 
Castilla y León.11 
 
The PER is part of a broader public program, named SIPTEA (Sistema 
Integrado de Protección de los Trabajadores Eventuales Agrarios), which 
consists of three pillars to target agricultural workers in southern Spain: 
occupational training; a special unemployment benefit to seasonal 
agricultural workers (the agrarian subsidy); and the Rural Employment Plan 
(PER), through which municipalities, backed by the subsidies from the 
National Employment Public Service, can offer public jobs to seasonal 
agricultural workers. In 1984, the agrarian subsidy accounted for 75% of 
the national minimum wage, to be received during 180 days per year if the 
worker met the following requirements: the person was unemployed, 
inscribed in the Social Security census of seasonal agrarian workers, lived 
in Andalusia or Extremadura, was older than 16 and not old enough to 
obtain a retirement subsidy, and had worked (and paid contributions to the 
National Insurance) during the previous 12 months a minimum of 60 
working days (the so-called “peonadas”, in Spanish) 12. Compared to the 
unemployment benefits granted by the “general” social security scheme 
(which most of the workers contribute to), the agrarian subsidy is more 
                                                           
10
 In 1984, 1985 and 1986 this figure raised to 46%, 44% and 48%, respectively, while it 
remained below 17% in the rest of Spanish regions. 
11
 The program was then slightly amended and renamed PFEA (Plan de Fomento del 
Empleo Agrario). 
12
 Besides the minimum working days (which have been reduced several times), the other 
requirements remained unchanged through the whole period under study (1977-1996). 
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beneficial to unemployed workers because the benefit received is larger and 
the minimum number of working hours needed to request it is also higher. 
 
The PER complements the agrarian subsidy to the extent that it finances 
public works that employ preferably seasonal agricultural workers, who 
otherwise would find big difficulties in accruing the minimum amount of 
working days. The type of investment financed is, essentially, basic 
infrastructure works (such as road pavement) and the main requisite to be 
fulfilled by the projects is that a substantive share (in many cases up to 
75%) of the workers hired must be seasonal agricultural workers currently 
unemployed. Table 1 shows the growing evolution (especially between 
1984 and 1986) of the contracts and funds assigned to the PER. As for the 
agrarian subsidy (not included in table 1), the total amount of spending 
raises from 42,130 million (constant) pesetas in 1984 to 60,784 in 1995 but 
the proportion of spending per beneficiary remains fairly constant –around 
22 constant pesetas/beneficiary – and it is the same in Andalusia than in 
Extremadura.  
 
Table 1: Evolution of the number of contracts and funds assigned to the PER 
       No. Employment contracts Investment 
(pesetas per capita) 
Year Andalusia Extremadura Total Total/inhab. Total 
1984 85,191 27,367 112,558 1.4% 5,643.2 
1985 196,939 57,598 254,537 3.2% 5,939.6 
1986 212,978 73,198 286,176 3.6% 8,630.6 
1987 201,556 80,672 282,228 3.6% 9,555.9 
1988 159,913 73,387 233,300 2.9% 11,305.2 
1989 151,554 65,071 216,625 2.7% 13,348.4 
1990 122,590 51,398 173,988 2.1% 13,001.5 
1991 113,077 47,866 160,943 2.0% 15,957.7 
1992 94,357 43,937 138,294 1.7% 14,143.8 
1993 111,830 50,576 162,406 2.0% 14,598.9 
Source: Spanish Congress. Doc.61, Serie E. 18 May 1994 
 
The distribution of PER jobs is a joint task of several Administrations. 
Firstly, the central government, through the National Employment Public 
Service (INEM), redistributes the PER budget amongst its provincial 
delegations, who act as the regulatory commissions. The criterion to 
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allocate the funds to the commissions is the demand and supply of 
employment in each province. The task of these commissions is, then, to 
evaluate and approve the reports sent by the city councils, which contain in 
detail the type of projects to be funded, the number or workers required and 
the share of unemployed people to be hired. Then, once the provincial 
delegations approve the projects and their financing13, it is the mayors who 
select the employees to be hired.  
 
2.2. Political economy considerations 
The fact that the distribution of jobs is made at the mayor’s discretion is one 
of the main aspects that explain the PER’s susceptibility to patronage. On 
one side, mayors have often been accused of allegedly committing fraud 
(although only a small number have been prosecuted). They can do so in 
two ways. First, mayors might agree to pay “agrarian wages” to workers. 
This avoids the enrollment of the workers in the “general” social security 
scheme, and helps them increasing the number of working hours – taken 
into account afterwards to claim the agrarian subsidy. Second, mayors (or 
other representatives in the city council) might agree to sign agrarian cards 
stating a number of working hours not really accomplished. On the other 
side, as Cazorla points out,  “the person selecting and the person being 
selected to work meet face to face, which in the rural mindset inevitably 
generates a feeling of gratitude which can be shown (…) in many ways 
including that of giving political support” (1995: 49).  
 
Notice that the job per se (and the salary received) is fairly unimportant to 
the worker: the most important advantage extracted from it is the agrarian 
subsidy. Such benefit, disbursed by the central government, is not collective 
but personalized and this also influences the voter’s decision to support the 
incumbent. As a result, the PER created in Andalusia and Extremadura a 
large amount of unfinished public works and an inflated number of 
                                                           
13
 The central government grants to municipalities most of the money they need to 
provide the jobs. In addition, a smaller part of the funds needed comes from the regional 
government, which covers the cost of material and equipment, and whenever all these 
amounts do not suffice, the local government disburses a small portion of the cost. 
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unemployed people14. For instance, Cazorla (1994) reports that in certain 
seasons there were Andalusian towns where the real number of unemployed 
individuals was only ten percent out of the total number of subsidized 
workers. 
There are other factors, however, that raise concerns about the political –
rather than economic – implications the PER and the agrarian subsidy might 
have. The program targets low-income individuals and, as noted, the 
agrarian subsidy accounts only for 75% of the national minimum wage. 
This means that to the recipient household the benefit usually represents a 
subsistence rent, which might build a strong dependence relationship 
between politicians and subsidized workers. As Stokes (2005) points out in 
her study of Argentinean machine politics, the utility that poor voters obtain 
from the private reward, exceeds the disutility of voting contrary to their 
ideological preferences. Stokes’ empirical analysis concludes that poverty 
predicts clientelism. So, the beneficiaries of the PER not only might cast 
their vote to support the socialist party as an expression of gratitude but also 
because the political agents can credibly threaten to cancel the program 
(threat that can be posed by the central government) or to make jobs 
inaccessible to opposition voters (it is mayors who can exert such 
influence). In any case, both tactics hinder the voter’s possibilities of 
claiming the agrarian subsidy.  
 
Jobs, rather than non-excludable public goods or other types of public 
investment, are regarded as a particularly effective way of exerting political 
pressure because, as noted by Robinson and Verdier (2002), they are “a 
credible, excludable and reversible method of redistribution which ties the 
continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular 
politician”. Although Robinson and Verdier consider developing countries 
to be the focal point of clientelism, such practice also can arise within 
democracies, especially when they are young (Keefer, 2007)  – as is the 
case of Spain in the early eighties. Some might argue that in a democracy 
with secret ballot elections where the vote is not perfectly observable, the 
                                                           
14
 An example can be found in the municipality of Pinos Puente (in Andalusia) where the 
number of subsidized workers went from 900 in 1984 to 4,500 in 1987 (i.e. from 7% to 
33%, out of total population). 
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exchange is not self-enforcing and clientelism can no longer be feasible. 
This argument has already been refuted by several studies because, despite 
the politicians’ inability to monitor the vote, they can certainly observe “a 
range of other actions and behaviors that allow [them] to make good 
guesses” (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004). This idea is in line with that 
of Nichter (2008), who argues that under a secret-ballot system, clientelism 
has more to do with turnout buying than with vote buying. As Nichter 
mentions, the group of citizens targeted might differ depending on whether 
vote buying or turnout buying occur. In the first case, core voters are more 
likely to be the target as the politicians have already established close links 
with them. In the second scenario, indifferent voters are more likely to be 
targeted.   
 
 
3. Data and empirical approach 
 
3.1. Data and variables  
Sample. The database used to examine the potential effect of the PER on 
election outcomes consists of electoral results and voter turnout in the 
general elections at the municipal level, as well as information about the 
mayors and his partisan affiliation. The data cover the period 1979-1993. 
The 1977 general election, the first one to take place under democracy, is 
excluded from the sample provided that some relevant data needed is 
unavailable for that year. Therefore, the period under study starts in 1979, 
the year of the second democratic election. The last election included in the 
study is 1993 because, as mentioned, in 1996 the PER was replaced by a 
program (AEPSA) that extended its scope to a larger number of Spanish 
regions. Thus, the general elections taken into consideration are those held 
in 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1993, while the municipal elections are 
those of 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991 and 1995.  The information concerning 
electoral outcomes, voter turnout and the mayor’s party has been obtained 
from the Ministry of the Interior and several yearbooks from El País (a 
Spanish newspaper).  
 
The final sample contains information for over 3,900 municipalities within 
the autonomous regions of Andalusia and Extremadura (treatment group) 
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and the adjacent regions of Castilla la Mancha, Castilla y León and Murcia 
(control group). Map 1 shows the geographical location of the five regions.  
 
Map 1: Treatment and control regions 
 
 
 
The sample is restricted to these five regions with the aim to reduce to the 
greatest possible extent the disparities between treatment and control 
groups. Relative to other Spanish regions, Castilla la Mancha, Castilla y 
León and Murcia presented lower divergences – in socioeconomic and 
political terms – with Extremadura and Andalusia15. As far as 
socioeconomic features concern, Table 2 presents the results of a test of 
differences that compares mean values of several variables, taking as a 
reference group the treated regions and comparing its mean values with i) 
those for the control group (panel A of Table 2) and ii) those for an 
alternative control group including all Spanish regions besides Andalusia, 
Extremadura, Castilla la Mancha, Castilla y León and Murcia (panel B of 
                                                           
15
 In fact, as mentioned, it is those regions where the PER (or PFEA) was extended to in 
1996 by the People’s Party. 
Castilla León
Castilla la Mancha
Murcia
Andalusia
Extremadura
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Table 2). The variables selected for the comparisons across regions are: 
unemployment rates, education levels, population density, population 
growth and a measure of the “rurality” of a municipality (labeled as 
Agrarian activity and computed as a dummy equal to one if the 
municipality’s main non-tertiary activity is agriculture). The test is limited 
to these variables (described in further detail below) because they are 
relevant for the econometric analysis that follows in the next section. Table 
2 shows, for instance, that municipalities of Andalusia and Extremadura 
have, on average, 77.7 inhabitants/km2 more than municipalities in Murcia, 
Castilla la Mancha and Castilla y León (see panel A). In addition, panel B 
shows that the difference between the mean density in the municipalities of 
Andalusia and Extremadura and the mean density in the municipalities of 
the rest of Spain (besides those in Murcia, Castilla la Mancha and Castilla y 
León) is 121 inhabitants/km2 (being Andalusia and Extremadura less 
densely populated). Lastly, on the political side, it is worth noting that from 
1982 until 1996, all the regional governments, with the exception of Castilla 
y León (from 1987), were governed by the socialist party. 
 
Table 2: Test of difference in means 
 Panel A Panel B 
Variables 
Difference 
(SE) 
t-test           
(p-value) Difference (SE) 
t-test           
(p-value) 
Unemployment -0.06  (0.002) 
-30.93  
(0.000) 
-0.17  
(0.001) 
-1.00  
(0.000) 
Rural activity 0.08  (0.016) 
4.87  
(0.000) 
-0.22  
(0.016) 
-13.26 
 (0.000) 
Population 
growth 
-0.02  
(0.003) 
-4.86  
(0.000) 
0.01 
 (0.038) 
0.31  
(0.75) 
Education -0.01 
 (0.002) 
-4.79  
(0.000) 
0.07  
(0.007) 
10.01  
(0.000) 
Density -77.70  (8.921) 
-8.7  
(0.000) 
121.20  
(32.68) 
3.71  
(0.000) 
Notes: (1) In Panel A and B the reference group is the treatment group that includes Andalusia and 
Extremadura; (2) panel A shows the difference in means when the control group includes Castilla 
la Mancha, Castilla y León and Murcia; (4) panel B shows the difference in means when the 
control group includes all Spanish regions besides the treated regions and Castilla la Mancha, 
Castilla y León and Murcia; (5) the null hypothesis is that the difference in means is not 
statistically different than zero; (6) a negative sign of the difference represents that averages are 
higher in the treatment group. 
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Dependent variable. To estimate the effect of patronage on elections, I use 
three main dependent variables: the PSOE’s vote share in general elections, 
the voter turnout in general elections (i.e. the total ballots cast as a share of 
voting population), and a dummy variable indicating whether the mayor of 
a municipality is re-elected in the next election16.  
 
Treatment variable.  The variable to be used in this study should be, ideally, 
the number of beneficiaries of the program and its geographical 
distribution. This information is not available for the period under study; 
however, I now discuss alternative measures. Provided that the program 
specifically targets rural municipalities of Andalusia and Extremadura, this 
kind of municipalities should have in principle a higher concentration of 
PER jobs. According to the OECD Rural Policy Review of Spain (2009), 
rural municipalities are defined as municipalities with a population density 
of less than 150 inhabitants per squared kilometer. Taking this classification 
as a reference, I construct the variable Rural as a binary variable that equals 
to one if the municipality has less than 150 inhabitants/km2. Two other 
indices, however, can be used to contrast the appropriateness of using the 
population as a proxy of “rurality”. One is the share of workers employed 
within the agricultural sector (variable labeled as Agrarian workers) and the 
other one is a dummy variable equal to one if agriculture is the 
municipality’s main non-tertiary activity (variable labeled as Agrarian 
activity). In section 4 of this chapter I assess formally the validity of these 
variables as good proxies to the number and distribution of PER 
beneficiaries. These three measures used to identify rural municipalities are 
not relevant per se, but become the variable of interest once they are 
interacted with a treatment variable that indicates whether the municipality 
belongs to the treated regions, and the observation corresponds to a year 
after 1984. 
 
Control variables. Lastly, to provide more precise and robust estimates the 
regressions include a set of control variables, which is limited due to the 
                                                           
16
 It is not possible to examine the effect of the PER on the vote share for the mayor at the 
local elections because this information is not available at the municipal level prior to 
1984. 
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unavailability of data prior to the introduction of the PER. The control 
variables that could potentially have an effect on either the support for the 
PSOE, the voters’ mobilization (i.e. the turnout) or the mayor’s probability 
of reelection are three. First, the unemployment rate is included as a proxy 
of poverty provided that low-income households in Spain are more prone to 
support left-wing parties (such as the socialist party). Also, unemployment 
may either enhance or deter electoral participation. In turn, if citizens 
identify the local administration as the provider of employment, 
unemployment may have a negative effect on the mayor’s probability of 
reelection. The second control variable is education (measured as the share 
of population with studies), which, if it predicts lower levels of poverty, it 
would have the opposite effect than unemployment. Education can also 
have an impact on the voter turnout (although the literature is not 
conclusive on what should be the sign). The third control variable added in 
the regression is the population growth, which, if driven for instance by an 
in-flow of migrants, could modify the political preferences of the voters in a 
municipality. The definitions, data sources, and descriptive statistics of the 
variables discussed in this section can be found in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variable Description Mean (S.D) Source 
PSOE vote (%) No. of votes for PSOE as a share of valid ballots cast;  at general election  
0.38  
(0.17) 
 Ministry of the 
Interior 
Re-election 
Binary variable equal to one if the 
mayor is re-elected at the election 
0.51 
(0.50) 
Turnout 
Total ballots cast as a share of voting 
population according to electoral 
census; at general election 
0.78 
(0.09) 
PER 
Binary variable equal to one if the 
observation corresponds to a 
municipality in Andalusia or 
Extremadura and  the election year is 
after 1984 
0.16 
(0.37) - -   
Rural 
Binary variable equal to one if the 
municipality has less 150 inhabitants 
per Km2 
0.66 
(0.47) 
Population 
censuses. National 
Institute of Statistics 
(INE) 
Agrarian 
workers 
Workers employed within the 
agricultural sector as a share of 
working-age population 
0.34 
(0.19) 
Agrarian 
activity 
Binary variable equal to one if the 
municipality’s main non-tertiary 
activity is agriculture 
0.63 
(0.48) 
Education 
Population with studies as a share of 
total population 
0.20 
(0.07) 
Unemployment 
Number of unemployed people as a 
share of labour force 
0.13 
(0.13) 
Population 
growth 
(Populationit- Populationit-1)/ 
Populationt 
-0.04 
(0.08)  
Education 
centres 
Education establishments per 1000 
inhabitants  
0.93 
(3.37) Population census 
and Census of 
establishments Health centres 
Health establishments per 1000 
inhabitants 
0.40 
(1.13) 
 
3.2. Specification 
The aim of this study is to identify the average effect of the introduction of 
the PER on electoral outcomes in the municipalities of Andalusia and 
Extremadura (those affected by the policy). An ideal strategy would be to 
use a randomized experiment, to ensure there are no permanent differences 
in any other pre-treatment variables. However, a counterfactual is not 
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available as it is not possible to observe electoral outcomes at the same 
point in time in the treatment regions with and without the introduction of 
the PER. In this case, one should turn to non-experimental methods that 
mimic an experiment. In this sense, a well-established econometric 
technique is the difference-in-differences approach (Card and Krueger, 
1994, 2000).This consists on a particular fixed-effects estimation that takes 
into consideration two types of differences: structural differences between 
the treatment and the control group, and differences within the treated 
municipalities over time (i.e. between the pre- and post-treatment periods).   
 
Empirical strategy. The introduction of the Spanish PER in 1984 provides a 
set up with electoral outcomes for a treatment and control group for two 
time periods (before and after 1984). This allows assessing formally the 
electoral consequences of the PER at the central government level using the 
following baseline model: 
 
Vit = αi + µ t + δ PERit + γ Xit + εit                                                      (1) 
 
where Vit denotes the election outcome of municipality i at term t 
(depending on which analysis is run, either the PSOE’s vote share in 
general elections or the voter turnout); αi and µ t are municipality and time 
fixed-effects, to control respectively for municipality-specific omitted 
variables and local trends; Xit is a vector of time-varying control variables 
(share of population with studies, unemployment rate and share of working-
age population) for municipality i;  PERit is a binary variable equal to one  
if the municipality is affected by the Plan for Rural Employment, that is, if 
the observation corresponds to an election after 1984 and a municipality 
within Andalusia or Extremadura;  εit is the time-varying error term, 
assumed to be independently distributed. The key estimate is δ, which 
indicates the difference between the average change in the vote share for 
the socialist party (or the average change in the voter turnout) of the 
treatment group and that of the control group.   
 
Although any municipality in Andalusia and Extremadura can avail itself of 
the PER, it is especially rural municipalities in these regions which have the 
vast majority of its beneficiaries. This fact can be considered by introducing 
the variable Rural in equation (1); see equation (2) below.  
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Vit = αi + µ t + β Rurali + δ PERit + ρ Rurali × PERit + γ Xit + εit             (2) 
 
In this case, the coefficient of interest that reflects the impact of the PER in 
the rural municipalities of the treated regions is ρδ + ρ), i.e., a triple 
difference estimate. This gives more robust estimates and controls for 
potential changes (not motivated by the policy) in the voters’ preferences in 
rural areas of the treatment regions and for changes in the voter’s 
preferences of all municipalities in the treatment group (due to other 
regional policies that might have affected the voters’ perception of 
politicians). 
 
As for the advantages that mayors can reap from the program established by 
the central government, I focus on estimating the effect of the PER on the 
mayors’ probability of being reelected. In this case, the specifications are as 
follows: 
 
Reelectionit = αi + µ t + δPERit + γXit + εit                                               (3) 
Reelectionit = αi + µ t + βRurali + δPERit + ρRurali × PERit + γXit + εit (4) 
 
where the dependent variable Reelection is a binary variable that equals to 
one if the mayor at election t is the same than the mayor elected at t+1 
election. The next section contains the results of estimating equation (1) to 
(4) and the tests performed afterwards to assess the robustness of the 
estimates. 
 
It is worth noting that the idiosyncratic error term in the linear panel-data 
models above may suffer from a serial correlation problem, which means 
that there are unobservable factors that cannot be controlled for which 
affect election results and, at the same time, are correlated over time within 
municipalities. Political preferences in a municipality are quite persistent: 
many municipalities have a historical record of repeatedly voting en mass 
for the socialist party, the people’s party or another party. The test for 
autocorrelation suggested by Wooldrige (2002) confirms that the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected (F-test = 1886.914, p-value = 
0.0000). Therefore, to provide consistent estimates the errors are clustered 
at the municipality level. 
Chapter 3. Electoral Rewards to Patronage Politics 
64 
 
 
Verification of the “parallel trends” hypothesis. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the regions that comprise the control group are chosen to 
minimize disparities between control and treatment groups. Further, the 
specific selection of the control group is made to ensure a fundamental 
identifying assumption is met: the trends followed by electoral outcomes in 
the two groups in the absence of intervention (i.e., before 1984) must be 
equal. To evaluate this hypothesis formally, Table 4 presents the average 
trend of the vote share for the PSOE in treatment and control groups before 
the PER was established and the difference in means. The t-test performed 
over this sample does not reject the null hypothesis that the difference in 
means is not statistically different than zero. 
 
Table 4: Test for the parallel-trend assumption 
Variable 
Treatment group 
Mean (SE) 
Control group 
Mean (SE) Difference 
PSOE vote share trend 0.073 (0.003) 
0.070 
(0.001) -0.003 (0.003) 
N. Observations 1066 2837 
Notes: (1) the figures presented in this table correspond to the mean of the outcome variable, 
i.e. trend of the PSOE vote share in the pre-treatment period; (2) standard errors in 
parenthesis; t-statistic= -0.8776, p-value= 0.3802. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Strong reasons – drawn upon the political economy literature on clientelism 
– suggest that the unique features of the PER and the agrarian subsidy leave 
room for a direct exchange of employment for votes. Despite some 
anecdotal and qualitative evidence presented in the previous sections, up to 
now there is no quantitative evidence of the extent to which the socialist 
party or the mayors that allocate PER jobs obtain some sort of electoral 
reward. The double and triple differences approaches described along 
section 3 enable to shed some light in this matter. 
 
The starting point of this section consists in evaluating whether a measure 
capturing the rural condition of a municipality is a good approximation of 
the share of PER beneficiaries. Table 5 in section 4.1 presents the estimates 
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that confirm that, indeed, this is the case. Afterwards, the analysis of the 
electoral returns for the central and the local governments are presented 
separately in section 4.2. Tables 6 and 7 in section 4.2 show the effect of 
the PER on the vote share for the PSOE (and its evolution over time) and 
the voter turnout.  Tables 8 and 9 suggest that mayors did not benefit from 
the distribution of jobs with higher probabilities of being reelected and 
neither did the socialist mayors provide an advantage to their party in 
general elections. Lastly, a set of robustness tests are presented in section 
4.3. First, the alternative measures of “rurality” are used to confirm the 
previous results (Table 9). Second, I assess the robustness of the estimates 
by controlling for the possibility that the approval of the Statutes of 
Autonomy of Andalusia and Extremadura in the early 80s (rather than the 
introduction of the PER) determines the change in the political support in 
these regions given that the devolution of tasks translated into larger 
transfers of funds to the regional governments (Table 10). 
 
4.1. The determinants of the geographic distribution of PER 
beneficiaries 
The triple difference approach previously mentioned requires the use of an 
index of “rurality” to have an approximation to the share of PER 
beneficiaries and, hence three different measures have been selected: Rural, 
Agrarian workers and Agrarian activity. To test the appropriateness of 
these variables as good proxies of the share of PER beneficiaries, they are 
introduced in a regression where the proportion of subsidized seasonal 
agricultural workers in the municipality is the dependent variable. Such 
information is available at the municipal level only for the year 2000, from 
the system of multi-territory information of Andalusia, SIMA. In some of 
the regressions I also include the unemployment rate as an explanatory 
variable because, as already explained, the supply and demand of 
employment is the indicator used by the central government to allocate the 
program funds amongst the provincial delegations and also because the 
approval of the projects by these delegations depends on the share of 
unemployed workers to be hired by the city council in each project. Results 
are presented in Table 5. 
 
The positive sign and the statistical significance of the estimates confirm 
that the three measures of “rurality” selected are good predictors of the 
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share of PER beneficiaries: being a rural municipality  or a municipality 
whose main non-tertiary activity is agriculture increases by around 6 
percentage points, on average, the share of PER beneficiaries, while an 
increase by one percentage point in the share of either agrarian workers or 
unemployment rates translates into a 20-30% higher share of such 
beneficiaries. The model with the highest explanatory power is that of 
column 7 (i.e. the one including both the unemployment rate and the share 
of agrarian workers in a municipality).  
 
Table 5: Determinants of the distribution of subsidized seasonal agricultural workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Rural 
municipality 
0.05*** 
(0.007) 
 
   0.03*** 
(0.007) 
  
Agrarian 
activity 
 0.06*** 
(0.005) 
 
   0.06*** 
(0.004) 
 
Agrarian 
workers 
  0.25*** 
(0.020) 
 
   0.31*** 
(0.017) 
Unemployment    0.22*** 
(0.018) 
 
0.20*** 
(0.018) 
0.22*** 
(0.017) 
0.29*** 
(0.014) 
Constant 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.00 
 (0.040) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.038) (0.030) (0.030) 
Observations 735 735 735 735 735 735 735 
R-squared 0.282 0.367 0.433 0.374 0.396 0.503 0.650 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: subsidized seasonal agrarian workers as a share of working-age 
population; (2) robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (3) SE 
clustered by municipality; (4) the control variables included in all specifications are: share of 
population with pre-compulsory education, share of population with post-compulsory education 
and share of working-age population; (5) see Table 3 for definition of independent variables.   
 
4.2. The electoral rewards to the distribution of PER jobs 
PSOE votes in general elections. Table 6 reports the estimates of equation 
(1) and (2), that is, the average effect of the introduction of the PER on the 
vote share of the socialist party at the general elections in Andalusia and 
Extremadura as a whole (column 1) and also in their rural municipalities 
(column 2) – considered as such if they have less than 150 inhabitants/km2 
– where the share of PER beneficiaries is higher. The results show that, on 
average, the municipalities of Andalusia and Extremadura increased their 
support (in terms of votes) to the socialist party by around 3 percentage 
points after the introduction of the PER. This coefficient remains 
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statistically significant when control variables (education, unemployment 
rate and population growth) are included. Column 2 presents the triple 
differences estimates (i.e. those corresponding to equation 2 above). The 
results in this column show that the coefficient of the PER variable is not 
statistically significant, which indicates that non-rural municipalities in 
Andalusia and Extremadura did not significantly offer higher support for 
the PSOE after the introduction of the PER. This is consistent with the 
previous discussion; see for instance, the first newspaper headline in 
footnote 5 where it is stated that only “villages” (and not large cities) are 
meant to reward the socialist party. In column 2, however, the point 
estimate associated to the interaction variable PER×Rural is 0.03. This 
coefficient, which is statistically significant, indicates that under the PER 
policy, the vote share for the PSOE is 3 percentage points higher in rural.  
Considering that the average vote share for the PSOE in rural municipalities 
was 35% before the establishment of the program, the estimates suggest an 
average increase of 8.6% in the support for the socialist party after 1984. 
 
The control variables are also statistically significant and the sign of the 
associated coefficients is as expected: a one percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate increases by 6 percentage points the vote share for the 
PSOE (a 16% increase for an average municipality where the PSOE obtains 
38% of votes); a one percentage point increase in the share of educated 
population raises by 7 percentage points the support for the PSOE; the 
population growth has a positive effect on the vote share for the PSOE but 
is only statistically significant at the 10%. A possible explanation for the 
effect of the population growth could be that, as the PER reduced the 
outflows of migrants from the treated regions (Jofre-Monseny, 2012), the 
residents who refrained from emigrating from Andalusia and Extremadura 
and, to a lower extent, the immigrants who were attracted to these regions 
by the generous welfare benefits offered by the program, would support the 
PSOE for its policy. 
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Table 6: Effects of the PER on the support for the PSOE at general elections and its 
evolution over time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
PER 0.03*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.00 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) 
Rural     
     
PER×Rural  0.03***   
  (0.011)  0.03*** 
PER × Term1989-93   0.00* (0.011) 
   (0.002)  
PER × Term1993-96   -0.01***  
   (0.003)  
PER × Term1989-93 × Rural    0.01*** 
    (0.002) 
PER × Term1993-96 × Rural    -0.01* 
    (0.003) 
Controls:     
     
Unemployment 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Education -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Population growth 0.02* 0.02* 0.02** 0.02** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 19,456 19,456 19,456 19,456 
R-squared 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.531 
Municipality fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: PSOE’s vote share at general elections; (2) robust standard errors 
in parentheses, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (3) SE clustered by municipality; (4) time fixed-
effects in all equations; (5) Term1989-93 and Term1993-96 in columns 3 and 4 are time dummies 
indicating the electoral term; (6) the reference term is that of 1986-1989 (i.e. first term after the 
PER was introduced; (7) see Table 3 for definition of independent variables and controls. 
 
Persistence over time. In this study, it is also relevant to examine the 
evolution of the electoral rewards to the PER across time for two reasons. 
First, as noted, from the early 90s there were already major concerns about 
the fraud committed by local representatives when allocating jobs and 
signing agrarian cards with fake working hours. To lower the capacity of 
such representatives to commit fraud, the regulatory commissions took a 
(slightly) more active role in monitoring the process. Second, as time goes 
by citizens might become more reluctant to exchange their vote for 
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employment the more aware they are of the negative consequences that this 
extended practice has had on the economic development of the region. To 
examine the evolution of the estimates of equations (1) and (2) across time, 
I include in these equations time effects for the “post-treatment” terms 
interacted with the other relevant variables (taking as the reference term the 
first one after the introduction of the PER). The outcomes are presented in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 6. When looking at rural municipalities of 
Andalusia and Extremadura, the results in column 4 show that during the 
first term after the establishment of the PER, the difference in the vote share 
for the PSOE between rural and non-rural municipalities was around 3 
percentage points during the first term (1986-1988), 4 percentage points 
during the second term (1989-1992) and 3 percentage points during the last 
term analyzed (1993-1995). Therefore, although the effect of the PER had a 
peak in the second term after its introduction, the positive impact is 
persistent during all the period under study. This suggests that the increase 
in democratic culture did not weaken the ties between patrons (politicians) 
and clients (voters). Instead, it run parallel to the establishment of a 
clientelist network that reinforced the patron-client dependence and favored 
the continued reward to the socialist party.   
 
Plausible explanations. The increase in the support for the socialist party 
could be explained partly from  lower abstention rates amongst PSOE 
voters provided that abstention in Spain tends to be higher amongst the left-
wing voters (which embraces PSOE supporters) than amongst the right-
wing. 17 To examine this issue further, I run the regressions on equations (1) 
and (2) using as a dependent variable the voter turnout at the general 
elections. Results are presented in Table7. The coefficients in column 4 
suggest that in rural municipalities of Andalusia and Extremadura the 
introduction of the PER increased by 5 percentage points the voter turnout. 
                                                           
17
 A clear example is that of the 2004 Spanish general elections where there was a 
substantive increase in the turnout of 7 percentage points, which lead the PSOE to its 
victory. The main opposition party, the People’s Party, had a major lost of votes in 
percentage terms but not in absolute number of votes, which means that the mobilization 
of voters did not favour the PP  (see Boso et al. 2005). Furthermore, in a quantitative 
analysis of the Spanish case, Rowe et al. (2012)  find that a one point increase in voter 
turnout raises the vote share for the socialist party by 0.5 points in the short-run and by 
0.8 points in the long-run. 
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To an average rural municipality in Andalusia and Extremadura, with 72% 
turnout before 1984, this represents a 7% increase.  
 
Table 7: Effects of the PER on turnout at general elections 
 (1) (2) 
   
PER 0.01*** -0.04*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
Rural   
   
PER x Rural  0.05*** 
  (0.005) 
Constant 0.70*** 0.70*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 19,456 19,456 
R-squared 0.421 0.425 
Municipality fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: voter turnout at general elections; (2) robust 
standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05,   * p<0.1; (3) SE 
clustered by municipality; (4) time fixed-effects in all equations; (5) the 
control variables included are: education, unemployment and population 
growth; (6) see Table 3 for definition of independent variables and controls. 
 
An alternative possibility that could partly justify the increase in votes for 
the socialist party in general elections after 1984 might be a shift of votes 
coming from other parties’ supporters. In 1982, the second most voted party 
in both the treatment and control regions was the People’s Party (known at 
that time as Alianza Popular, at the same time that attracted part of UCD’s 
votes when it dissolved in 1983), with an average vote share of 35% 
(against 40% for the socialist party). The PP, exerting its role as the main 
opposition party, repeatedly criticized the PER and, thus, it would be 
plausible that the introduction of the program had a negative impact in its 
vote share. This is indeed confirmed when equations (1) and (2) are 
regressed using as dependent variable the vote share for the PP. In this case, 
the triple difference estimates (eq.2) show that on average the PER 
decreased by 14 percentage points the PP’s vote share. However, it is worth 
noting that in the case of PP’s supporters (who are strongly leaned towards 
the right) it is likely that only a minor share switched their vote towards the 
PSOE.  
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Another party that could have been electorally punished by the introduction 
of the policy was the communist party (initially Partido Comunista de 
España, and after 1986 comparable to Izquierda Unida). As noted early, the 
main unions – closely linked to the Communist Party –were accused of 
attracting affiliates through the discretionary allocation of funds from the 
Community Employment. Indirectly, if this also represented higher support 
for the Communist Party, then the introduction of the PER, which left the 
unions with no control on the program’s funds, would have translated into 
lower vote shares for the Communist Party. In this case, it is more likely 
that votes switched from the Communist Party to the socialist party given 
the left-wing ideology of both parties. A formal assessment of this 
hypothesis does not provide statistically significant results with the DD 
approach. On the contrary, the triple differences approach – i.e. the analysis 
when “rurality” is accounted for – does yield statistically significant results 
(although at the 10%). In this case, the reduction of the vote share for the 
communist party after 1984 was a 1 percentage point. 
 
Local election outcomes. At the local level, I examine the effect of the 
introduction of the PER on the mayor’s probability of reelection. Note that 
in this case it is not only relevant whether the political party hold office 
from one term to another, but whether the mayor, individually, was 
rewarded by the citizens who received PER jobs. Table 8 presents marginal 
effects for OLS and logit regressions. As shown in columns (1) to (4), the 
establishment of the program did not affect the mayors’ probabilities of 
being reelected.  
 
Another fact to take into consideration is the partisan alignment between 
socialist mayors and the party ruling at the central government, which could 
have provided mayors with further resources to distribute jobs. Moreover, 
as Golden and Picci (2011) suggest, the advantage the politicians might 
enjoy from the use of pork barrel or clientelism, depends on their ability to 
claim credit from the benefits distributed. In the context of the Spanish 
PER, the mayors are certainly able to claim credit for the jobs allocated but 
not for the agrarian subsidy collected thanks to the public job. Therefore, to 
mayors, the credit from the program might be easier to claim if they are 
aligned with the central government responsible for distributing the 
unemployment benefit. In columns 2 and 4 this hypothesis is tested by 
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introducing the PER×Rural×PSOE interaction, where PSOE is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the municipality is governed by a socialist mayor. 
The coefficient associated to the PER×PSOE interaction term in column 3 
is significant, and it does indicate that socialist mayors were more likely to 
be re-elected after the PER. However, this result has some pitfalls. First, it 
is only significant at the 10 percent and not robust to the use of a non-linear 
probability function. Second, the variable of interest, PER×Rural×PSOE, 
which reflects whether mayors from rural municipalities (i.e. the areas with 
the most PER beneficiaries) increased their re-election probabilities after 
the introduction of the program, is not statistically significant. Overall, the 
results suggest that the mayors – no matter their party of affiliation – did 
not reap any advantage at municipal elections. This is consistent with the 
pattern described in Corzo’s analysis of the Spanish PER (2002: 336): “the 
clientelist relation is not established with the closest level of power but, if it 
exists it is with the one who takes the most relevant decisions.” 
 
Table 8: Effects of the PER on the mayor’s probability of re-election 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Logit 
     
PER 0.01 -0.22* 0.01 -0.93 
 (0.078) (0.128) (.435) (0.604) 
PER × Rural 0.01 0.05 -0.10 0.10 
 (0.078) (0.131) (0.431) (0.622) 
PSOE  0.21***  1.19*** 
  (0.025)  (0.143) 
PSOE × PER  0.29*  1.18 
  (0.157)  (0.816) 
PSOE × PER × Rural  -0.02  0.05 
  (0.163)  (0.121) 
Observations 7,081 7,081 7,081 7,081 
R-squared 0.060 0.062 -- -- 
Chi-squared -- -- 234.9 230.9 
Municipality fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: dummy variable indicating whether the mayor is reelected at 
election t+1; (2) robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (3) SE 
clustered by municipality; (4) time  fixed-effects in all equations; (5) PSOE= binary variable equal 
to one if the mayor is affiliated to the socialist party; (6) all regressions include control variables: 
education unemployment; (7) columns 1 and 3 also include as a control dummy variables that 
account for the party of the mayor; (8) see Table 3 for definition of independent variables and 
controls; (9) coefficients in columns 3 and 4 are marginal effects at the means. 
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The previous results could have several explanations. The first one is that 
the worker’s main benefit from the PER, as mentioned early, was the 
indirect collection of the agrarian subsidy and therefore workers would 
strongly identify the socialist party at the central government as the 
authority responsible for the policy. Second, the range of distributable 
“favors” at the mayor’s disposal is not only limited to PER jobs. Thus, at 
the local level the relevance of employment might be diluted by other 
actions coming from mayors.    
 
The analysis conducted in this section, however, has certain methodological 
shortcomings that ought to be pointed out. Not only there is no available 
disaggregated data of the distribution of vote shares amongst parties in 
municipal elections prior to 1984 (which would allow to estimate, for 
instance, if the mayors’ incumbency advantage changes after the 
establishment of the PER) 18 but also there is no information available for 
the candidates running for each election. Such information would allow 
controlling for candidates that are incumbents or challengers, which would 
provide more robust estimates. The distinction between incumbent and 
challenger is relevant in this analysis as the former should be the ones 
experiencing a higher increase in the probability of re-election, provided 
that they are the suppliers of jobs. 
 
The finding of a null effect of the PER on the mayor’s probability of re-
election suggests that mayors did not benefit directly from allocating jobs. 
Another possibility, however, is the existence of a reverse coattails effect, 
such as the ones described in Ames (1994). This effect refers to the 
electoral advantages obtained by presidential candidates in municipalities 
where the mayor represents their party.19  To test for this hypothesis an 
interaction term is introduced to account for the effect of the establishment 
of the PER in rural municipalities governed by the socialist party (variable 
                                                           
18
 The term “incumbency advantage” refers to the fact that incumbents in a political office 
tend to obtain larger vote shares (compared to the new challengers) if they run for re-
election. One of the first attempts to provide empirical evidence on this matter is Erikson 
(1971). 
19
 Ames finds a significant effect in the presidential election of Brazil in 1989, when 
voters could weakly identify with political parties. 
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labeled as PSOE × PER × Rural). The results presented in Table 9 suggest 
that this was not the case, given that the interaction term is statistically 
insignificant. This may mean that the role of mayors is that of mere 
intermediaries who deliver jobs (also known as brokers in the literature on 
clientelism) or, as mentioned, that the only benefit from the entire program 
which voters considered important was the unemployment subsidy. 
 
Table 9:  Effect of the PER on PSOE’s vote share at general elections. Does having a 
socialist mayor provide an advantage? 
 (1) (2) 
   
PER 0.01 0.01 
 (0.013) (0.011) 
PSOE 0.12*** 0.04*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
PSOE × PER -0.06*** -0.02** 
 (0.015) (0.009) 
Rural -0.02***  
 (0.008)  
PER × rural 0.04*** 0.02** 
 (0.014) (0.012) 
PSOE × PER × rural 0.02 0.01 
 (0.016) (0.009) 
Constant 0.37*** 0.26*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) 
Observations 19,515 19,456 
R-squared 0.561 0.550 
Municipality fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: PSOE’s vote share at general 
elections; (2) robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; (3) SE clustered by municipality; (4) time fixed-
effects in all equations; (5) the control variables included are: 
education, unemployment and  population growth; (6) PSOE= 
binary variable equal to one if the mayor is affiliated to the socialist 
party; (7) see Table 3 for definition of independent variables and 
controls.  
 
 
4.3. Robustness tests 
To conclude the results section, additional findings are included with the 
aim to test the robustness of the previous estimates. Firstly, I test whether 
the results found in the previous sections are driven by the specific selection 
of the variable Rural as an index of “rurality”. To assess this possibility, the 
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same regression are run using the alternative variables previously 
mentioned (Agrarian activity and Agrarian workers). The analysis is 
conducted for general election outcomes and for the mayor’s probability of 
being reelected (Table 10). The results presented show that the previous 
findings remain significant when we measure the “rurality” of a 
municipality with the share of agrarian workers (but not when we measure 
it with the Agrarian activity variable). The estimates in column 2 suggest 
that, overall, the introduction of the PER raised the vote share for the 
socialist party by 6 percentage points. Column 1 also suggests that the 
introduction of the program had an effect but this was not different in 
municipalities where agriculture was the main non-tertiary activity.   
 
With regards to the impact of the PER on the voter turnout, I reject the 
hypothesis that the PER had an effect in agrarian municipalities of 
Andalusia and Extremadura and neither in municipalities with large shares 
of agrarian workers, which questions the robustness of the previous finding.  
 
Table 10: Robustness test (I). Effect of the PER on general election outcomes. 
Alternative measures of “rurality” 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dep. variable: 
PSOE’s vote share 
Dep. variable: 
Turnout  
     
PER 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.01*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
PER × Agrarian activity 0.01  0.00  
 (0.006)  (0.004)  
Agrarian workers  -0.05***  -0.02** 
  (0.012)  (0.009) 
PER × Agrarian workers  0.04***  -0.01 
  (0.013)  (0.009) 
Observations 19,456 19,456 19,456 19,456 
R-squared 0.530 0.531 0.422 0.422 
Municipality fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (2) 
SE clustered by municipality; (3) time fixed-effects in all equations; (4) the control 
variables included in all specifications are: education, unemployment and population 
growth; (5) coefficients in columns 7 and 8 are marginal effects at the means; (6) see 
Table 3 for definition of independent variables and controls.   
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As for the impact of the program on the mayors’ probability of reelection, 
the finding that the PER had no statistically effect remains unchanged when 
using the alternative proxies of “rurality” (Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Robustness test (II). Effect of the PER on local election outcomes. Alternative 
measures of “rurality” 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dep. variable: mayor’s probability of reelection 
 OLS Logit 
     
PER 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.16 
 (0.039) (0.045) (0.189) 0.230 
PER × Agrarian activity -0.05  -0.20  
 (0.043)  (0.212)  
Agrarian workers  -0.07  -0.55 
  (0.085)  0.461 
PER × Agrarian workers  -0.17  -0.67 
  (0.133)  (0.734) 
Observations 7,081 7,081 7,081 7,081 
R-squared 0.060 0.061 0.110 0.108 
Municipality fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (2) SE 
clustered by municipality; (3) time fixed-effects in all equations; (4) the control variables 
included in all specifications are: education, unemployment and population growth; (5) 
coefficients in columns 7 and 8 are marginal effects at the means; (6) see Table 3 for 
definition of independent variables and controls.   
 
Finally, to evaluate further the robustness of the finding that the PER 
benefited electorally the socialist party, I contrast the alternative 
explanation that it was not the PER but the decentralization process started 
in the early 80s (prior to the introduction of the PER) in Andalusia and 
Extremadura what had an effect on the support for the socialist party in 
these regions.  
 
The Spanish Constitution approved in 1978 established the right of the 
regions for autonomy, which set the bases of the current system of 
Autonomous Regions in Spain. Andalusia and Extremadura approved their 
Statute of Autonomy in 1981 and 1983, respectively, and this was followed 
by a decentralization of powers from central to regional governments, 
coupled with large transfers of funds to compensate for the costs. At the 
time of the approval of Andalusia and Extremadura’s Statutes (and, through 
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the rest of the period under study) their regional governments were aligned 
with the central government, which could have lead to certain bias in the 
allocation of transfers.20 If these funds were used, for example, to build new 
schools or hospitals, voters could also have incentives to reward the PSOE 
for that. The devolution of powers in the health sector in Andalusia was in 
1984 and in Extremadura it was in 2001, while in the education sector 
unrelated to universities the devolution of powers was in 1982 in Andalusia 
and in 1999 in Extremadura (Informe CEOE, 2011).   
 
To test for the possibility that the decentralization process had an impact on 
the vote share for the PSOE in general elections, I add as control variables 
the number of education and health centres per 1000 inhabitants. The 
results, not presented for the sake of brevity, show that the sign, 
significance and magnitude of the coefficients associated to the main 
variables (PER and PER × Rural) remain unchanged and therefore the 
results presented in the previous section are confirmed. 21  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This article provides empirical evidence on the electoral returns to the 
discretionary allocation of public employment. It does so by examining the 
Spanish Plan for Rural Employment (PER), a program that provides 
temporary jobs to seasonal agricultural workers in order to mitigate the 
negative consequences of high unemployment in the rural municipalities of 
certain regions in Spain (Andalusia and Extremadura).  
 
The PER has been highly controversial since its establishment in 1984 and 
it is regarded as a mechanism to simply ensure a subsistence rent to many 
households without solving effectively the unemployment problem. The 
main concern, however, is the widespread perception that the PER has been 
used by the Spanish socialist party to create and consolidate its strongholds 
                                                           
20
 Arulampalam et al., 2009, for instance, show that this is the case in India. 
21
 The coefficient associated to both the share of education and health centres is 
statistically insignificant. 
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in the southern regions of Andalusia and Extremadura.  Despite the 
relatively large number of references to this topic in the political science 
literature, so far no attempt was made at quantifying the electoral benefits 
received by the PSOE. In fact, there is not a large sample of studies on 
clientelism providing quantitative evidence for these matters.   
 
The empirical analysis undertaken consists on using a double and triple 
differences design to assess the political changes that occurred after the 
introduction of the PER. Such changes may, a priori, affect two different 
layers of government. On the one side, the central government, who was 
responsible for establishing and funding the PER, as well as for distributing 
a special unemployment benefit (mainly targeted at PER beneficiaries). On 
the other side, the local government, who was responsible for the 
(discretionary) allocation of PER jobs amongst its citizens.  
 
The findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, rural 
municipalities of Andalusia and Extremadura (those mostly affected by the 
PER) experienced an increase in the vote share for the socialist party in the 
general elections after the introduction of the program. Second, the positive 
effect of the PER on the support for the PSOE remains statistically 
significant during the whole period under study but it has a peak during the 
second term after 1984 and it weakens thereafter, probably because of a 
stronger monitoring of the process of allocation of jobs in the 90s (which 
reduced to a certain extent the chances of fraud). Third, a plausible 
explanation for the raise in the vote share for the PSOE could be an increase 
in the voter turnout (which, in Spain, tends to favor left-wing parties). 
Although I do find some evidence pointing towards this hypothesis, the 
significance of the results is not robust to the choice of alternative measures 
of “rurality”. Finally, I test for the impact of the PER on the mayor’s 
reelection probabilities given that they are ultimately the suppliers of jobs.  
However, I do not find evidence neither of the electoral rewards to mayors 
in local elections (not even for those affiliated to the socialist party) nor of a 
reverse coattails effect that grants electoral advantage in general elections to 
the party aligned with the mayor. The most plausible explanations are that 
mayors are merely regarded as brokers delivering jobs – therefore, not with 
power to take top-level decisions about the program –      and/or that voters 
do not see in PER jobs (and the wages earned through them) a benefit per 
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se but an instrument to obtain a more generous welfare benefit (the agrarian 
subsidy).  
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Chapter 4  
Partisan Targeting of Inter-Governmental Transfers & 
State Interference in Local Elections: Evidence from 
Spain 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent decades, a number of countries have decentralized their provision 
of public services (see, e.g., Shah and Thompson, 2004). Such measures are 
recommended by scholars and international organizations alike as part of 
reform packages that can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
service delivery (e.g., Brosio and Ahmad, 2009). A better matching of 
preferences (e.g., Oates, 1972) and increased accountability (e.g., Seabright, 
1996) are the arguments often used to support this policy. Decentralization 
is typically recommended if these benefits can compensate for any 
inefficiency generated by spillovers and/or the limitations of economies of 
scale. However, whether decentralization can actually deliver these benefits 
is more controversial, with failure often being attributed to measures that 
are only ‘partial’ in nature, a term coined to refer to situations where the 
devolution of fiscal power is limited (e.g., Brueckner, 2009, and Devajaran 
et al., 2009). For instance, some authors claim that debt-related moral 
hazard problems can arise as a result of an excessive reliance on transfers 
(e.g., Rodden, 2002, and Weingast, 2009). Similarly, corruption is also said 
to be more prevalent with transfer-dependent sub-national governments, 
because of the diminished interest of voters in holding politicians 
accountable (e.g., Weingast, 2009, and Brollo et al., 2012). Moreover, 
according to Khemani (2010a and 2010b), ‘partial’ decentralization might 
reduce citizen’s awareness of sub-national responsibilities thus fostering 
clientelism and rent-seeking.  
 
Various authors also point to the problems created by higher layer partisan 
incumbents that discriminate between aligned and unaligned local 
governments when allocating transfers, to the point that they are even able 
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to influence the results of sub-national elections (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2006, 
and Scheiner, 2005). This interference in the workings of local elections can 
ultimately undermine one of the very benefits of decentralization, namely 
the improvement in politicians’ accountability1. It is this specific issue that 
this chapter focuses its attention on. The issue examined is whether the 
control of a higher layer of government by one party is beneficial for its co-
partisans holding power at a lower layer. Specifically, our main goal is to 
determine whether Spanish regional governments (the so-called 
Autonomous Communities) allocate more transfers to aligned local 
governments – i.e., to municipalities in which the mayor is affiliated to the 
same party than the regional president. The focus is on earmarked capital 
transfers, which are deemed to be the most discretionary of the transfers 
made in Spain. Additionally, it is analyzed whether partisan alignment has 
an effect on the votes obtained by a mayor at the local elections, and 
whether this effect is related to the larger amount of transfers allocated to 
aligned mayors. Finally, to shed some light on the mechanisms explaining 
these results, this study analyses how these effects differ across 
municipalities depending on whether regional and local elections are held 
on the same day or not, the competitiveness of the regional election, or the 
amount of regional budgetary resources.  
 
Our analysis is motivated by a large amount of anecdotal evidence that 
suggests that the parties controlling higher layers of government allocate 
more resources to local governments run by co-partisans, and that inter-
governmental transfers are an important means of achieving this goal. At 
least in Spain, our case of study, voters and politicians alike seem to believe  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1
 Some authors go further and suggest that the overall level of political competition in the 
country can be reduced if holding mayoralties helps the higher layer incumbent to 
become entrenched (see Scheiner, 2005). Other authors claim that the mere structure of 
local government might be endogenous to these practices, since incumbents might be 
reluctant to push for full decentralization if this fosters competition (see Khemani 2010b). 
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this to be the case. A recent post in a Spanish blog is illustrative of this: 
“The other problem [with transfers] is the ‘old-boy network’ and 
the ‘partisanship’ of grantors. Nobody dares to meddle with this 
issue, for fear of being added to the black list, and so risk 
receiving less than is usually received, but the reality is that 
having a ‘friend in the right place’ and being a ‘member of the 
party’ weights much more heavily than it should in the awarding 
of transfers.” (http://blocs.mesvilaweb.cat/sbaulida) 
 
Other informal evidence suggests that being aligned with a party controlling 
the higher layer might help a candidate to win more votes at the local 
elections, and that this might also be due to the higher amount of resources 
channelled to that municipality. Here is an example of how parties 
campaigned for votes at the last local elections held in Spain in 2011:  
“People should understand (when deciding their vote) that it is the 
PP (Partido Popular, the main right-wing party) who will be in 
control of the resources of the government of the Autonomous 
Community.” (http://comarcalia.info/).  
 
But can these examples be generalized or are they just a Spanish anomaly 
and anecdotes that emerge in the middle of a keenly contested electoral 
campaign? We argue that they are not merely anecdotal, and to demonstrate 
this, a more systematic analysis is undertaken drawing on a new database of 
regional transfers to local governments and of voting patterns at local 
elections for around 3,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2000 to 
2007. Likewise, we do not believe this issue to be limited to Spain, and so 
the results should be informative for other countries. For instance, Scheiner 
(2005) describes cases of both developing (e.g. India, Brazil and Mexico) 
and developed countries (e.g. Japan, Austria and Italy) in which transfers to 
local governments are politically manipulated in favour of co-partisans. 
However, only a few papers provide quantitative, empirical evidence of this 
effect. Using US data, Grossman (1994) finds that states aligned with the 
federal government do, in fact, receive more funds. Arulampalam et al. 
(2009) find that the effect of alignment in India is to increase transfers from 
central to state governments by up to 16%. Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2006), 
focusing on the Mexican case, find that under the PRI, state governments 
controlled by this party received up to 40% more transfers than those 
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controlled by the opposition. Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008), and 
Brollo and Nannicini (2012), the only papers to examine grants to local 
governments, find an ‘alignment effect’ of between 30 and 40% for the 
cases of Brazil and Spain, respectively. A number of papers also examine 
the impact of alignment between layers of government on electoral 
outcomes2. There is evidence, for example, of the effects of the US 
presidential vote on state legislative elections (see, e.g. Campbell, 1986). 
Similar interactions are found for Argentina by Gélineau and Remmer 
(2006). In a comparative study of Argentina, Canada, Germany and the US, 
Rodden and Wibbels (2011) show that the interaction between federal and 
state or provincial elections becomes more apparent the more centralized 
the parties are. Bottom-up effects, from gubernatorial to national elections, 
are found by Samuels (2000) for Brazil.  
 
The study of this chapter contributes to these two lines of literature in 
several ways. First, our focus on regional-local interactions provides greater 
plausibility to the main line of reasoning used in explaining the alignment 
effect, i.e. the difficulties in assigning political credit to the different 
government layers. Note, for instance, that the spending responsibilities of 
these two layers of government tend to overlap to a greater extent than 
those of federal and state governments. Indeed, quite often the provision of 
basic infrastructure (the specific target of the transfers studied) is a joint 
task, shared by state and local governments. Second, by focusing on local 
elections we are able to present evidence not only of existing discrimination 
in transfer allocation but also of the influence of higher layer incumbents on 
the results of elections at lower layers. It is worth noting that no previous 
attempts have been made in the literature to analyze ‘incumbency spillover’ 
effects between regional and local elections. Third, the use of data from 
several regions allows us to exploit institutional and political differences 
across these areas, which might shed some light on the particular 
                                                           
2Most of the papers dealing with ‘incumbency spillover’ effects examine interactions 
between different elections at the same level of government. There is evidence of US 
Presidential and Gubernatorial effects on the elections for the federal and state 
legislatures, respectively (e.g. Campbell and Summers, 1990; Folke and Snyder, 2012). 
Similar effects are found in Europe by Hainmueller and Kern (2008) and Ade and Freier 
(2011).  
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mechanism at work. In this sense, we are able to examine whether the effect 
of alignment on transfers and votes depends on the availability of budget 
resources in the region, the timing of regional and local elections, and the 
competitiveness of regional elections.  
 
Fourth, we are aware that alignment status might well be correlated with 
party popularity and so a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) is used in 
the analyses of this chapter, thus focusing on candidates that barely won or 
lost a majority of seats at the local elections. Several recent papers in the 
‘incumbency advantage’ literature use RDD as their main identification 
strategy (e.g., Lee, 2008; Lee et al., 2004; Hainmueller and Kern, 2008; 
Broockman, 2009; Folke, 2010; Folke and Snyder, 2012; Trounstine, 2011, 
and Ade and Freier, 2011). More closely in line with our concerns, Brollo 
and Nannicini (2012) use this procedure to study the effect of alignment on 
transfers in Brazil. However, the use of the traditional ‘close elections’ 
RDD, where the threshold is located at 50% of the vote, is problematic in 
our case, for two reasons. Firstly, local councils in Spain are elected using a 
proportional electoral rule, the d’Hondt rule, which generates many possible 
thresholds at which an additional vote can result in a party gaining one 
more seat, and none of these thresholds is necessarily located at 50% of the 
vote. To deal with this problem, the forcing variable used is the share of 
votes that the regional incumbent’s bloc has to lose (win) in the local 
elections in order to lose (gain) the majority of seats on the local council. 
Secondly, in a large proportion of municipalities, no party has more than 
50% of the seats, which means that in many cases the mayor is elected on 
the formation of a coalition of parties. In this chapter, it is documented that 
usually these coalitions are formed along ideological lines. This means that 
the discontinuity in the treatment probability is lower than one, and, as 
such, requires the use of a ‘fuzzy’ RDD (Van der Klauw, 2002; Lee and 
Lemieux, 2010). This method consists basically in instrumenting the 
alignment status with a dummy equal to one if, at the local elections, the 
ideological bloc of the incumbent grantor obtains more seats than those won 
by the opposition bloc. This also constitutes a contribution of this study to 
the RDD literature. Earlier papers have developed an RDD for proportional 
elections (see Folke, 2010, and Ade and Freier, 2011), and this is used as a 
benchmark for the present study.  
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Using the aforementioned ‘fuzzy’ RDD, we find a highly marked effect of 
partisan alignment between regional and local governments on the 
allocation of regional transfers to local governments. Local governments 
controlled by the same party as the regional government receive 83% more 
funds for earmarked capital transfers than is the case of similar unaligned 
municipalities. This effect is more than twice that estimated by OLS or 
‘difference-in-differences’. Moreover, mayors belonging to the same party 
as the regional president receive around 10% more votes at the local 
elections. These effects are stronger when regional and local elections are 
held on the same day. We also find that these effects are larger in regions 
with less competitive regional elections, and with more budget resources. 
This last finding suggests that the effect of alignment on votes works, at 
least partly, through the allocation of transfers.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
theoretical arguments that explain why alignment between incumbents at 
different layers of government might have an effect on the allocation of 
transfers. Section three provides the background information on Spain (i.e. 
local governments, transfers, and local politics) needed to set the stage for 
the subsequent analysis. Section four describes the econometrics and the 
data. Section five presents the results. The last section concludes.  
 
 
2. Theoretical discussion 
 
In this section, we review the main theories that predict an alignment effect 
(i.e., that municipalities controlled by the same party as that to which the 
regional president belongs will receive larger transfers from this layer of 
government). We briefly summarize the main theories of targeted public 
spending, then discuss how predictions may vary in the case of inter-
governmental transfers (as opposed to the incumbent’s direct spending), 
and consider whether the outcomes in local vs. regional elections matter to 
the higher layer incumbent, and whether the timing of the two elections is 
also important.  
 
Swing voters, core voters, and pivotal districts. Extant models of 
distributive politics offer several explanations as to the ways in which 
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public spending policies might target different groups of voters. First, 
higher layer incumbents might seek to enhance their probabilities of being 
re-elected by allocating more resources to constituencies with many swing 
voters (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996), on the 
understanding that their low party allegiance might make it easier to buy 
their votes. Secondly, politicians may choose to allocate transfers to places 
in which their parties’ core voters concentrate. There are several rationales 
that might account for this behavior. Risk-averse incumbents, for example, 
might prefer the lower degree of vote variability among core voters to the 
only potentially higher average vote return in swing districts (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1986). Additionally, the vote returns of a core-voter strategy 
might be higher if incumbents have a better understanding of the specific 
needs of their core supporters (Cox, 2009) or if transfers to these places are 
effective in boosting turnout (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006)3. Thirdly, 
when there are many electoral districts and the purpose is to secure a 
majority of seats, the strategy might be to allocate more resources to pivotal 
districts, i.e., those in which the incumbent won/lost by a narrow margin 
(Snyder, 1989; Case, 2001)4.  
 
Transfers and alignment. However, none of the above approaches is able to 
capture one of the fundamental traits of intergovernmental transfers. 
Contrary to other targeted spending programs, which are implemented 
directly by the incumbent, intergovernmental transfers are decided by the 
higher-layer grantor government but executed by the sub-national recipient 
government. This is especially true in the case of earmarked capital 
transfers, which are the focus of this study. In this case, the grantor selects 
the projects based on its own priorities and partly funds them, but it is the 
local government that must propose specific projects for funding and who 
has to contribute local funds to them and take responsibility for their 
                                                           
3To date the empirical evidence is not conclusive as to which of these two hypotheses is 
most pertinent, some papers supporting the swing voter hypothesis (Case, 2001; 
Johansson, 2003; Dhalberg and Johansson, 2002) and others the core-voter one 
(Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006). 
4
 The empirical counterparts of the pivotal district and of the swing voter hypotheses are 
similar, since the proportion of swing voters is often proxied by the incumbent’s vote 
margin (Johansson, 2003; Case, 2001). 
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execution. This overlapping of responsibilities means that the grantor 
cannot expect to reap all the political benefits from the tactical allocation of 
these transfers, since some share in the benefits must seep back to the local 
government. This should not represent an impediment for the higher layer 
grantor if the local government is controlled by the same party as the upper 
layer grantor (i.e., both layers are aligned). However, if the local 
government is controlled by the opposition, such transfers might not be that 
effective in improving the electoral prospects of the higher-layer 
incumbent.  
 
At least two different explanations might be invoked to explain this seepage 
of electoral benefits across layers of government. Firstly, voters might split 
the political credit derived from the provision of the infrastructure between 
layers of government (Arulampalam et al., 2009). When credit is attributed 
to the grantor government, the party in control at this layer can reap all the 
electoral benefits. If credit is divided equally between all layers, no party 
can obtain an advantage from the additional transfers allocated to a 
municipality. When the strategy of the incumbent is to target swing voters, 
the division of political credit between layers means that a larger proportion 
of transfers will be allocated to aligned governments with larger numbers of 
swing voters (Arulampalam et al., 2009; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 
2008). The bold and dotted lines in Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 1 plot a 
hypothetical (and over-simplified) linear relationship between the electoral 
vote margin of the higher-layer incumbent and the transfers allocated to the 
municipalities under this hypothesis. The graph implicitly assumes that 
there are more swing voters in municipalities with a narrow margin of 
victory5. If the municipality is aligned with the higher layer incumbent (a 
situation that occurs when the vote margin of the regional incumbent is 
positive) and voters split credit between the two layers, the amount of 
transfers received will be higher, as indicated by the jump or discontinuity 
in the relationship between transfers and vote margin. This jump vanishes 
                                                           
5
 As discussed by Johansson (2003), this will be true if the distribution of ideological 
preferences in support of the incumbent (and, hence, against the opposition) is symmetric 
and single-peaked. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) present results that suggest that the 
departure from these assumptions is not dramatic in practice. 
Chapter 4. Partisan Targeting of Inter-Governmental Transfers 
91 
 
when voters are able to assign all the credit to the higher layer of 
government. 
 
Secondly, it is conceivable that partisan alignment between layers of 
government might also confer some benefit on the higher layer incumbent 
enabling him to reach his core supporters. The mayor might be particularly 
adept at identifying who the party’s core supporters are at the local level 
and what their specific needs are. Thus, controlling the mayoralty would 
ensure that the initial goals of the projects funded by the higher layer of 
government do not become distorted. Such a scenario suggests that the 
alignment effect might also interact with the core voter strategy. The bold 
and dashed lines in Panel (a) of Figure 1 show the shape of a hypothetical 
relationship between the incumbent’s vote margin and transfers under this 
hypothesis. In this case, we assume that transfers grow with votes at both 
sides of the zero-margin threshold. As in the swing-voter case, alignment 
makes the amount of transfers jump at the threshold. Of course, the 
alignment effect vanishes if the grantor is able to monitor the use of 
transfers fully without the help of the mayor. 
 
Figure 1: Transfers vs. vote margin in Swing voter, Core voter & Pivotal municipalities 
  a) Swing voter vs. Core voter b) Swing voter vs. Pivotal  
  
 
 
 
  
Vote margin 0 Vote margin 0 
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Regional vs local elections. These two justifications of the interaction 
between the alignment status and the incumbent’s vote margin at the higher 
layer rely implicitly on the assumption that incumbents aim to maximize 
their probability of being re-elected at the next higher-level elections. 
Arulampalam et al. (2009) explicitly acknowledge this fact. The only paper 
that suggests that the incumbent’s strategy might, in fact, be focused on 
winning local elections is Brollo and Nannicini’s (2012). This paper argues 
that in Brazil the best strategy for the federal president prior to the local 
elections is to try winning as many mayoralties as he can, since mayors are 
influential opinion leaders in their communities and by engaging in 
campaigning and rent-seeking activities on the president’s behalf can help 
win more votes for the president at the higher layer elections.  
 
In line with this hypothesis, to use the resources at his disposal efficiently, 
the higher layer incumbent should focus his attention on aligned pivotal 
municipalities, i.e., those in which the mayoralties were won by the 
narrowest margins. This strategy would target more funds for these 
municipalities (compared to aligned municipalities won by a larger margin) 
and punish unaligned pivotal municipalities, which would receive less 
money than aligned ones with a similar vote margin as well as less money 
than unaligned municipalities that the higher layer incumbent lost by a 
greater margin. The dashed and bold lines in Panel (b) of Figure 1 illustrate 
this idea. Brollo and Nannicini (2012) find mixed evidence in favor of this 
tactic, which they refer to as ‘tying your enemy’s hands in close races’.  
 
Concurrent vs. alternating elections. Brollo and Nannicini (2012) focus on 
the case of Brazil, where local elections are held in the middle of the federal 
term-of-office. As we explain below, in Spain regional and local elections 
are concurrent in some regions and alternating in others. This distinction 
allows us to compare the strength of the alignment effect in both cases. The 
simultaneous occurrence of the elections may either reduce or increase the 
alignment effect. On the one hand, it might shift the attention of voters 
towards the issues that are most relevant at the regional level, thus limiting 
the tactical use of transfers to localities. Likewise, if the alignment effect 
only occurs when the strategy focuses on capturing mayoralties, then the 
urgency of winning the next regional election (typical of concurrent 
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elections) might attenuate the alignment effect. Before regional elections, 
the regional incumbent might choose to focus on his core voters and if he is 
able to monitor the use of resources without the help of mayors, this will 
generate a core-voter type profile but without any discrimination in favor of 
the aligned mayors. On the other hand, the simultaneous holding of regional 
and local elections may increase the salience of local issues during the 
campaign for the regional elections. For example, in concurrent elections, 
regional candidates may well be obliged to speak about local infrastructure 
during campaign visits to municipalities. Similarly, even if transfers do not 
matter directly for regional elections, they might matter indirectly through 
their effect on the local elections, and the simultaneous occurrence of both 
elections could thus generate a ‘bandwagon effect’, with the impact on the 
vote of the local incumbent being transferred to some extent to the vote of 
the aligned regional incumbent. Finally, note that even in concurrent 
elections, the strategy of capturing mayoralties might make sense if the 
regional elections are not competitive. Intuitively, if the regional incumbent 
feels safe, there would be less need to try to increase the total number of 
votes. Instead, it might be worthwhile pursuing a longer-term strategy, i.e., 
winning additional mayoralties. This would allow more perks to be 
distributed to party supporters and might prove helpful at future regional 
elections. 
 
 
3. Background information on Spain 
 
3.1.  Spanish municipalities   
Spanish government comprises three layers: central, regional, and local 
tiers. There are seventeen regional governments, the so-called Autonomous 
Communities (ACs), which have fairly wide-ranging spending 
responsibilities including, for example, the provision of health care, 
education and welfare. Spain’s local layer consists of over eight thousand 
municipalities, most of which are relatively small. These municipalities are 
multipurpose governments, with major expenditure categories 
corresponding to the traditional responsibilities assigned to the local public 
sector (environmental services, urban planning, public transport, welfare, 
etc.), with the exception of education, which is the responsibility of the 
regional government. Current spending is financed out of the 
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municipalities’ own revenues (approximately two thirds) and unconditional 
grants (approximately a third). The latter are allocated according to a 
formula, which hinders the use for pork-barrel politics. However, the 
funding of capital spending is heavily dependent on grants: in 2008, capital 
grants, on average, represented 38% of capital spending. Most Spanish 
municipalities do not have the capacity to fund necessary investments from 
other sources: their tax bases are quite limited, extraordinary resources from 
asset sales are not always available, and some municipalities may even have 
problems to access credit. 
 
Capital grants are transferred primarily from the regional layer (64%) and 
take the form of ‘project grants’6: there is an open call at regular intervals 
(usually yearly) and a municipality can apply by submitting its 
infrastructure projects (e.g., street and road paving, sewage systems and 
water pipes, parks and recreations, educational and sports facilities, etc.). 
These are evaluated according to previously established criteria (typically 
published in the call), which are subject to the interpretation of the grantor. 
Provisions are usually made for funding emergency situations or projects 
considered a priority concern by the regional government. The call often 
does not specify clearly the weight attached to each of the criteria or it fails 
to specify the link between the score assigned to each criterion and an 
objective variable, leaving this very much at the discretion of the grantor.  
 
3.2. Local politics in Spain 
Local elections are held every four years on the same day throughout all the 
Spanish municipalities. Voters choose between several closed party lists. 
The electoral system is a proportional one, votes being allocated to seats 
using the d’Hondt rule with a threshold. The mayor is subsequently elected 
by a majority of the council (see Colomer, 1995). The council operates as a 
small representative democracy, and has to reach a majority vote to pass the 
initiatives and regulations proposed by the mayor, who acts as the agenda-
setter. The discipline enforced by Spain’s political parties means that the 
chances of amending the mayor’s proposals are quite low when the mayor’s 
                                                           
6
 A 19% comes from upper-local governments and the rest from the central government 
or the European Union.  
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party or coalition controls a majority of the seats. The proportion of 
coalition governments is high (around 30% during the terms we analyze), 
and most are formed along ideological lines. There are, however, 
exceptions to this rule due, for example, to the fact that the platforms of 
many local parties are based solely on local issues and so they are under 
less compulsion to reach an agreement on ideological grounds or because of 
pressure from higher party ranks. Nevertheless, the influence of the party on 
the behaviour of local politicians is substantial, the local political system 
being seen as a first step to subsequent promotion at the regional and 
national levels.  
 
Elections to the regional parliament are also held every four years and on 
the same day than the local elections in thirteen out of the seventeen 
regions. We refer to these polls as Concurrent elections. In the remaining 
four regions (i.e., Galicia, Catalonia, Basque Country, and Andalusia), 
regional elections are held in the middle of the local governments’ term of 
office. We refer to these polls as Alternating elections. Voters also choose 
between several party lists, and the electoral system is also based on the 
d’Hondt rule with a threshold. Representatives elect the regional president 
who, in turn, decides the composition of the Cabinet. Here, also, around a 
third of the administrations are coalition or minority governments.   
 
 
4. Empirical design 
 
4.1. The ‘fuzzy’ RDD  
Papers using observational approaches to estimate the effect of party 
ideology on votes and policy outcomes may suffer from an omitted 
variables problem: party control can be correlated with the incumbent’s 
popularity and this, in turn, might have an impact on the outcome variable. 
To deal with this problem some papers have recently adopted the ‘close-
race’ Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) framework (see Lee, 2008; 
Lee et al., 2004; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009; 
Albouy, 2010, Folke, 2010, Trounstine, 2011, and Gerber and Hopkins, 
2011). The reasoning behind this method is that elections won by a narrow 
margin are in practice very similar events to elections lost by a similar 
narrow margin. Thus, by focusing on close races, the RDD generates quasi-
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experimental estimates of the effects of interest (see Hahn et al., 2001). In a 
recent survey, Green et al. (2009) show that RDDs are comparable in 
accuracy to experimental studies. 
 
As mentioned, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) use this approach to estimate 
the effect of partisan alignment on the allocation of federal transfers to local 
governments in Brazil. In this case, the treatment variable is defined as a 
dummy indicating whether the party of the federal President (or the 
coalition that supports him) won the local election. The authors restrict the 
analysis to two- and three-candidate races so as to avoid problems 
generated by the fact that Brazil is a highly fragmented, multi-party system 
without any stable party coalitions. In any case, the plurality rule used in 
Brazilian elections allows the authors to apply the traditional ‘close-
elections’ RDD. This is not an option in our case, since local councils are 
elected in Spain using a proportional electoral rule. This rule generates 
many thresholds at which an additional vote brings one more seat to a party, 
and these are not necessarily located at the 50% vote threshold. To deal 
with this problem, we proceed in two steps. First, we compute our forcing 
variable as the share of votes that the ideological bloc (i.e., left or right) of 
the regional incumbent has to lose (win) to lose (gain) the majority of seats 
in the local council (and, thus, change its alignment status), henceforth 
referred to as the vote margin. The calculation of this vote margin is not 
trivial and has required the development of a specific procedure based on 
the d’Hondt rule. We provide more details on this method in section 4.4 and 
in Annex A.  
 
Second, we show that if the ideological bloc of the regional incumbent has 
a majority of seats in the local council it is more probable (although not 
certain) that this bloc also holds the mayoralty, which means that the two 
layers of government are aligned. This reflects the fact, discussed above, 
that, more often than not, coalitions are formed along ideological lines. This 
means a ‘fuzzy’ RDD has to be used (Van der Klauw, 2002; Lee and 
Lemieux, 2010), since this allows the treatment (i.e., alignment) to be 
determined only partly by whether the assignment variable (i.e. the vote 
margin) crosses a cut-off point (from negative to positive). While in the 
‘sharp’ RDD the probability of treatment jumps from 0 to 1 when the 
assignment variable crosses a threshold, the ‘fuzzy’ RDD involves a smaller 
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jump in this probability. Since the probability of treatment jumps by less 
than one at the threshold, the discontinuity in the outcome variable (that is, 
votes or transfers) at this point can no longer be interpreted as an average 
treatment effect. However, the treatment effect can be recovered either by 
dividing the jump in the outcome variable by the jump in the probability of 
treatment or by estimating the effect of alignment on the outcome by 2SLS, 
using the threshold dummy as an instrument for alignment. 
 
4.2. Equation specification  
In our case, we use the following three-equation model: 
 
iiii mg a t εα ++= )(  (1) 
iiii umfav ++= )(   β
 
(2) 
iiii mh d a υγ ++= )(
 
(3) 
 
where ti=per capita transfers received by the local government before the 
local election; ai=1 if there is alignment between the regional and the local 
government and zero otherwise; mi= regional incumbent’s vote margin at 
the previous local elections; vi= vote share of the local incumbent at the 
local elections; di=1 if the regional incumbent’s vote margin is positive (i.e. 
di=1 if mi>0); the terms f(mi), g(mi) and h(mi),  include polynomial terms of 
orders one or higher, fitted separately at either side of the threshold (see Lee 
et al., 2004; Lee, 2008, and Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The first equation is 
used to estimate the effect of alignment on transfers. The second estimates 
the effect of partisan alignment on the local incumbent’s vote. The third 
describes the discontinuity in alignment that we then use to identify the 
effects of interest. Substituting (3) into (1) and (2) we obtain the reduced 
form equations: 
 
iiii mk d t ωϕ ++= )(1  (4) 
iiii mj d v νφ ++= )(1  (5) 
 
where ϕ=αγ  and φ=βγ are the ‘intent-to-treat’ estimates, which are equal 
to the product of the effects of alignment on votes and on the discontinuity. 
The estimation of equations (3), (4) and (5) allows us to recover the effect 
of alignment on votes and transfers as γϕα ˆ/ˆˆ =  and γφβ ˆ/ˆˆ = . We could 
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also estimate (1) and (2) by 2SLS, using di as an instrument for ai. Both 
procedures should deliver the same estimate as long as the order of the 
polynomials h(mi) and j(mi) or k(mi) is the same. The estimates obtained can 
be interpreted as a weighted Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), 
where the weights reflect the ex-ante likelihood of being near the threshold 
(see Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The specification in (2) and (3) can easily be 
modified to analyze possible heterogeneous effects. Being z a dummy 
variable defining two non-overlapping groups of municipalities, we have: 
 
iiiiiiiii zmpmk zzdd t ςηηη +×+++×+= )()(321  (6) 
iiiii3iiii zmlmjz zdd v ϖλλλ +×++×+×+= )()(21  (7) 
 
To deal with the possible correlation of this dummy with other traits that 
differ across subsamples we introduce the interactions between alignment 
and several of the variables that can affect differ across municipalities and 
the discontinuity dummy and the polynomial at the same time. Thus, the 
interpretation of the differential effect of alignment across subsamples relies 
on an identification strategy based on controlling for observables. 
Furthermore, in order to shed further light on the possible mechanisms 
behind the alignment effect we can examine the shape of the polynomial at 
either side of the threshold, comparing these results with the predictions 
derived from the different theories surveyed in section two. We are, 
however, also well aware that the shape of the polynomial has no causal 
interpretation in an RDD. To attenuate this problem, we discuss the shape 
of the polynomial only after the inclusion of a set of controls. The graphs 
used for this purpose plot the residual of the dependent variable (either 
transfers or vote share) against the forcing variable. This means that in this 
case too our identification strategy relies on our controlling for observables 
and that the conclusions reached are not as reliable as those derived from 
the main RDD estimates. 
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4.3. Econometrics  
In implementing the RDD we have taken various methodological decisions. 
First, as shown above, our main estimation method uses all the observations 
while controlling for a flexible polynomial. Following Lee and Lemieux 
(2010), we explicitly test for the optimal order of the polynomial with the 
Akaike information criteria. This procedure allows us to retain the entire 
sample when estimating the heterogeneous effects. A possible drawback of 
this method is that our results might be sensitive to outcome values for 
observations far away from the threshold (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). 
To cope with this problem we also provide additional results obtained by 
restricting the bandwidths to 25% and 12.5%. The reason for this choice is 
that the optimal bandwidth size (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2009), is very 
close to 25% both for transfers (26.3%) and for votes (23.8%). Thus, in line 
with Lee and Lemieux (2010), we present our results with optimal and half 
optimal bandwidths.  
 
Second, in order to show the need for using a ‘fuzzy’ RDD, we verify the 
discontinuity in the treatment probability. To verify that there is a 
substantial discontinuity is tantamount to having a strong first-stage 
relationship in an IV design. Third, we also check the continuity of the 
forcing variable around the threshold by inspecting the histogram and using 
a more formal test (see McCrary, 2008). The continuity test provides a 
means for discarding the manipulation of the forcing variable, an issue 
raised in various papers (see, e.g., Caughey and Sekon, 2011). For this same 
purpose, we also test for the continuity of some pre-determined covariates. 
Finally, we also provide some results using a set of control variables (see 
next section), in order to provide an additional validation check for our 
estimates (coefficients should not change greatly) and to improve the 
precision of our estimates. Furthermore, the use of covariates helps in the 
interpretation of the shape of the polynomials, since, as already mentioned, 
they have no causal interpretation in an RDD analysis. 
 
4.4. Sample and data 
Sample. We estimate the effects of partisan alignment between local and 
regional governments on transfers from the regional to the local level and 
on the votes cast for the local incumbent using data on Spanish 
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municipalities. We use two cross-sections of data, for the terms 2000-03 
and 2004-07, with around 3,000 municipalities in each. The sample is 
determined by data on transfers taken from a survey on budget outlays 
conducted yearly by the Spanish Ministry of Economics. This database 
includes all the municipalities with more than 5,000 residents and a 
representative sample of the smaller ones7.  
 
Transfers. The main results we report are for the estimation of the 
alignment effects on capital transfers allocated to local governments in the 
two years preceding the next local election. As explained in section two, 
given the characteristics of these transfers, we expect them to matter more 
in the period running up to local elections. This distinction, however, is 
irrelevant for twelve out of the fifteen regions (i.e., those with Concurrent 
elections), as regional and local elections are held on the same day. It is 
true, however, than even if local elections matter most, the effect of 
alignment might differ in those regions with Alternating regional and local 
elections (see section two for a discussion) and this is why we also present 
our results for each of the samples. Although not included here for the sake 
of brevity, we will also discuss the results obtained when analyzing the 
effects of alignment on transfers two years before the regional elections (in 
the case of Alternating elections) and during the first half of the term (in the 
case of Concurrent elections).  
 
In any of these cases, the two-year aggregation helps reducing the volatility 
of the variable and the use of yearly information will not provide any 
statistical advantage, since the alignment status does not change between 
years within these two year periods. As we explained above, we focus on 
capital grants originating from the regional government because of a 
presumably higher discretionality in their allocation. However, to confirm 
this intuition we also present results for the effect of alignment on current 
grants and on grants originating from other layers of government (Central 
and Upper-Local).  
                                                           
7
 Due to problems in accessing the data, the analysis is restricted to fifteen regions, 
excluding the Basque Country and Navarre. These are quite small regions and their 
exclusion should not represent a big problem. 
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Votes. The second outcome variable we analyze is the mayor’s vote share in 
the 2003 and 2007 local elections. Our results using the coalition’s vote 
share and the probability of mayoral re-election are similar and not reported 
here for the sake of brevity. Votes by party at the local elections of 1999 
and 2003 are used to construct the forcing variable and the discontinuity 
instrument. See Table A.1 in Annex A for the source of the vote results.  
 
Alignment. As explained above, alignment is measured as a dummy equal to 
one when the mayor and the regional president belong to the same party, 
regardless of whether the government at both layers is a single party or a 
coalition8. See Table A.1 for the sources of these variables. As robustness 
checks, we have also analyzed whether the results are affected by the use of 
more comprehensive alignment definitions: situations where one party, 
even if it is not the main one, is present at both layers, and situations where 
the mayor and the regional president simply belong to the same ideological 
bloc and not only to the same party.  
 
Forcing variable. As explained above, our main forcing variable is the 
Regional incumbent’s bloc vote margin, computed as the votes needed for 
the ideological bloc of the regional incumbent to gain/lose the majority of 
seats in the local council, expressed as a percentage of total votes cast at the 
local elections. To define ideological blocs we classify all the parties 
standing at the local elections in three groups: left, right and local parties 
(see Table A.1 for more details). When the regional party is a left/right 
political party, all the categories except left/right are included in the 
regional opposition’s bloc. As a robustness check, we also provide results 
after excluding those municipalities with representation of local parties 
from the analysis. The results obtained do not depend on the specific 
treatment of these parties.  
 
To compute the votes needed to bring about a change in the majority of 
seats from one bloc to another, we use a very similar method to that 
developed by Folke (2010). He provides an algebraic formulation for this 
                                                           
8
 The concrete definition of alignment used determines the size of the sample, since we 
exclude the observations not included on the treatment or the control group. 
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distance under the Saint-League system, the one in operation in Sweden 
(his country of study). With this formulation he is able to compute the 
number of votes that each party needs to win (or lose) an additional seat. 
We develop a similar algebraic formulation for the d’Hondt system used in 
Spanish local elections. What we compute is the number of votes that the 
ideological bloc to which the regional president belongs must lose (gain) to 
lose (win) a majority of seats at the local elections. In order to do this, we 
make a number of assumptions regarding vote migration. We consider that 
the marginal votes lost (won): i) go (come) to (from) abstention, or ii) to 
(from) abstention and partly to (from) the other ideological bloc. We also 
assume that these votes are distributed among the parties of the bloc in line 
with their initial vote share in the bloc. The main results of the study use the 
vote margin computed under assumption i)9. Intuitively, in this case, our 
formulation works as if we were subtracting small numbers of votes from 
the mayor’s bloc, distributing them among the parties according to their 
vote share within the bloc, while keeping the number of votes for the parties 
of the other bloc constant. As we subtract votes, seats shift from one bloc to 
the other. The procedure stops when we observe a shift in the seat majority 
from one bloc to the other. The number of votes needed to reach this point 
divided by the total number of votes initially cast at the election is our 
measure of vote margin. See Box A.1 in Annex A for the algebraic 
formulation used to compute the vote margin10.  
 
Control variables. In order to provide a further check on the reliability of 
the RDD results and to improve the efficiency of our estimates, we also 
present results when controlling for several covariates. In the case of the 
transfer equation, we control for log(population), land area per capita, 
property tax rate, assessed value of the property, debt burden, and Regional 
dummies × term effects (see also Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). In 
the vote share equation, we control for party of the mayor × term effects, 
Regional dummies × term effects, incumbent’s historical vote share, 
                                                           
9
 As a robustness check we have also examined whether the computation of the vote 
margin under assumption (ii) does change the results. 
10
 In Annex B we also provide a numerical example which illustrates how this method 
works in practice. 
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historical turnout at local elections, local coalition dummy, local first-term 
dummy, and population size dummies.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Exploring the discontinuity 
Figure 2 plots the seat margin of the regional incumbent’s bloc at the local 
elections against its alignment status which is given a value of one if the 
mayor and the regional president belong to the same party. The graph 
shows a considerable jump when the ideological bloc of the regional 
incumbent moves from -1 seat to +1 seat (i.e., when it requires one 
additional seat to gain/lose a majority of seats). 
  
Although it might seem appropriate to perform the analysis by comparing 
the average value of transfers or votes for the municipalities located at the -
1 and +1 values of the seats margin, this would not be correct, since this is 
quite a large group with considerable internal variability in the popularity of 
the regional incumbent. For this reason, we use the vote margin as the 
forcing variable, computed as the percentage of votes needed for the 
regional incumbent’s bloc to win/lose a majority of seats in the city council. 
Panel b in Figure 2 shows the plot between this forcing variable and the 
alignment status. The dots represent averages of the alignment dummy over 
5% bins. The size of the bin has been selected using the ‘bin test’ proposed 
by Lee and Lemieux (2010). The black line is the flexible polynomial fitted 
separately on both sides of the threshold. From the figure it is evident that 
there is a sizeable jump in the probability of alignment when moving from -
1 to +1 seats.  
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Figure 2: Alignment vs margin 
 a) Seat margin 
 
 
b) Vote margin 
 
 
Notes: (1) 2000-03 and 2004-07 terms. (2) Alignment Regional-Local = 1 if the mayor and the 
regional president belong to the same party. (3) Regional incumbent’s bloc seat margin = 
distance in seats to a change in ideological bloc’s seat majority; seats as obtained at the 1999 and 
2003 local elections.  (4) Regional incumbent’s bloc vote margin = distance in percentage of 
votes to a change in ideological bloc’s seat majority; vote shares as obtained at the 1999 and 
2003 local elections (see Box A.1 in Annex A). (5) Dots = Bin averages; Bin size = 0.05 (40 
bins); optimal bin size selected using a standard F-test for nested models (Lee and Lemieux, 
2010). (6) Black line = 2nd order polynomial, fitted separately on either side of the zero 
threshold, using the full bandwidth. (7) Dashed lines = 95% confidence interval. (8) See Table 
A.1 in Annex A for variable definitions and data sources.  
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Table 1 shows the results obtained when estimating the discontinuity with 
different bandwidths: 100% with polynomials of orders 1 to 3, and 25% and 
12.5% with a local linear regression. In the full sample case, the Akaike 
information criterion suggests that it is optimal to fit a 2nd order polynomial. 
In this case, the estimated value of the discontinuity is 85%. The results do 
not change much when other polynomial orders are used or when the 
bandwidth is restricted.  
 
Table 1: Discontinuity in the probability of alignment  
    
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
      
      d 
 
0.879 
(89.13)*** 
 
0.853 
(55.02)*** 
 
0.848 
(39.90)*** 
0.897 
(102.78)*** 
0.865 
(59.64)*** 
R2 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.805 0.771 
AIC 
-2368.86 -2380.02 -2376.29 --.--  
      
      Bandwidth  100% 100% 100% 25%  12.5%  
Polynomial  order 1 2 3 1 1 
Obs. 4344 4344 4344 2243 1150 
    
Notes: (1) 2000-03 and 2004-07 terms. (2) Dependent variable is Alignment, a = 1 if mayor and 
the regional president belong to the same party. (3) Explanatory variables: discontinuity dummy d 
and polynomial on the Regional incumbent’s bloc vote margin; polynomial fitted separately on 
either side of the zero threshold; d is one if vote margin is positive and zero if vote margin is 
negative. (4) Bandwidth = 100% indicates that all the observations have been used in the 
estimation; 25% of vote indicates a bandwidth of -25% to 25%, 25% being (approximately) the 
optimal bandwidth of both the transfers and incumbent’s vote share used in Tables 2 and 3 (see 
below). (5) t-statistic in parentheses, robust standard errors used; ***, ** & * = statistically 
significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels. (6) AIC = Akaike information criterion.  
 
A possible concern with the RDD is the possibility that the forcing variable 
might be manipulated. This could occur, for example, if the electoral results 
have been manipulated or, in the case of multi-party governments, if the 
vote of the last representative needed to form a winning coalition has been 
bought. We deal with this last problem by using local votes for the 
ideological bloc of the regional incumbent as opposed to votes obtained by 
the actual coalition that supports the mayor. A way of verifying that the 
forcing variable has not been manipulated is to examine its histogram or, 
more formally, to test for the continuity of this variable at the cut-off by 
running local linear regressions of the log of the density separately on both 
sides of zero (see McCrary, 2008). We have performed both checks, and we 
have not found any evidence of manipulation. Another validity check 
consists on testing for the presence of a discontinuity in the pre-determined 
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covariates. The results of this exercise also suggest that none of these 
variables is discontinuous around the threshold11.  
 
5.2. Partisan alignment and transfers  
Figure 3 below shows the plots between the forcing variable and both the 
amount of capital transfers and of residual transfers (i.e., the residual of a 
regression between transfers and control variables). The graphs suggest that 
there is a clear discontinuity: municipalities marginally on the right of the 
cut-off (those which are very likely to be aligned) do receive much greater 
sums in transfers than those marginally on the left (those which are very 
likely to be unaligned). The result is a little bit clearer when using residual 
transfers.  This shape suggests that the strategy used by regional 
governments revolves around trying to influence close local races in places 
where the mayor is a co-partisan. 
 
  
                                                           
11
 All these results are reported in Annex B, Table B.1, Figure B.1 & Figure B.2. 
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Figure 3:  Capital transfers vs vote margin 
 a) Capital transfers 
 
 
b) Residual Capital transfers 
 
 
Notes: (1) Regional transfers = Capital transfers from the Regional to the Local 
government during the last two years of the 2000-03 and 2004-07 municipal 
terms. (2) Black line = 2nd order polynomial, fitted separately on either side of 
the zero threshold, using the full bandwidth. (3) Black line = 2nd order 
polynomial, fitted separately on either side of the zero threshold, using the full 
bandwidth (4) See Figure 2. 
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Tables 2a and 2b below present the RDD estimates. Panel (a) shows the 
Reduced form estimates while Panel (b) reports the 2SLS results. Columns 
(i) to (iii) show the results with the full sample and with polynomials of 
orders 1 to 3. The polynomial of order 2 is the optimal one (according to the 
AIC criterion). Column (iv) repeats the results using the optimal polynomial 
but introducing the control variables in the equation. Columns (i) to (iv) in 
Table 2b present the results with the 25% and 12.5% bandwidths, using a 
local linear regression and without (i and ii) and with control variables (iii 
and iv). The estimates are quite robust to the choice of bandwidth and 
polynomial order and to the introduction of covariates. The reduced form 
coefficients are around 80 euro and those of the 2SLS are around 92 euro. 
This amount has to be compared with the transfers received by unaligned 
municipalities just at the left of the cut-off, which are around 107 euro. 
With these numbers, an aligned municipality would receive 83% more per 
capita transfers than a similar unaligned one.  
 
Table 2a: Effect of alignment on capital transfers. RD results 
 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 a) Reduced form 
d 63.86 
(6.12)*** 
78.55 
(5.07)*** 
79.84 
(4.05)*** 
80.56 
(5.95)*** 
R2 0.081 0.082 0.082 0.282 
AIC 58434.10 58429.23 58433.09 --.-- 
 b) 2SLS 
a 75.65 (5.31)*** 
89.36 
(5.08)*** 
92.97 
(4.54)*** 
91.65 
(4.97)*** 
Bandwidth 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Pol. order 1 2 3 2 
Controls NO NO NO YES 
Obs. 4344 4344 4344 4344 
Notes: (1) See Table 1. (2) Reduced form = OLS regression of capital transfers against 
d, which is one if vote margin is positive and zero if vote margin is negative, 
controlling for a two-sided polynomial of the vote margin; 2SLS = 2SLS estimation of 
capital transfers against the alignment dummy, a, using d as the instrument, and 
controlling for the same polynomials. (3) Control variables included: log(population), 
land area per capita, property tax rate, assessed value of the property, debt level and 
Regional × term effects . See Table A.1 in Annex A for definitions and data sources. 
(4) Optimal polynomial order used in column (iv).  
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Table 2b: Effect of alignment on capital transfers. RD results 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 a) Reduced form 
d 75.11 
(4.39)*** 
78.15 
(4.86)*** 
75.58 
(5.68)*** 
80.00 
(6.02)*** 
R2 0.073 0.229 0.104 0.234 
AIC 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
 b) 2SLS 
a 83.73 
(4.88)*** 
87.12 
(4.97)*** 
87.37 
(5.13)*** 
90.39 
(5.76)*** 
Bandwidth 25%  25%  12.5%  12.5%  
Pol. order 1 1 1 1 
Controls NO YES NO YES 
Obs. 2243 2243 1150 1150 
Notes: (1) See Table 1. (2) Reduced form = OLS regression of capital transfers 
against d, which is one if vote margin is positive and zero if vote margin is negative, 
controlling for a two-sided polynomial of the vote margin; 2SLS = 2SLS estimation 
of capital transfers against the alignment dummy, a, using d as the instrument, and 
controlling for the same polynomials. (3) Control variables included: 
log(population), land area per capita, property tax rate, assessed value of the 
property, debt level and Regional × term effects . See Table A.1 in Annex A for 
definitions and data sources. (4) Local linear regression with optimal bandwidth 
used in columns (i) and (ii); ½ of optimal bandwidth used in columns (iii) and (iv). 
 
5.3. Partisan alignment and votes 
Figure 4 shows the plot between the forcing variable and the mayor’s share 
of the vote. The graph suggests that there is a discontinuity in the vote 
share: local incumbents marginally to the right of the cut-off do receive 
more votes than those marginally to the left. The shape of the plot is as 
expected: to the right of the cut-off the local incumbent’s vote share is 
positively correlated with that of the regional incumbent’s ideological vote 
share; to the left of the cut-off, both variables are negatively correlated.  
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Figure 4:  Local vote share vs vote margin 
 Local vote share 
 
 
 Notes: (1) Local vote share = % vote share of the local incumbent party at the 
2003 and 2007 elections. 3) Black line = 2nd order polynomial, fitted 
separately on either side of the zero threshold, using the full bandwidth.  
 
Tables 3a and 3b present the RDD estimates. Here, also, the results are 
quite stable across specifications. The reduced form coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 99% level in all cases and identify a 
discontinuity between 3.8% and 4.4%. The 2SLS results suggest that the 
average treatment effect is higher, between 4.3% and 5.8%. These are 
sizeable effects, especially if we take into account that a mayor’s vote share 
at the left of the cut-off is just 42.7%, meaning that an aligned mayor will 
receive 10.07% (=4.3% over 42.7%) more votes than a similar unaligned 
mayor. Additional results (not shown here) suggest that the effects on the 
votes for the whole coalition are a bit lower, implying that the mayor’s 
party is the one that benefits most from alignment with the regional 
government.  
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Table 3a: Effect of alignment on local vote share. RD results 
 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 a) Reduced form 
d 0.066 (9.16)*** 
0.048 
(5.00)*** 
0.047 
(4.01)*** 
0.044 
(3.64)*** 
R2 0.096 0.103 0.100 0.554 
AIC 
-4931.17 -4957.77 -4949.28 --.-- 
 b) 2SLS 
a 0.075 (6.44)*** 
0.053 
(5.06)*** 
0.049 
(4.78)*** 
0.058 
(4.86)*** 
Bandwidth 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Pol. order 1 2 3 2 
Controls NO NO NO YES 
Obs. 4344 4344 4344 4344 
Notes: (1) See Table 2. (2) Dependent variable: % vote share for the mayor. (3) 
Control variables: party of the mayor × term effects, Regional dummies × term 
effects, incumbent’s historical vote share, historical turnout at the local and regional 
elections, local coalition dummy, local first-term dummy, and population size 
dummies (see Table A.1). 
 
Table 3b: Effect of alignment on local vote share. RD results 
 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 a) Reduced form 
d 0.053 (5.59)*** 
0.044 
(2.56)*** 
0.036 
(2.38)*** 
0.038 
(2.67)* 
R2 0.065 0.571 0.140 0.644 
AIC 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
 b) 2SLS 
a 0.059 (5.71)*** 
0.051 
(2.56)*** 
0.038 
(3.10)*** 
0.043 
(2.81)*** 
Bandwidth 25%  25%  12.5%  12.5%  
Pol. order 1 1 1 1 
Controls NO YES NO YES 
Obs. 2243 2243 1150 1150 
Notes: (1) See Table 2. (2) Dependent variable: % vote share for the mayor. (3) 
Control variables: party of the mayor × term effects, Regional dummies × term 
effects, incumbent’s historical vote share, historical turnout at the local and regional 
elections, local coalition dummy, local first-term dummy, and population size 
dummies (see Table A.1). 
 
5.4. OLS and ‘difference-in-differences’ 
The estimated effect of alignment on capital transfers (83%) is twice as 
large as the effect estimated by Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) 
Chapter 4. Partisan Targeting of Inter-Governmental Transfers 
112 
 
using ‘difference-in-differences’. This differential is striking, given that 
both studies draw on very similar data. Comparison of the respective 
results, however, is difficult, since the samples and periods are different. To 
determine the causes of this discrepancy, we have also estimated the 
alignment effect on transfers by OLS and ‘difference-in-differences’ (i.e., 
including municipality fixed effects) in our sample, controlling in both 
cases for the full set of control variables. The results, shown in Table 4, 
imply that aligned municipalities receive 52% more grants than unaligned 
municipalities. This is higher than the 40% reported by Solé-Ollé and 
Sorribas-Navarro (2008), but still much lower than our RDD estimates. 
 
Table 4: Effect of alignment on transfers & local vote share. OLS & Difference-in 
Differences 
    
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
   
   
 a) Capital transfers b) Vote share 
    
    a 
 
61.65 
(10.34)*** 
60.45 
(5.07)*** 
63.90 
(5.11)*** 
0.092 
(21.23)*** 
0.031 
(7.17)*** 
0.042 
(5.08)*** 
R2 0.102 0.214 0.328 0.103 0.243 0.554 
       
       Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Municipality fixed- 
effects 
NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Obs. 4344 4344 4344 4344 4344 4344 
       
      Notes: (1) See Tables 2 and 3. (2) Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in eq. (iii) & 
(vi). 
 
5.5. Other transfers  
We have also estimated the effect of being aligned with other layers of 
government (Upper-local government, and Central government) on the 
amount of capital transfers allocated by these layers to municipalities. The 
reason we do not focus on these transfers from the outset is the smaller 
quantities involved. The results are shown in Table 5 and suggest that 
municipalities aligned with Upper-local governments receive around 60% 
more transfers than those unaligned. The effect on capital transfers 
allocated by the central government is much lower, around a 27% increase, 
and is not statistically significant. A possible explanation for this result 
might be the fact that it is quite difficult for central government to 
discriminate in its allocation of resources given the high number of Spanish 
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municipalities (around 8,000) and the consequent lack of specific 
knowledge about the local political situation of each. Thus, it might be the 
task of intermediate governments (regional and upper-local) to help channel 
the monies of central government to the most politically sensitive places 
(see also Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005, and Solé-Ollé, 2012).  
 
We have also estimated the alignment effects on the current transfers 
allocated by each of the three upper layers of government. In each case the 
alignment effect is not statistically significant. This is as expected, since 
most current transfers to Spanish municipalities are formula-based and, as 
such, are much more difficult to manipulate than earmarked transfers for 
capital projects. Overall, our results identify the instruments and 
governments that are most prone to being affected by political tactics in 
Spain: capital transfers and intermediate governments, mainly regions and, 
to a lesser extent, also Upper-local governments. 
 
Table 5: Effect of alignment on other types of transfers. RD results 
    
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
   
 Capital transfers: Current transfers: 
 Provincial  Central  Regional  Provincial  Central  
   
  
 a) Reduced form  
   
     d 22.44 
(3.34)*** 
 
9.33 
(1.23) 
 
8.92 
(0.78) 
 
3.44 
(0.45) 
 
4.56 
(0.27) 
 
  
 b) 2SLS 
  
   a 27.65 
(3.45)*** 
 
8.54 
(1.10) 
 
12.34 
(0.66) 
 
5.09 
(0.37) 
 
8.98 
(0.12) 
 
      % Increase 62.43 27.13 10.75 12.67 9.76 
      
      Obs. 3982 4344 4344 3982 4344 
Notes: (1) See Table 2. (2) % Increase = 2SLS coefficient over capital transfers evaluated at left 
limit of the threshold. 
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5.6. Robustness checks  
The results are robust to many changes in some key aspects of the 
methodology. We briefly discuss the main conclusions of this analysis12. 
First, the results are very similar when using two other (more 
comprehensive) measures of alignment: (i) including all the cases in which 
the main party at one layer (the one holding the mayoralty or the regional 
presidency) is a mere partner in the coalition at the other layer, and (ii) 
including includes cases in which the two layers are considered to be 
aligned if the mayor’s party belongs to the same ideological bloc than the 
party of the regional president, but it is not necessarily the same party. 
Second, the results are also robust to the exclusion of the municipalities in 
which local parties are represented in local councils, and to using only the 
municipalities in which the two main parties obtain more than 80% of the 
vote. Finally, the results are more or less the same when using an alternative 
measure of vote margin, computed on the assumption that votes are 
transferred not solely from abstention but also from the opposition bloc.  
 
5.7. Heterogeneous effects 
Concurrent vs. Alternating elections. Table 6 shows the RDD results 
(reduced form) obtained when including interactions of the discontinuity 
dummy and the polynomial terms with the election timing dummies. The 
results suggest that the effect is much higher (nearly twice as high) in the 
case of Concurrent elections than in the case of Alternating elections.  
 
  
                                                           
12
 The tables showing the complete results are included in Annex B, Table B.2. 
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Table 6: Effect of alignment on capital transfers. Electoral margin and fiscal capacity 
        
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
   
 All elections  Concurrent  
 
       
 
       d ×       
Concurrent 
91.28 
(4.90)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- 67.00 
(3.77)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
d  × 
Alternating 
51.06 
(2.96)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- 43.15 
(2.20)** 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
 
       
 
       d ×       
Competitive 
--.-- 50.02 
(3.29)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- 53.59 
(7.07) 
*** 
--.-- 47.75 
(3.78)*** 
 d  × Non-
competitive 
--.-- 111.28 
(6.73)*** 
 
--.-- 32.06 
(4.22)*** 
 
121.57 
(8.00)*** 
 
--.-- 115.64 
(8.23)*** 
 
 
       
 
       d × High 
resources 
--.-- --.-- 108.85 
(4.19)*** 
 
16.06 
(1.58) 
 
--.-- 106.89 
(5.29)*** 
 
18.23 
(2.23)** 
 d  × Low 
resources 
--.-- --.-- 90.48 
(5.15)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- 86.14 
(9.64)*** 
 
--.-- 
 
       Difference 
[F-test p-
value] 
46.91 
[0.000] 
 
25.36 
[0.000] 
 
18.39 
[0.121] 
 
30.85 
[0.002] 
 
67.98 
[0.012] 
20.67 
[0.048] 
 
67.89 
[0.000] 
 
 
       
Notes: (1) See Table 3. (2) Reduced form RD results. (3) Competitive/Non-competitive = vote 
share for the regional incumbent >(<) lower than the median. (4) High/Low resources = per capita 
resources (transfers + standardized tax revenues) >(<) than the median. (5) All equations have been 
estimated using the full sample, a two-sided second order polynomial for each of the interacted 
variables, and the full set of control variables. (6) Difference = difference between the coefficients 
of the two mutually exclusive categories (e.g., in column (iv) concurrent vs. alternating, and in 
column (viii) High margin vs. Low margin). (7) Standard errors clustered at the regional level. 
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Table 7: Effect of alignment on local vote share. Electoral margin and fiscal capacity  
        
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
 All elections  Concurrent  
 
       
 
       d ×   
Concurrent 
0.048 
(4.01)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- 0.038 
(2.82)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
d  × 
Alternating 
0.012 
(1.29) 
 
--.-- --.-- 0.010 
(1.39) 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
 
       
 
       d ×   
Competitive 
--.-- 0.037 
(2.65)** 
 
--.-- --.-- 0.029 
(4.53) ** 
 
--.-- 0.006 
(0.42) 
 d  × Non-
competitive 
--.-- 0.047 
(6.96)*** 
 
--.-- 0.012 
(1.78)* 
 
0.048 
(4.02)*** 
 
--.-- 0.030 
(3.28)** 
 
 
       
 
       d × High 
resources 
--.-- --.-- 0.064 
(5.86)*** 
 
0.027 
(2.15)** 
 
--.-- 0.061 
(3.13)*** 
 
0.045 
(2.38)** 
 d  × Low 
resources 
--.-- --.-- 0.028 
(1.78) * 
 
--.-- --.-- 0.038 
(4.40)*** 
 
--.-- 
 
       Difference 
[F-test p-
value] 
0.028 
[0.049] 
 
0.010 
[0.565] 
 
0.026 
[0.015] 
 
0.018 
[0.047] 
 
0.019 
[0.035] 
 
0.023 
[0.040] 
 
0.024 
[0.042] 
 
   Notes: (1) See Tables 2 and 4. (2) Reduced form RD results. 
 
To shed some light on the mechanism that can derive these results, we 
interact discontinuity dummy and the polynomial terms, not only with the 
election time dummies, but also with the other potentially disturbing 
variables. We consider, for example, that the alignment effect might also be 
affected by whether: (i) regional elections are competitive or not, (ii) the 
region has a large amount of budget resources, meaning it can allocate more 
generous capital transfers and that the differences between aligned and 
unaligned municipalities might be more marked, (iii) the municipality has 
greater needs or is in a poorer financial situation. The competitiveness of 
regional elections has been proxied by a dummy (Competitive) which is 
equal to one if the regional vote share of the regional incumbent in the 
previous regional election is lower than the sample median. The availability 
of budget resources has been measured by a dummy which indicates 
whether the region has more resources than the median (High resources)13. 
                                                           
13This variable is equal to one (zero) if per capita standardized resources (transfers + 
standardized tax revenues) is higher (lower) than the sample median. Regional-level data 
to compute this variable comes from BADESPE (Institute for Fiscal Studies, Ministry of 
Economics).  
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Municipal needs and the municipal financial situation are proxied by three 
dummies: Small, indicating whether the municipality has less than 5,000 
residents, Debt, indicating whether the debt burden per capita lies above or 
below the median, and High fiscal capacity, indicating whether the per 
capita assessed value of the property lies above or below the median. We 
find that Concurrent is quite strongly correlated with Competitive 
(correlation coefficient equal to -0.52) and with High resources (correlation 
coefficient equal to 0.18) but not with the other variables (correlation 
coefficients around 0.05-0.07, in absolute value).  
 
In Table 6, column (iv) shows the results when introducing the interaction 
with the three variables at the same time. The previous results still hold; the 
effect in Concurrent elections being more marked than that in Alternating 
elections, despite the relevance of the other interactions. However, the 
difference between Concurrent and Alternating elections is now much 
smaller, probably as a result of the aforementioned correlation between 
election type and the degree of competitiveness of the regional elections. In 
results not shown in Table 7, we find that all the financial needs and 
financial situation variables have a positive impact on the alignment effect, 
but these interactions are not statistically significant and their inclusion 
does not modify our conclusion regarding the difference between 
Concurrent and Alternating elections. In Table 7 we repeat the analysis but 
now for the local vote share. Once again, the alignment effect in 
Concurrent elections is stronger than that in Alternating elections even 
when we control for the other interactions.  
 
The top panel in Figure 5 shows the plot between residual transfers and the 
vote margin for Concurrent and Alternating elections. The discontinuity is 
clearly larger in the first case. The shape of the two plots is similar, but in 
the case of Alternating elections the slope at the right of the threshold is 
more clearly negative. We will return to this when interpreting the results in 
the next section. 
 
Finally, the availability of data for the Alternating elections sample allows 
us to look at the effect of transfers two years before regional elections (as 
opposed to two years before the municipal ones). Our results (not reported 
here for motives of space) show that in this case partisan alignment has no 
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effect on the amount of capital transfers allocated. It seems therefore that 
these transfers matter mostly for local elections14.  
 
Figure 5: Residual capital transfers  vs. vote margin. Election timing & competitiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) See Figure 2. (2) Residual transfers = residuals from a 
regression between capital transfers and controls.  
                                                           
14
 Additionally, we have used the sample of Concurrent elections to look at the effect of 
alignment during the first two years of the (regional and local) term-of-office. In this 
case,  we find an effect of alignment on transfers which is approximately half the 
magnitude of the effect found for the second half of the term.  
 
 Panel a) All elections 
a.1) Concurrent elections 
 
 
a.2) Alternating  elections 
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Figure 5: Residual capital transfers  vs. vote margin. Election timing & competitiveness 
(continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) See Figure 2. (2) Residual transfers = residuals from a 
regression between capital transfers and controls. 
 
Competitiveness and Budget resources. Columns (ii) and (iii) in Table 6 
present the results for the interactions with the Competitiveness and Budget 
resources dummies, and column (iv) shows the effect of these interactions 
when they are introduced at the same time and simultaneously with the 
election type interactions. The results of this last column show that the 
alignment effect is also stronger in Non-competitive elections and in regions 
with High budget resources. Since there are just three regions with 
 Panel  b) Concurrent elections  
b.1)  Non-competitive elections 
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Alternating elections, and given the correlation between election type and 
Competitiveness and Budgetary resources, we repeated the analysis 
considering only the subsample of municipalities in regions with 
Concurrent elections. The results are shown in columns (v) to (vii) in Table 
6 and suggest that the differences persist: the effect of alignment on capital 
transfers is higher in municipalities belonging to regions with Non-
competitive elections and in regions with High budget resources. The 
differences are statistically significant and meaningful, especially for the 
Competitiveness interaction.  
 
The bottom panel in Figure 5 shows the plot between Residual transfers 
and the vote margin for Non-competitive and Competitive Concurrent 
elections. The discontinuity is larger when regional elections are non-
competitive and the slope of the polynomial is clearly negative only in this 
case. We will return to this result below. 
 
5.8. Interpretation of the results. 
Our results can be interpreted as follows. First, the greater alignment effect 
reported here for Concurrent than for Alternating elections might be due to 
a modification in voter behavior  (and, hence, in politicians’ incentives) 
occurring in this latter case  due to the simultaneous occurrence of local and 
regional elections. In Concurrent elections, voters cast their votes for local 
and regional candidates at the same time. In this case, if capital transfers 
confer some sort of advantage to the local incumbent, this advantage might 
automatically be transferred to the candidate from the same party at the 
regional level. This ‘bandwagon effect’ between candidates from the same 
party standing at simultaneously held elections has been documented in the 
literature (see, e.g., Ade and Freier, 2011). Similarly, in Concurrent 
elections, the local and regional campaigns might be more closely 
connected, with regional candidates having to speak about local issues 
during visits to municipalities due to the greater salience of such questions 
in the local campaign. This means that even if the infrastructure funded by 
capital transfers from regional governments plays a small role in party 
platforms at the regional level, it might have an indirect effect on voters’ 
decisions at that level. The absence of an alignment effect on local votes in 
the Alternating case can be similarly explained. 
 
Chapter 4. Partisan Targeting of Inter-Governmental Transfers 
121 
 
Second, the fact that, in Alternating elections, alignment only seems to 
matter before municipal elections, but not before the regional ones suggests 
that regional incumbents care most about these local contests. In this case 
(and also in the case of Non-competitive Concurrent elections), the shape of 
the polynomial also points in the same direction, suggesting that regional 
incumbents aim at capturing as many mayoralties as they can. Figure 3 
clearly shows that transfers decrease before the threshold and increase after, 
which is the pattern identified in section two for this type of electoral 
strategy (recall Figure 1). Although the effect estimated through RDD 
cannot be extrapolated to observations far from the threshold, the shape of 
the polynomial can be informative about the strategies used by the regional 
incumbents. Among the aligned municipalities, the regional government 
would rather target pivotal municipalities than loyal ones, while pivotal 
unaligned municipalities might be specially punished. Figure 5 shows that 
this strategy is most apparent when elections are Alternating. However, 
Figure 5 also shows that in the Concurrent elections, regions with Non-
competitive regional elections also adhere to this pattern. Moreover, the 
polynomial in regions with Competitive elections is quite flat, and the slope 
is even positive to the right-hand side of the zero-margin threshold. 
Similarly, the size of the discontinuity is much lower in this case. This 
suggests that an electoral strategy centered on pivotal municipalities might 
underlie the results of the Concurrent elections sample, at least for regions 
with Non-competitive elections. For the remaining regions in this sample, 
this strategy might be attenuated by a strategy that focuses on locations of 
core voters, with the aim of improving the chances of winning a highly 
competitive regional election by trying to mobilize the electorate. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this study we have used a ‘fuzzy’ RDD to estimate the effect of partisan 
alignment between regional and local governments both amount of transfers 
received and on the vote for the local incumbent at the local elections. We 
have provided very strong evidence that voters give more support to local 
incumbents belonging to the party that controls the regional government. 
Our results suggest that aligned municipalities obtain 83% more per capita 
transfers than unaligned municipalities. Aligned incumbents also win 10% 
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more votes than unaligned incumbents. These estimates are much higher 
than previous estimates for Spain using ‘difference-in-differences’ 
techniques and much higher than results reported for other countries, 
including those using an RDD.  
 
We have also documented that the effect of partisan alignment is stronger: 
(i) when regional and local elections are held on the same day, (ii) when 
regional elections are less competitive, and (iii) when the regional 
government has more budget resources to fund these discretionary transfers. 
This interaction with the amount of budget resources suggests that the effect 
of alignment on transfers ultimately has consequences in terms of votes. 
Some secondary evidence suggests that the alignment effect might arise as a 
result of a regional electoral strategy centered on the transfer of resources to 
pivotal and aligned municipalities with the aim of winning as many 
mayoralties as possible. This strategy seems more evident in Alternating 
elections and in Non-competitive Concurrent elections. It seems, therefore, 
at least in some cases, that the regional incumbent pursues a deliberate 
strategy of interfering in the outcome of local elections. As discussed in the 
introduction, such practices might erode accountability at the local level 
and, thus, undermine the very benefits of decentralization.  
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Annex A:  
Data and variables 
Table A.1: Variable definition and data source 
  
   
 Definition Source 
Capital transfers: Capital transfers from the 
Regional (R), Central (C), or 
Upper-Local (UL) 
governments per capita (items 
7.5, 7.2 & 7.6.1 of the 
revenue budget) 
Survey of local 
finances undertaken 
yearly by the Spanish  
Ministry of Economics 
(years 2000-2007) 
  - from the Regional gov. 
  - from the Central  gov. 
  - from the Upper-Local gov. 
Current transfers: Current transfers from the R, 
C, or UL governments per 
capita (items 4.5, 4.2 & 4.6.1 
of the revenue budget) 
  - from the Regional gov. 
  - from the Central  gov. 
  - from the Upper-Local gov. 
 
Vote share: 
  - Mayor 
  - Coalition 
Votes for the party of the 
mayor and for the coalition 
supporting him at the local 
elections, in % of votes cast Local election statistics (votes and seats for all 
the parties) and 
partisan identity of the 
mayor, provided by the 
Spanish  
Ministry of Interior & 
Ministry of Public 
Administration. 
(2003 and 2007 local 
elections) 
 
 
 
 
Vote margin computed 
with the same data 
using an algorithm 
developed for this 
purposes that replicates 
the workings of the 
d’Hondt rule (see Table 
A.2 in Annex A) 
 
 
  Alignment (a): 
 
Dummy equal to one if the 
party of the mayor is the same 
as that of the president of the 
Autonomous Community, the 
C government or the UL 
government 
  - Regional-Local  
   - Central-Local  
   -  Upper-Local-Local  
Incumbent’s bloc  
seat majority (d): 
Dummy equal to one if the 
ideological bloc of the party 
of the president of the 
Autonomous Community, the 
C government or the U-L 
government has more seats in 
the local council than the 
other ideological bloc 
  - Regional-Local  
  - Central-Local  
  -  Upper-Local-Local  
Incumbent’s bloc 
 vote margin  (m): 
% of votes cast at the local 
elections that have to be 
added to (subtracted from) the 
ideological bloc of the R, C or 
UL incumbent to win (lose) a 
majority of seats in the local 
council.  
  - Regional 
  - Central 
   - Upper-Local 
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Table A.1: Variable definition and data source (continued) 
 Definition Source 
   
Income per capita 
 
Residents’ income level, as 
estimated from objective 
indicators (e.g., cars, bank 
deposits, etc.)  
Anuario Económico de 
España, La Caixa 
(years 2000-2007) 
Debt burden 
 
Debt service (capital, item 9 
of the spending budget, + 
interests, item 3)  as a share of 
current revenues 
Ministry of Economics 
(years 2000-2007) 
Land area per capita 
 
Urban land area per capita, 
including both built on area 
and un-built land plots 
Centro de Gestión 
Catastral y 
Cooperación 
Triburaria, Spanish 
Ministry of Economics  
(years 2000-2007) 
 
Property tax rate 
 
Nominal property tax rate 
(IBI), % on assessed property 
value 
Property value 
 
Assessed property value per 
capita 
   Population 
 
Resident population 
Padrón de Habitantes,  
National Institute of 
Statistics 
(years 2000-2007) 
% Old 
 
% resident population older 
than 65 years 
% Young 
 
% resident population 
younger than 18 years 
% Immigrant 
 
% resident population non-
EU immigrant  
% Unemployed 
 
% resident population 
unemployed 
   Left mayor 
 
Mayor belongs to a left-wing 
bloc party 
 
Local election statistics 
(votes and seats for all 
the parties) and 
partisan identity of the 
mayor, provided by the 
Spanish  
Ministry of Interior &  
Ministry of Public 
Administration. 
(all local elections 
since 1979) 
Coalition 
 
Mayor governs in coalition 
with other parties 
Local party 
 
Party of the mayor cannot be 
classified as left or right wing 
Historical turnout 
 
% of voting age residents 
voting at the local elections 
held since 1979 
Historical vote share 
 
% vote share for the 
ideological bloc of the mayor 
at the local elections held 
since 1979 
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Table A.2: Computing the vote margin 
 Explanation: 
 The forcing variable for our RDD is the Regional incumbent’s bloc vote margin, 
computed as the ratio between the minimum number of votes needed for the ideological 
bloc of the regional incumbent to gain/lose the majority of seats in the local council and 
the total votes cast at the local elections.The computation of this measure is not 
straightforward and requires a consideration of the specific allocation system used to 
assign votes to seats, in this case the d’Hondt rule. Under this rule the votes for each 
party are divided by 1, 2, 3, 4, …, N, where N is the number of seats to be assigned. The 
resulting quotas or comparison numbers are ranked and N seats are allocated using this 
ranking.  
 
We have developed an algebraic procedure to compute the vote margin for each of the 
municipalities in the sample1. Our procedure works by subtracting votes from the 
regional president’s ideological bloc if it holds a majority at the local level, or adding 
votes if it does not. We make some initial assumptions regarding the migration of these 
votes. First, we assume that these votes either i) go to (come from) the abstention or ii) 
go to (come from) both the abstention and the parties in the opposition bloc. The 
formulation we present here is for the first approach i) and the formula used in the second 
approach and the Stata code are available upon request. Second, we assume that the votes 
lost by (added to) the regional incumbent’s bloc are allocated between the parties 
belonging to this bloc proportional to their initial vote share in the bloc. Below we 
present the formulation used for the close election cases2 –i.e., cases where the seat 
margin is –1 or +1. 
 Notation and definitions:  
 
i
Iv  & kOv : votes for parties i and k., from the regional incumbent’s (I) and opposition’s (O) 
blocs, respectively. 
i
Iα  & kOα : votes for parties i and k as a proportion of the votes for the bloc they belong 
to.  
i
Is  & kOs : seats for parties i and k. 
i
I
i
I
i
I
i
I svsc =)(  : comparison number for the last seat won by party i. 
)1()1( +=+ iIiIiIiI svsc : comparison number for the next seat to be gained by party i. 
)(min II sc = ))((min iIiIi sc : smallest comparison number for the last seat gained by a party in I.  
)1(max +II sc = ))1((max +iIiII sc : largest comparison number for the next seat to be gained by 
a party in I. 
)( kOkO sc , )1( +kOkO sc , )(min OO sc  and )1(max +OO sc : comparison numbers for the opposition’s 
bloc. 
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Notes: (1) A numerical example illustrating the workings of this algebraic procedure has been 
included in Annex B. (2) Whenever the seat margin is larger than one, the procedure we now 
explain is simply iterated until there is a switch in the bloc holding the majority. Then, the final 
measure of the “vote margin” is an aggregation of votes needed to lose (win) all these seats. (2) 
Party x is such that equation [A.1] and minM(viM - vi)/siM hold. Party x will typically be the party that 
gained the last seat. If there is another party that gained a seat (but not the last one) and which 
accrues a greater share of votes, this party could be the one that has to be considered in order to 
guarantee that the opposition bloc gains just one seat. 
  
Table A.2: Computing the vote margin (continued) 
Formulation: 
 If the regional incumbents’s bloc holds a majority in the local council and, so, a party 
from the opposition bloc has to gain a seat, its comparison number for the next seat to be 
gained, )1(max +OO sc , must be larger than the comparison number for the last seat 
distributed to a party in the regional incumbent’s bloc, once υ  votes are subtracted from 
that bloc. The condition for party z in the opposition gaining a seat is: 
                                                   )(min* II sc < )1(max +OO sc                                            [A.1] 
where )(min* II sc  is the smallest comparison number for the last seat originally gained by 
a party, say party x, among the parties from the regional incumbent’s bloc once υ  votes 
have been subtracted. z is the party that has the highest comparison number for the next 
seat to be gained among all the parties of the opposition bloc. Expression [A.1] can be 
rewritten as )1/(/)( +<− zOzOxIxxI svsv υ , where xυ are the votes subtracted from party x.
3
 Under 
the assumption that all the parties from the regional incumbent’s bloc lose votes 
according to the votes originally cast, expression [A.1] determines that the total amount 
of votes that the regional incumbent’s bloc has to lose to lose one seat is equal to: 
              1)/( += xIx αυυ  where xυ = xIOOII sscsc ))1(-)(( maxmin +                                          [A.2] 
If the regional incumbent’s ideological bloc is in a minority in the local council, the votes 
to be added to the opposition bloc for a party, say part y, in this bloc to gain a seat are 
such that: 
                                             )(min OO sc < )1(max* +II sc                                             [A.3] 
where )1(max* +II sc  is the largest comparison number for the next seat to be gained by 
party y from the regional incumbent’s bloc, once δ votes are added to the opposition 
bloc. Party y is the one that originally has the highest comparison number for the next 
seat to be gained. Expression [A.3] can be re-written as: 
                           1)/( += yIy αδδ       where    yδ = )1))(1()(( maxmin ++− yIIIOO sscsc      [A.4] 
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Annex B:  
Tables and Figures 
 
Table B.1: Covariates’ discontinuity tests  
       
 Polynomial order 
 1 2 
       
       
 Coef. 
 
t-stat. AIC Coef. 
 
t-stat. AIC 
       
       Population 
 
3420.72 
 
(0.74) 109764.10 9565.95 
 
(0.37) 109764.74 
Land area per 
capita 
 
-1245.01 
 
(1.34) 5332.12 -1244.22 (0.56) 5330.19 
Urban 0.001 
 
(1.23) 3211.23 0.023 
 
(0.10) 3200.10 
Coastal 0.034 
 
(0.87) 4321.11 -0.021 
 
(0.10) 4110.00 
Income per 
capita 
 
-0.016 
 
(2.23) *** -9808.695 -0.006 
 
(0.89) -9827.357 
Debt burden 
 
-0.002 
 
(0.75) -11005.18 0.003 
 
(0.66) -11010.14 
Property tax 
rate 
 
-0.035 
 
(-2.19)*** -3798.31 -0.013 
 
(0.11) -3603.87 
Property value 
 
-1.56 
 
(-1.14) 39425.43 0.039 
 
(0.02) 39245.64 
% Old 
 
0.0145  (2.27)*** -13354.79 0.0160  
 
(2.18) 
***
 
-13353.9 
% Young 
 
0.0005 
 
(0.46) -22868.14 -0.0004  (0.35) -22869.18 
% Immigrant 
 
-0.001 
 
(0.23) -16161.93 0.001 
 
(0.24) -16164.2 
% Unemployed 
 
-0.001  
 
(0.80) -22059.92 -0.002  
 
(1.68) 
*
 
-22059.13 
Left mayor 
 
-0.085 
 
(-2.26)** 6270.26 0.009 
 
(0.25) 6251.11 
Coalition 
 
-0.104 
 
(-2.43)*** 7869.52 -0.040 
 
(1.11) 7862.51 
Local party 
 
0.009 
 
(0.38) 5642.64 0.042 
 
(1.22) 5644.44 
Historical 
turnout 
-0.003 
 
(-0.09) -9133.25 -0.011 
 
(1.48) -9150.14 
Hist rical vote 
share 
0.027 
 
(2.00)*** -6234.66 -0.002 
 
(0.22) -6385.87 
       
       Notes: (1) Full sample (Obs. = 4344) used in the estimation. (2) Reduced form estimation: OLS with 
spline polynominal of order 1 or 2 fitted separately on both sides of the threshold. (3) AIC= Akaike 
Information Criterion. 
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Table B.2: RDD  Robustness checks 
 
     
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
 
     
 
Panel A: Reduced form 
 
A.1 Capital transfers 
 
     
 
     
 
Partner 
alignment  
Bloc 
alignment 
No 
local 
parties 
Two 
parties 
 
Alternative 
margin 
  
 
     d 
 
70.13 
(9.43)*** 
 
55.93 
(4.38)*** 
77.42 
(3.86)*** 
97.85 
(4.47)*** 
81.15 
(6.23)*** 
R2 0.288 0.215 0.290 0.214 0.294 
      
 
Panel B: 2SLS 
 
B.1 Capital transfers 
 
     
 
     
 
Partner 
alignment  
Bloc 
alignment 
No 
local 
parties 
Two 
parties 
 
Alternative 
margin  
 
     a 
 
84.45 
(5.02)*** 
 
82.81 
(4.37)*** 
88.06 
(3.87)*** 
98.40 
(4.47)*** 
92.67 
(4.99)*** 
      
      Obs. 4671 6000 2977 1876 4344 
      
Notes: (1) See Tables 2 & 3. (2) All equations have been estimated with the full 
sample, a second order polynomial and the same controls as before. (2) Partner 
alignment = the regional and the local government are considered to be aligned if 
the mayor and/or the main partner of a coalition belong to the same party; Bloc 
alignment = the regional and the local government are considered to be aligned if 
the mayor’s party belong to the same ideological bloc; No local parties = 
municipalities where local parties get represented excluded from the analysis; 
Two parties = sample includes only municipalities where the two main parties 
get more than 80% of the vote; Alternative distance = distance to change in seat 
majority computed allowing migration of votes between parties. 
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Table B.2: RDD  Robustness checks (continued) 
 
     
 (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) 
 
     
 
Panel A: Reduced form 
 
A.1 Capital transfers 
 
     
 
     
 
Partner 
alignment  
Bloc 
alignment 
No 
local 
parties 
Two 
parties 
 
Alternative 
margin 
  
 
     d 
 
0.033 
(3.42)*** 
 
0.029 
(3.21)*** 
 
0.036 
(2.95)*** 
 
0.045 
(5.04)*** 
 
0.043 
(4.33)*** 
 R2 0.241 0.207 0.311 0.276 0.567 
      
 
Panel B: 2SLS 
 
B.1 Capital transfers 
 
     
 
     
 
Partner 
alignment  
Bloc 
alignment 
No 
local 
parties 
Two 
parties 
 
Alternative 
margin  
 
     a 
 
0.040 
(3.39)*** 
 
0.039 
(3.21)*** 
 
0.038 
(2.96)*** 
 
0.047 
(5.03)*** 
 
0.055 
(5.18)*** 
 
      
      Obs. 4671 6000 2977 1876 4344 
      
Notes: (1) See Tables 2 & 3. (2) All equations have been estimated with the full 
sample, a second order polynomial and the same controls as before. (2) Partner 
alignment = the regional and the local government are considered to be aligned if 
the mayor and/or the main partner of a coalition belong to the same party; Bloc 
alignment = the regional and the local government are considered to be aligned if 
the mayor’s party belong to the same ideological bloc; No local parties = 
municipalities where local parties get represented excluded from the analysis; 
Two parties = sample includes only municipalities where the two main parties 
get more than 80% of the vote; Alternative distance = distance to change in seat 
majority computed allowing migration of votes between parties. 
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Figure B.1: Continuity of the forcing variable. Full sample 
  
 Histogram McCrary test 
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Figure B.2: Continuity of the forcing variable. Concurrent vs. Alternating elections 
  a) Concurrent elections 
  Histogram McCrary test 
  
 
  b) Alternating elections 
 
  Histogram McCrary test 
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Computing the vote margin 
 
An example. The forcing variable for our RDD is the Regional incumbent’s 
bloc vote margin, computed as the ratio between the minimum number of 
votes needed for the ideological bloc of the regional incumbent to gain/lose 
the majority of seats in the local council and the total votes cast at the local 
elections.  
 
Table B.3: Example of how the Regional Incumbent’s bloc vote margin is computed 
 
Panel a)  Initial seat allocation Panel b)  Final seat allocation 
Ideological 
blocs 
Regional 
opposition  
Regional  
incumbent  
Regional 
opposition  
Regional 
incumbent  
Parties P1 P2 P3 P4 P1 P2 P3 P4 
Votes (vi) 95 957 207 1116 95 957 152 820 
Vote share  
(vi/V) 0.04 0.40 0.09 0.47 0.05 0.47 0.08 0.41 
Seats  (si) 0 6 1 6 0 7 1 5 
Seat share (αi)   0.16 0.84     
                            Panel c) Seat allocation 
Divisors                                                          Comparison numbers 
1 95.00 957.00 207.00 
 
1116.00 95.00 957.00 152.00 820.00 
2 47.50 478.50 103.50 558.00 47.50 478.50 76.00 410.00 
3 31.67 319.00 69.00 372.00 31.67 319.00 50.67 273.33 
4 23.75 239.25 51.75 279.00 23.75 239.25 38.00 205.00 
5 19.00 191.40 41.40 223.20 19.00 191.40 30.40 164.00 
6 15.83 159.50 34.50 186.00 15.83 159.50 25.33 136.67 
7 13.57 136.71 29.57 159.43 13.57 136.71 21.71 117.14 
8 11.88 119.63 25.88 139.50 11.88 119.63 19.00 102.50 
9 10.56 106.33 23.00 124.00 10.56 106.33 16.89 91.11 
10 9.50 95.70 20.70 111.60 9.50 95.70 15.20 82.00 
11 8.64 87.00 18.82 101.45 8.64 87.00 13.82 74.55 
12 7.92 79.75 17.25 93.00 7.92 79.75 12.67 68.33 
13 7.31 73.62 15.92 85.85 7.31 73.62 11.69 63.08 
υi   55 296     
Vote distance 
(υ)   351       
Vote margin    
 
14.67%      
 
The computation of this quantity is not straightforward and requires paying 
attention to the workings of the procedure used to assign votes to seats, the 
‘d’Hondt rule’. As we already explained, under this rule the votes for each 
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party are divided by 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. The resulting quotas or comparison 
numbers are ranked and a fixed number of seats is allocated using this 
ranking. Panel (a) in Table B.3 illustrates how the ‘d’Hondt’ rule works 
with an hypothetical example with four parties, two belonging to the 
ideological bloc of the regional incumbent (P3 and P4) and two belonging 
to the ideological bloc of the opposition (P1 and P2). The ideological bloc 
of the regional incumbent got 1,323 votes, a 56% of the votes cast at the 
municipal elections, and 7 out of 13 seats, 6 for P4 and 1 for P3, and so it 
holds the mayoralty. On the opposition side, all 6 seats went to party P2.  
 
In Panel c) we detail the procedure followed to allocate seats, showing the 
comparison numbers obtained after dividing the votes of each party by each 
divisor. The first seat has been allocated to P4 with a comparison number of 
1,116.00, the second one to P2 with a comparison number of 957, the third 
one again to P4 with comparison number of 558, and so on. The last seat 
allocated is the sixth seat of P2 (and of the opposition’s bloc) with a 
comparison number of 159.50, which was slightly higher than the 
comparison number of the seventh seat of P4 (which would have been the 
eighth seat of the regional incumbent’s bloc). Intuitively, in order for the 
opposition bloc to have a majority of seats, votes have to be detracted from 
parties in the other bloc (or added to the parties in this bloc) to raise the first 
of these comparison numbers above the second one. In Panel (b) of Table 
B.3 we show a situation where this happened. To move from the initial seat 
allocation in Panel (a), with a majority of the regional incumbent’s 
ideological bloc, to the final seat allocation in Panel (b), with a majority of 
seats for the regional opposition, we have subtracted 351 votes from the 
incumbent’s bloc, allocating these votes amongst parties in the bloc in 
proportion to their initial vote share (i.e., 55 subtracted to P3 and 296 to 
P4). The ratio between these 351 votes and the total number of votes is 
14.67% and is our measure of the Regional incumbent’s bloc vote margin. 
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Chapter 5  
Concluding remarks 
 
This dissertation examines several aspects of the political economy of 
government spending centering the analysis on two specific issues: the 
political determinants of public expenditures (analyzed in Chapters 2 and 
4); and the effects of the tactical allocation of spending on voter behavior 
(studied in Chapters 3 and 4). The three empirical studies that constitute the 
dissertation focus on the Spanish case. The studies reveal that no matter 
which political system is in place, there always exist room for the 
misallocation of public resources targeted with electoral goals; yet, political 
tactics tend to adapt to the constraints set by each institutional framework. 
This concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the three studies 
and discusses several implications.  
 
The study of the distribution of road investment in Restoration times 
presented in Chapter 2 shows that the allocation of administrative resources 
among provinces depended on two sets of factors. The first one is the 
individual characteristics of the members of the Parliament (MPs). In this 
sense, the results suggest that both the share of MPs with a party leadership 
position and the provincial share of “propios” (i.e. senior MPs that were 
attached to a particular district and that did not respect the turn at some 
point) mattered for the distribution of resources. This last result, joint to the 
fact that the MPs’ seniority is found to be statistically insignificant, reveals 
that only a particular type of senior MPs (the “propios”) had the ability to 
attract resources.  
 
The second factor that had an impact on the allocation of spending during 
the Restoration was the regime’s global search for stability. During the 
early stages of the Restoration regime, those provinces with a higher share 
of districts that did not follow the two-party alternation system and, 
specially, those electing candidates from third parties, received fewer road 
funds, probably as a punishment strategy to have elections under control. 
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Over time, however, there was a shift in the political tactics of the Regime 
and, by the end of the nineteenth century, the provinces that elected more 
candidates from the minority parties (the non-hegemonic parties) were 
favored with larger shares of road investment. This fact coincided with the 
weakening of the Regime and the socioeconomic changes in the country 
(one of them being the introduction of the universal male suffrage in 1890). 
 
The results of this first study posit a puzzling question: why should the 
ruling party of a “weakly institutionalized polity” – where public officials 
can use coercion, violence and mass fraud – have any incentive to skew 
public resources in favor of particular groups to win elections? The findings 
– consistent with Ellman and Wantcheckon (2009) – suggest that when the 
opposition reaches a degree of political power that threatens the regime, 
concessions may be granted in order to keep the social and political 
situation under control. Electoral competition under this type of polities has 
not received much attention to date and further research should be done in 
this direction as electoral dynamics differ substantially from those in an 
established democracy. Such examination of electoral dynamics could be 
applied, for instance, to evaluate whether the tactics used by the Mexican 
PRI to remain in power for over seventy years – see Diaz-Cayeros et al. 
(2006) – remained unchanged over such a long period of time. 
 
Further, the lack of economic criteria in road planning may have 
detrimental and persistent effects to be considered (although not estimated 
in this dissertation). As argued in chapter 2, neglecting economic factors 
may explain, in part, the fact that investments in large transport networks 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in Spain did not spur 
economic growth in the country (Herranz-Loncán, 2007).  
 
Although the situation described in Chapter 2 took place in the 19th 
century, pork-barrel politics still exist nowadays in Spain, as shown by 
several studies. The findings in Solé-Ollé (2012) suggest that tactical 
motives played an important role in the distribution of infrastructure 
investment across regions during the period 1964-2004 in Spain as funds 
were skewed towards regions with close elections (in terms of vote margin 
and votes needed to obtain an additional seat) and regions aligned with the 
central government. In this line, Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005) also show 
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that political factors – mainly, the electoral productivity of investments – 
were one of the main determinants of the regional allocation of 
infrastructure investment over 1987-1996. From another perspective, Bel 
(2012) argues that over the last three centuries the Spanish central 
government’s investment in infrastructure has been used to centralize the 
transportation system around Madrid, its political capital, thus largely 
disregarding efficiency criteria. 
 
Besides political reasons, socioeconomic factors are also behind the 
allocation of public spending. Governments have widely used spending as a 
means of redistributing rents from high to low-income individuals. On the 
one side, EU structural funds are a clear example. Specifically, “Objective 
1” funds, which are granted to NUTS2 regions with a GDP per capita level 
below 75% of the EU average, have served to increase the growth of the 
recipients (Becker et al., 2010). A closer look at this issue reveals 
heterogeneous effects: in regions with low capacity to administer the funds, 
grants are inefficiently spent with consumption – instead of production – 
purposes and may become a source of political corruption (Becker et al. 
2012). On the other side, inefficient public spending can also arise from 
public employment. In Italy, for instance, public jobs have redistributed 
income between the North and the South but, at the same time, the South 
has become overly dependent on public employment as a permanent source 
of income (Alesina et al., 2001). In Spain a similar vicious cycle arises in 
the case of the Plan for Rural Employment (PER), the topic of interest in 
the third chapter of the dissertation. 
 
Chapter 3 aims at estimating the impact of the introduction of the PER on 
the electoral support for the incumbent governments to assess the 
possibility that jobs where directly exchanged in return for votes at the local 
and central elections. At the central government level, the findings of this 
study suggest that, in general elections, the establishment of the PER 
increased by 3 percentage points the vote share for the socialist party in the 
rural municipalities of the treated regions – which represents an average 
increase of 8.6%. The study also examines the evolution of this effect over 
time and shows that it remained persistent, suggesting that despite the 
increase in democratic culture the ties between patrons (politicians) and 
clients (voters) did not weaken. Further, the increase in the levels of 
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monitoring of the process that happened in the 90s to reduce fraud does not 
seem to have lowered the capacity of the incumbent to obtain electoral 
rewards. At the local government level, there is no evidence that the PER 
increased the mayors’ probability of re-election in local elections and 
neither there is evidence of a reverse coattails effect by which presidential 
candidates had an electoral advantage in municipalities where the mayor 
represents their party. This suggests two feasible explanations: the role of 
mayors is that of mere intermediaries who deliver jobs; and/or the only 
benefit from the entire program which voters take into consideration when 
casting their vote was the unemployment subsidy obtained thanks to the 
PER. 
 
In terms of policy implications, considering the findings of Chapter 3, a 
logic question that arises is whether the program should be suppressed. The 
answer is not straightforward. The main drawback of the program is the 
high degree of discretion that local politicians have to allocate PER jobs. 
The agrarian subsidy per se is not the main issue of concern. All in all, the 
policy has a combination of factors that, somehow, ends up distributing 
welfare benefits to low-income households with the main criterion being 
the politician’s decision.     
 
As far as demographics concerns, Jofre-Monseny (2012) shows that the 
PER caused a reduction in the flows of migration leaving rural 
municipalities in Andalusia and Extremadura (essentially due to lower out-
migration rates) and increased unemployment rates by 15% in the affected 
municipalities. A question that remains open is the consequences of the 
PER on the economic growth of these two regions. Although at first sight 
the detrimental impact of the program seems obvious, it would be 
interesting to quantify to which extent the effect is driven by the PER. 
However, the main limitation to undertake such analysis is the lack of 
income data in the pre-treatment period, disaggregated at the municipality 
level.  
 
Finally, the question evaluated in Chapter 4 is “Does partisan alignment 
between different layers of government have electoral and material returns 
for co-partisans?” The results found in this chapter can be summarized as 
follows. In close races, municipalities aligned with the regional government 
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obtain on average 83% more per capita transfers and their incumbents gain 
11% more votes at the local elections. The effect on transfers is very large, 
compared with previous RDD results in other countries, and further light 
should be shed on why Spain behaves differently. 
 
This study also evaluates the possibility that the partisan effect is not 
homogeneous across municipalities. To test for this possibility, the analysis 
focuses on three important issues that may potentially impact either the 
allocation of transfers or the electoral results: the timing of the elections at 
the different layers of government (i.e. whether they are concurrent or 
alternating); the competitiveness of regional elections; and the funds 
available to regional governments. The findings suggest that the effect of 
alignment is stronger when regional and local elections are held on the 
same day, in regions with less competitive regional elections, and in regions 
with more budget resources. 
 
The effect of partisan alignment has also been estimated considering other 
layers of government. In the case of upper-local governments, the results 
show a statistically significant effect, while no effect is found in the case of 
central government transfers. The last result may reflect the fact that central 
governments lack of specific knowledge about the political situation of each 
municipality. This would be consistent with the decentralization theory, 
according to which lower-level governments have the greatest amount of 
information. Also, the study examines the effect of alignment on current 
transfers received by municipalities from upper-level governments. In this 
case, no statistically significant effect has been found, as expected, provided 
that current transfers are mainly allocated using formulas. 
 
A good process of fiscal decentralization has to ensure not only the 
provision of resources to meet the expenditure responsibilities devolved to 
sub-central governments but also that such provision guarantees economic 
efficiency and equity amongst the members of the federation. If the 
normative approach is omitted and tactical policies are in place, the benefits 
of decentralization (a better matching of preferences and increased 
accountability) can be undermined as shown along chapter 4. The 
inexistence of a relationship between current transfers and partisan 
alignment found in this fourth chapter suggests that formula-based grants 
Chapter 5.Concluding remarks 
144 
 
are more effective in avoiding political interferences and, therefore, its use 
is preferable (although not fully exempt of political interference). 
 
A complex issue that is not tackled in this last study is the quantification of 
the aggregate over-spending due to the misallocation of funds to co-partisan 
governments in municipalities with close elections. To do that, one would 
need to calculate the efficient level of public goods.  
 
Finally, there are questions related to these three studies that are left for 
further research. First, chapter 3 has focused on public spending as a 
political tool to be used as a “stick and carrot” to limit a growing 
opposition, however, no mention has been made to the revenue side, i.e. the 
source of funding of such investment. This could have also been subject to 
political manipulation to extract rents from opponents of the Regime. 
Although nowadays public investment in Spain is funded through resources 
that come mainly from a common pool and the burden of taxation is borne 
by a large number of individuals, the tax scheme in the 19th century was not 
too sophisticated. For instance, the “cédulas personales” (introduced in 
1874) were a tax that had to be paid by most of the citizens over 14 but was 
dependent on the approval of the mayors (Portillo Navarro, 1997).  
 
A second topic of interest that could be explored is related to chapter 4. 
Considering the large number of corruption cases currently arising in Spain, 
and the perception that corrupt politicians are not sufficiently punished in 
elections1, it would be interesting to see the role that public spending and 
partisan alignment play.  Up until now, it has been proven that the 
availability of information affects the vote loss of the corrupt incumbent 
(Costas-Pérez et al. 2012). But, in addition, it could also be the case that if 
aligned governments are perceived as efficient officials more capable to 
                                                           
1
 Despite facing a major corruption scandal in the region of Valencia, the People’s Party 
obtained a majority of seats in the 2011 regional election. As quoted in the website of the 
national media: “El PP de Camps mejora su mayoría en Valencia a pesar de Gürtel y el 
PSOE se hunde” (Camps’s People’s Party enlarges its majority in Valencia despite Gürtel 
and the PSOE sinks). Source: http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20110524/pp-gana-valencia-
mejora-resultados-pesar-del-caso-gurtel-61-escrutado/434048.shtml  
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attract resources to their municipalities, this could deflect attention from 
corruption scandals. In this case the issue to be analysed would be whether 
corrupt incumbents have lower vote losses if they are aligned with the 
upper-level government, and thus have received larger transfers to invest.  
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